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WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FERZAN ÖZPETEK’S FILMS 
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This study aims to inaugurate a thorough reading of two films by Ferzan Özpetek 
that employ Orient as their setting and major narrative element, Hamam (1997) and 
Harem Suare (1999), to examine their complicity with the Orientalist practices of 
representation. The discussion is informed by just as it responds to some of the 
crucial issues within postcolonial theory. Inspired by the deconstructive critique, the 
intrinsic relation between the Orientalist discourse and the general economy of 
Western subject formation has been elaborated through the analysis of the films. A 
three-fold approach has been pursued to be able to diagnose the latent Orientalism 
signing the films, since three constitutive moments authorize the attempt of giving a 
static form to the Orient. Therefore visual, aural and sexual registers of the 
Orientalist figuration has been explored.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Orientalism, Cinema, Ferzan Özpetek, Representation, Deconstruction, 
Postcolonial Theory. 
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Bu çalışma Ferzan Özpetek’in konu ve  mekan olarak Doğu’yu  gereksindiren iki 
filminin Oryantalist temsil pratikleriyle olan ilişkisini  araştırmak amacıyla; Hamam 
(1997)ve Harem Suare (1999) adlı filmlerin ayrıntılı bir okumasını amaçlamaktadır. 
Tezde yürütülen tartışma Postkolonyal kuram içerisindeki bir takım temel problemler 
tarafından belirlenmiştir ve  yine bu problemlere yanıt vermek çabasındadır. 
Yapıçözümcü eleştiriden esinlenilerek,  sözkonusu filmlerin çözümlemesi yoluyla  
Oryantalist söylem  ve Batılı özne oluşumun genel ekonomisi  arasında varolan içsel 
ilişki ayrıntılandırılarak açımlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Filmleri biçimlendiren örtük 
Oryantalizmi açık edebilmek amacıyla üç katmanlı bir yöntem izlenmiştir, çünkü 
Doğuya sabit bir biçim verme çabasını üç  kurucu an belirlemektedir. Bu nedenle, 
Oryantalist temsil görsel, işitsel ve cinsel ayrımlarının kuruculuğu  açısından 
incelenmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Oryantalizm (Şarkiyatçılık), Sinema, Ferzan Özpetek, Temsil 
Yapıçözüm, Postkolonyal Kuram. 
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And so she did: wandering up and down, and trying 
turn after turn, but always coming back to the house, 
do what she would. Indeed, once, when she turned a 
corner rather more quickly than usual, she ran 
against it before she could stop herself. 
 
‘It’s no use talking about it,’ Alice said, looking up 
at the house and pretending it was arguing with her. 
‘I’m not going in again, yet. I know I should have to 
get through the Looking-glass again – back into the 
old room – and there’d be an end of all my 
adventures!’ 
 
—Lewis Carroll, Through The Looking Glass 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
One of the puzzling challenges of the early childhood is surely learning orientation, 
which is basically learning to gain the sense of directions, to be able to posit oneself 
according to an abstract map which tells, for instance, what lies right or left side of you. 
This puzzle becomes even more intriguing when the elders finally manage to convince 
the child (which is, I suspect, always an attempt initially aims to re-prove the “fact” to 
themselves) that the earth is indeed like a ball squeezed from both of its poles. For the 
child, whose borders are still uncertain and “rational faculties” do not yet properly 
function, there remains the vexing question: If the world is actually like a ball, how we 
can name places East or West, since some place will be West if one stands at the right 
hand of it and will at the same time be East if one stands at the left hand of it?  Probably, 
no answer will truly satisfy this child who clings vainly to this simple fact, up until she 
will eventually give up debating on this little confusion. This surrender, which is only 
one among many, will also be her ticket to the world.  
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The world maps strikingly points to the same enigma of the inscription of the world. 
Being bird-eye view demonstrations of the world, they assume an imaginary spectator 
that owns the encompassing gaze over the whole globe, which is carefully sliced and 
flattened out to be properly projected. This so-called impersonal and all encompassing 
gaze that enables the map hides as much as it reveals about the world it represents. This 
point of view that situates itself in out-space seems to be a deliberate attempt to efface 
the terrestrial spectator that tries to bring the world into his own terms. To be able to see 
the whole world means also to be able to win it, this is practically learned from the long 
history of battles and discoveries. There seems to be an intimate relationship between 
the attempt to visualize and the constitution of the world. The world, that seems to lie 
naturally out there, is but always already the site that is marked with force. This marking 
engenders the difference, which properly distributes and labels the earth into 
geographies and territories and brings Terra, which means “country” in Latin, into 
being. Nonetheless, this difference that constitutes the world is not difference on its 
behalf; rather it is the difference from a certain “same”, whose norms are historically 
determined with dynamics of power. Then, the question of what actually operates the 
geographical (hence, cultural, economical, even onto-epistemological) allocation is itself 
a potential threat to the existing framework, which effaces its premises by naturalizing 
its own conclusions and reflects them back on the world it constitutes. 
 
Orientalism, which can be broadly called as the body of practices, institutions and 
manners destined to produce, circulate and disseminate the knowledge of Orient, had to 
wait Edward Said to receive the first extensive critical attention. Said, in his 
groundbreaking study, examined the development of Orientalist discourse via his 
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meticulous analysis of primarily British and French scholarly studies and artworks on 
and about Orient from the periods of seventeenth and nineteenth centuries to the media 
images and area studies of twentieth century. Despite numerous reworks, further 
contributions, important reformulations and affirmative criticisms that follow the path 
his work has opened, his analysis still holds invaluable critical value and provides many 
start points for any further discussion on Orientalism.  Three of them will be briefly 
mentioned, since they actually constitute my start point.  First is the broad definition of 
Orientalism given by Said in the introduction as “style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between the ‘Orient’ and ‘the 
Occident’” (Said, Orientalism 2). This ontological and epistemological distinction brings 
the Orient as an object of knowledge and thereby constitutes the identity of the West by 
this primary differentiation and objectification. This clarifies what Said means by saying 
that “the Orient is Orientalized”  
 
A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries 
between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, 
which they call “the land of the barbarians.” In other words, this universal 
practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space beyond “ours” which is 
“theirs” is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely 
arbitrary. I use the word “arbitrary” here because imaginative geography of 
the “our land- barbarian land” variety does not require that the barbarians 
acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for “us” to set up these boundaries 
in our minds; “they” become “they” accordingly, and both their territory and 
their mentality are designates as different from “ours”. (Said, Orientalism 54)     
 
With this definition, we may also avoid the futile effort to distinguish what the real 
Orient is, since places called “Orient” only come into being by taking the proper form 
and name.  Before this Heideggerian installation, before their entry into this primarily 
Western discourse that presences them forth as simply the “Orient”, they had an 
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ontological and epistemological constitution that was different in nature, not a natural 
and pure state as the quest for any “real” Orient assumes.  
 
Said’s analysis gives us the second important point with which we can deal with how 
this installation works. “The legitimacy of such knowledge as Orientalism was during 
the nineteenth century stemmed not from religious authority, as had been the case before 
the Enlightenment, but from what we can call the restorative citation of antecedent 
authority.”(Emphasis mine, Said 176)    He emphasizes the citationality, the inter-
textuality of Orientalism, how the discourse is built upon citing its own body of work. 
Then we can conclude that, like any other discourse, Orientalism may work only by 
constant circulation, repetition and citation. This citation re-validates, re-adjusts and re-
structures the discourse and is the only way for it to last and prosper. However, this 
necessary mechanism of citation is also the site for possible difference, deviation and 
transgression which may distort the discourse as well as maintain it.  
 
The final point that must be mentioned and taken over from Said is his remark on the 
visibility and Orientalism. “In all cases the Orient is for the European observer, and what 
is more, […] the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries 
for impartial impersonality. […] The Orient as a place of pilgrimage is one; so too the 
vision of Orient as spectacle, as tableau vivant.” (Said, Orientalism 158)   Why there is 
this obsessive desire on the part of Western intellect to visually demonstrate, to figure 
out, and to properly bring the Orient into light?  This visual quality that dominates the 
Oriental discourse is not only evident in, for instance, Oriental paintings, though it 
reveals this over-determination most successfully. The scholarly work mostly dealing 
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with linguistics, geography, history and ethnicity of the Orient also demonstrates a good 
deal of anxiety to bring the Orient into light with the heavy employment of strict 
categorizations, schemes, ideal types and maps. This visual characteristic that dominates 
the whole range of Oriental discourse could be read as a symptom of eidetic nature of 
Western Metaphysics and provide a critique of the foundations of Western Thought. 
 
I believe that film as a specific visual medium offers an excellent ground to such critique 
taking its impetus from the three theoretical remarks of Said mentioned above.  First of 
all, film, as the hegemonic visual medium of twentieth century, is one of the fiercest 
battlegrounds of representation where image, voice, writing, time, space and motion and 
by the same token basic philosophical positions are constantly reformulated and altered. 
Moreover, film, especially in its hegemonic Western form, already has a set of norms 
and practices with which it deals with other cultures and especially with Orient.  
Therefore, film could be a perfect ground to discuss the basic operations of distinction, 
citation and visualization on which Orientalism and hence Western Thought heavily 
depends to sustain themselves.  Nonetheless, these operations do not bring about a 
monolithic discourse and are not necessarily enunciated by essentially the Western 
subject. Two films of Ferzan Özpetek, Hamam (1997) and Harem Suare (1999) do 
indicate this point most splendidly than any other film could do. They do show a great 
variety of conflicting moments and are complex texts that are already negotiated with 
transgressions, deviations and even with a certain criticism of Orientalism that is 
primarily operated through explicit citation.  However, neither bringing such conflicts 
into ground especially with the help of sexual transgressions nor the so-called 
“indigenous” identity of the filmmaker is able to destabilize the Orientalist discourse 
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played out within these texts. On the contrary, I believe that they help to further 
consolidate and re-structure the Orientalist discourse whose primary aim of figuring  and 
locating the other should not be forgotten.  At the most fundamental level, this 
consolidation is executed by authentificating these texts with the help of apparently 
indigenous signature of Ferzan Özpetek.  This gesture of conceiving the non-Western 
author as “native informant” reveals how Orientalism vitally depends on truth 
production and the deliberate avoidance of the problem of mediation.  This 
authentification helps the Orientalist discourse to posit its own premises that construct 
the whole text as the immediate truth coming out of the mouth of the native informant as 
if what the “native” enunciates comes from a pure outside which lies beyond the 
Western mind-set . This tautological gesture is crucial for such discourse to operate and 
it works specifically by locating itself as the pre-discursive difference that cannot be 
bothered with necessary mediative quality of representation.  
  
Another instance that these films provide consolidation for the Orientalist discourse is 
the specific handling of visuality and narration to depict the Orient.  The visual regime 
of these films provides a rich and sensual picturesque quality for the Orient.  The Orient 
is again demonstrated as a site for pleasure and transgressive sexuality with excessive 
tactility, sensuality and richness. By such gesture, the Orient is over-determined with 
desire of a self that is transferred to the other, which in the end helps to draw the line 
that separate and constitute them better. This anxiety to bring the Orient to foreground, 
to give it a form and to visualize is not far from the desire to produce knowledge of it. 
Both operations point towards an asymmetric relationship that is marked by power and 
domination of one over the other. Therefore this anxiety of visibility, which is not even 
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confronted or exposed by Özpetek, should be thoroughly examined with a philosophical 
inquiry which will dwell on the eidetic feature of thought and its intimate relationship to 
the subject formation.  
 
This eidetic feature of Western thought is also intimately related to the logo-centrism it 
bears on. The hegemony of speech and the word over writing to proclaim truth also 
helps to clarify the anxiety to narrate which attempts to conclude and finalize what it 
depicts specifically in its conventional Western instance. Hence, classical narrative 
operates to stand for and conclude about what it tells. This compulsion to narrate 
exposes the desire to reach a final form and is heavily present in the films mentioned.  
 
Second, such desire that dominates these texts can be read as an excessive anxiety in this 
specific context to delineate the East, which strangely resists proper handling in both 
representative modes of theory and arts and hence becomes the favorite site for such 
attempts. Again in this special context, it can be read as a desire to re-create an Ottoman 
history and identity, which is surely a long-standing controversial and confusing issue 
specifically for the Turkish Modernity.  
 
Within this context, the function of voice-over in the film deserves a good deal of 
discussion. Voice in film is generally employed to give a sense of unity and to connect 
the series of images and narratives into a coherent main plot.  It manipulates the 
spectator to choose and select from the multiple elements that constitutes the  
mise en scene, editing and character. Even the most controlled visual tableaux cannot 
totally control the items to be selected and perceived. The cinematic image is potentially 
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open to dissemination even in the most extreme controlled cases and potentially has the 
power to multiply the subject positions. Voice-over can be seen as a remedy to block 
this potential proliferation and to re-introduce a stabile point from which the whole 
series of images and events to be organized.  The voice centralizes, selects, reveals and 
highlights some elements as much as it conquers, excludes, silences others and therefore 
operates upon the series of images to bring about a secure identity position. The 
employment of voice-over that connects the sub-plots and intrudes to rule the overall 
meaning in Harem Suare can lead us to conclude that there is an over-determined 
anxiety establishes and operates the text that will be analyzed and exposed in detail.  
 
This crisis and the counter-actions that try to efface or resolve it brings us back to 
citation and repetition, which are supplemental for Orientalism to last, and  the 
“irreducible cognitive failure” (Spivak, SR 207)  in bringing the Orient to foreground. 
This failure is as unavoidable as the failure of any attempt of counter-hegemonic 
representation as Spivak illustrates with the example of Subaltern Studies. Every attempt 
to bring the Orient or the subaltern whose presence is marked with a certain negativity 
and non-presence will face with the handicap of handling this absence-presence with the 
specular tools of thought, which depends on a more or less verifiable presence. The 
films of Ferzan Özpetek are also failed attempts in this sense that cannot avoid 
paradoxes and incoherencies of this lack of presence. Like any other texts they carry 
their own limits and handicaps within their margins. Nonetheless, this surplus that 
cannot be properly effaced from the text does not mean that they automatically hold an 
overt political/philosophical counter position. Indeed I believe that this essential 
deviation and difference must be understood as something essentially neutral, yet which 
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can be worked on and strategically utilized to destabilize the text. This can be done only 
by affirming such attempt as a project which will never be completely achieved.  
 
Keeping such theoretical framework in mind, I aim to develop a discussion of 
Orientalism around the key terms of visuality, citation and difference with the help of 
the films mentioned. My primary aim is to launch a critique of Western metaphysics that 
I claim to be intimately connected to the discourse of Orientalism, and it is radically 
different from blaming and correcting whatever representative frame that these films 
bring forth. If Orientalist practices, meanings and representations do subsist and can 
always find a place within the realm of culture, then they must be far from being little 
mistakes or prejudices that can be simply corrected by referring back to historical or 
sociological “facts”. Rather, they must be taken seriously and read as an important 
symptom of phallogocentric philosophical discourse that penetrates itself upon every 
single thing with a violence disguised in the appearance of benevolent medical 
operation.  
 
Therefore, my discussion begins with a brief summary of certain problems and questions 
the post- colonial critique posits and follows a trajectory that pursues the different 
contributions and methodologies of prominent figures such as Said and Spivak.  
 
In the next chapter, the relation between Orientalism and visuality will be studied.  
Linked to the specific handling of visuality within Western metaphysics that has been 
critically demonstrated by Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida, this connection will be 
discussed in detail on this visual characteristic with the help of the context the films 
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provide. The visual regime that represents the Orient as an ahistorical and timelessly still 
locality, characterized by excessive sensual visuality will be discussed according to such 
theoretical scheme.     
 
Within the following chapter, the argument will be further developed by a detailed 
discussion of the strategies of voice-over usage and narrative structure both films 
employ and the gesture of authentification that has been mentioned previously. 
 
The discussion will move next to the discussion of identity in general and the questions 
of gender and sexuality in particular with focusing on the  “Oriental” settings that the 
films heavily employed:. Both of these settings are marked with transgressive sexual 
desires for the part of the Western subject and constructed as enigmatic places that 
signify the hidden treasures and joys of the Orient.  
 
Finally, in the conclusion chapter, the whole argument will be revisited. An overall 
analysis will be given on the question where to locate both films within the Orientalist 
discourse.  
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2 SURVEYING POST-COLONIAL STUDIES 
 
2.1 Said and Orientalism 
 
An introduction is a selection which is assumed to represent, that is to stand for or in the 
name of, a body of work by sketching out the most broad lines and most significant 
features. Or, else by following an imaginary boundary, it attempts to establish what it 
aims to introduce. An introduction may draw on the generalities, the most common traits 
of what it introduces, or else it may focus on the extremities, the most un-common 
features of what it aims to introduce. Either case, it selects by the same way it excludes. 
This introduction will be no different. Like any other exemplary of what is called as 
“introduction”, this brief explanatory section will be necessarily partial, excluding and 
sometimes ex-orbitant to what will be discussed later. 
 
Secondly, it will necessarily deviate from the pre-determined route that had been 
presumed because the field that will be introduced is far from being a field “proper” 
though it is not simply possible to say that it lies outside or essentially counter to 
institutionalization or it does not tend to become an academic sub-discipline. Indeed, if 
one considers the various publications of readers and volumes dedicated to the field 
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broadly called as “postcolonial studies”, one may be inclined to think that it has already 
become a sub-discipline within the academic division of labor. 
 
Then the problematic which will inevitably lead this introduction errant concerning what 
it intends to introduce, which is the field of post-colonial studies, is not the suppositions 
of insufficient maturation into a discipline or ambivalent institutional identity. Then 
what causes this difficulty is the ambivalent nature of its focus and locus. It could be 
best illustrated as a constant movement on ground, which is itself also moving. First of 
all, the subject of the critique is vast and dispersed from the institutional and academic 
practices to the grand Western metaphysical texts, from literature to international policy, 
from media productions to feminism and psychoanalysis both as theoretical work and 
clinical practice: all interwoven, adjacent and intersecting each other. While constantly 
targeting the Western subject, it also implicit or explicitly point to an ontological and 
epistemological condition for the non-Western subject with the concern not to commit 
the same ventriloquism that it exposes and criticizes in the Western discourse. Then, 
post-colonial studies lack its subject proper, as the “subaltern”, oriental or the non-
Western (all of which are different subject positions not different names of a monolithic 
position) subject can be found only at the margins of what has been inscribed as history, 
scientific discourse, literature or film, not by being present but by constituting the trace 
that has been inscribed but crossed out, by deferment.  The trace of the other points to a 
presence which “does not henceforth exists” or/and (both at the same time) “never exists 
yet” as the paradoxical statement of Derrida on mother language points to (Derrida, 
Monolingualism 69).  Very much alike, the topography it traverses along is varied, 
discrete yet very much related and it is subject to further modifications from almost all 
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disciplines such as philosophy, psychoanalysis and literary theory. It tactically, 
strategically, and even “essentially” allies with and also confronts to feminism, post-
structuralism, cultural theory and so on. Even the naming and most basic notions of the 
field are still subject to intense debates: like the controversy on the “post” prefix whether 
it implies an “after” or a “beyond” and the debates on naming subject matter such as 
neo-colonialism, Third World, East/ West and South/North divisions. These 
controversies and debates signal the active crisis and rich critical potentiality that the 
field promises rather than an infertile stasis of a self-content. This un-properness is 
actually the strength and promise of the field while making the attempt to “introduce”, to 
name and summarize all the more difficult.  
 
Being aware of its exclusion, partiality and   dispersed nature,  my introduction takes 
Edward Said’s analysis on Orientalism as a start point , rather than giving a linear 
historical account of the field which precedes Said’s work afar. It is well known that the 
first significant intellectual moves from the periphery, or the Third World precedes far 
Edward Said’s analysis on Orientalism, largely feeding from and in turn feeds the anti-
colonial movements following the post-war, especially by French intellectuals 
responding to the Algerian resistance. Nonetheless, Fanon should be mentioned briefly 
here as one of few figures that deviate from the standard receptions of Third world anti-
colonialist theories, which opened the path for the post-colonial studies. 
 
Frantz Fanon’s theoretical work combines a certain existentialism, psychoanalysis and 
Hegelian-Marxian dialectics to shed a light on the dynamics of the colonized and 
colonizer as complex subject formations and it compels to invoke psychoanalytic 
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concepts such as unconscious, fantasy, desire and identification. His theoretical work 
retroactively attracted much interest in the wake of post-structuralist articulation into the 
post-colonial discourse and subjected to different re-readings as in the case of Homi 
Bhabha’s introduction to the re-print of White Skins, Black Masks (1967) that principally 
points to irreducible tensions inherent in Fanon’s dialectical historical progressiveness 
that opens up the most complex moves of his thought. (The difference between the 
reception of Fanon’s works is very well illustrated when one compares Bhabha’s 
introduction from  the re-print of White Skins, Black Masks (1967), with Sartre’s for the 
Wretched of the Earth( 1964).) His position as an anti-colonial thinker is still and from 
time to time bound to an existential emphasis on the subject as the active agent that 
engenders itself by a Hegelian sublation by negation and a (though non-proper) version 
of nationalism as an umbrella term to establish an ambivalent identity dialectically 
stemming from its Otherness for the reified colonized to recover the trauma of 
degradation and long-standing exploitation. However, his body of work is far more 
complex and promising for the up-coming post-colonial critique than most of its 
contemporaneous theory-politics such as Negritude movement or naïve materialism that 
reduces everything to class antagonisms. His great contribution to the upcoming critique 
is his mobilization of psychoanalysis and related notions of sexual difference, desire and 
fantasy to deal with the intricate power politics invested in imperialism and its more-
than-simple violence upon the psyche of both parts that in turn shapes the imperial/ 
colonial practice itself.  Fanon’s analysis pushes the anti-colonial critique on its move to 
divert from simple dualism and vulgar reduction to economy-politics by opening up a 
space where racial difference is marked by a sexual difference with an emphasis on 
identification processes and hence subject formations. This approach is promising for 
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especially for its attempt to relate the politics of dominance and social oppression to a 
certain symptomology of positioning other for consolidating self. This pathology of the 
colonizer self is also the remedy for the colonized other with a double move of negation 
in Fanon’s analysis which will inevitably lead to an emancipatory moment deferred to 
the future. Fanon’s analysis is still far from the sophistication that poststructuralist 
challenge brought to the opposition between ideology and truth, or on a more concrete 
level between “natural” laws of economy and “cultural” differences. Meyda Yeğenoğlu 
demonstrates that: 
 
Positioning the colonizer and the colonized other in a relation of dialectical 
opposition as in the Hegelian model of master/slave, self/other opposition 
suggests that the politics of subversion resides in the act of inversion of such 
opposites. Such a strategy of reversal, which forgets that the reversal itself 
remains locked within the same logic, should be seen as an inevitable extension 
of the adoption of a totalizing dialectics of self and other. (Yeğenoğlu 59-60) 
 
But his work pulsates with and preserves much of the ambivalence that later theorists, 
primarily such as Said. Since, Said’s critique will be different from un-problematized 
Third-Worldisms that base themselves on problematic authenticities, ethnicities and 
simple-minded economic determinisms that confine the issue of racism to an 
unsophisticated version of ideology. Of course this does not mean that post-structuralism 
solve the knot at once and totally absolved the former issues to free the field from its 
impediments, rather it exposes their being irresolvable aporias, which, yet and for that 
reason,   cannot be given away as Spivak’s work brilliantly exemplifies. (Spivak, PCCI 
136) 
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Edward Said primarily owes his deserved reputation to his 1979 study called 
Orientalism which is itself the first and foremost part of a series of studies such as The 
Question of Palestine and Covering Islam. He builds up a meticulous analysis of the 
specific instances of Orientalism as a constitutive frame through which phallogocentric 
Western “stance” receives, inserts and en-genders an Oriental object in accordance with 
a historical self-positioning that justifies its superiority. 
 
Edward Said was attentive to the critique of imperialism enunciated by anti-colonialist 
thinkers such as Fanon. Different from these thinkers, his interest will be focused 
sharply on a “mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary- scholarship, 
imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” called  Orientalism 
which had been considered as a popular nineteenth century  engagement so far in 
specifically Middle Eastern culture within a wide range such as  anthropology, 
philology, archaeology, painting and literature. (Said, Orientalism 2) The strength and 
importance of Said’s analysis is not merely due to its novelty and uniqueness in its 
critique that aims high-calibrated Western intellectual efforts to produce knowledge of  
the Oriental in respectful fields. Since as early as 1960s, Anwar Abdel Malek had 
initiated a critique of Orientalism which he posited as a specific practice of Western 
knowledge and pointed to the implicit assumptions behind its logic of operation.  He 
pointed to the inherent assumption that Orientalist studies posit Oriental subjects as 
being incapable for enunciating and analyzing their own conditions of being. 
 
Said follows and also radically bends this line of criticism toward a groundbreaking 
analysis that re-formulates the relation of Orientalism to a dynamically conceived 
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Western Imperialism/ (neo) colonialism. Said weaves his approach from a variety of 
theoretical frameworks such as provided by Foucault and Gramsci while at the same 
time  he utilizes  various concepts such as  psychoanalytically inspired  one such as 
desire and fantasy and literary analysis techniques to broach Orientalist texts. 
Nonetheless, his method cannot be reduced to none of these theoretical positions and 
this irreducible and plural approach gives much of the strength and potential to his 
analysis  that at the same leave it vulnerable to criticisms. 
 
His handling of imperial discourse and Orientalism as its specific yet constitutive 
instance is different from previous perceptions which conceives colonial practices with a 
strong economic determinism and sees it as the simple outcome of economic 
exploitation. This is fundamentally due to the fact that such economic determinism and 
consequently teleological euro-centric revolutionism shares most of the premises of 
what Said calls “latent Orientalism” with its bourgeoisie counter-part. Even when such 
position advocates a universal liberation from economic exploitation, such redemption 
stays largely Eurocentric and formulated as a utopian moment where all cultural 
difference will be melt in a post-revolutionary sameness.  
 
On the other hand, approaches relying merely on “ideology” conceive colonial 
representations as a subterfuge: that subverts and hides the “real” one for the purposes of 
legitimization as if a real other is immune to the material effects of ideology that alter 
and shape the reality. Paradoxically, if ideology has only the power to manipulate the 
appearances and representations but has no effect on “real” things, then the whole 
operation of ideology suddenly enters a grave crisis. Of course, ideology in Althusser 
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and Gramsci is much more sophisticated and intricate considering how ideology shapes 
the reality, yet it still preserves the problematic distinction between the domain of 
ideology and truth that waits for the critical agent to unveil itself.   Ideology as the only 
term, then, cannot respond to the complicity in colonial discourse such as Orientalism 
where knowledge and lies, science and pseudo-science, fantasy and reality are woven 
into each other and no final decision can be easily made without an essential failure. 
 
On the other hand, Said’s analysis of Orientalist discourse and structures, though at 
times glimpses back at this opposition which is almost impossible to surpass, sweeps the 
ground by carrying the discussion away from the question of  truth, validity of 
knowledge or  aesthetic judgment. His ambivalent emotional attitude towards the 
masters of the field whose motives and fears he harshly exposes and criticizes while 
expressing admiration and even empathy for their painful, sometimes creative efforts 
grasps the reader with surprise. Further, Said’s concern is not primarily to disproof the 
validity of knowledge that has been accumulated within the field, but rather to give us an 
account how, for whom and especially under which circumstances this knowledge is 
desired, produced and circulated. 
 
Such re-formulation reveals the discursive nature of knowledge, in accordance with 
what Foucault calls as regime of truth, and its intricate relation to power, an infinite 
series of complex moves on each other which is more difficult to understand than it 
seems at the first glance. First of all, this necessary relational bind is not instrumental, 
that means knowledge is not simply subjected to and determined by the demands of 
power. In this specific case, the Orientalist is not necessarily a zealous patriot or agent 
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of, let us say, East India Company, but rather whose conditions, standpoint and even the 
opportunity to produce the knowledge of Orient is historically marked by the (omni) 
presence of Empire within the Orient. This term “historical” does not only refer to the 
material presence of the Western imperial force in Orient but also to the fictional quality 
of history itself which carries the marks of fantasy and desire of the subject that inscribes 
it. 
 
With Said, the question whether the knowledge on Orient is right or wrong shifts its 
ground and leaves its place to the question of how and under what conditions this 
knowledge has been produced and how it gains its circulative power to carry it to the 
collective common sense of Western mind which is shared both in high and popular 
instances. This circulation and citation is the constitutive moment for Orientalism to 
become a discourse proper, which will shape and normalize what it inscribes. One 
method for such operation, as Said brilliantly exposes in the Orientalist masters’ 
language, is the ontological constitution of the subject matter maintained by the claim of 
transparency and immediateness which is invoked by a “scientific”, impersonal style. 
 
[…] that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the 
Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of 
representation that make the Orient visible, clear, “there” in discourse about it. 
(Said, Orientalism 22) 
 
This operation of pointing toward the Orient, this seemingly transparent transmission of 
what has been perceived by the Western scholar/traveler/artist is the constitutive 
moment for an Orient to be the Orient. That is how it is signed and therefore gains its 
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name and figure. Said draws our attention to the two fundamental operations through 
which the discourse of Orientalism is founded.  
 
One is the meticulous, almost obsessive effort to name, catalogue and differentiate the 
Oriental, which is exclusively evident in the realm of philology. The immense effort to 
sort and classify the Oriental (especially Semitic) languages marks and also effaces the 
desire of the Western scholar to excavate the origin of and hence constitute the common 
Christian- European identity, which was  hardly historically self-evident  when one 
considers the vast difference between European cultures.  Language plays the lead role 
in such project and one does not surprise considering its archaic relation to Western 
metaphysics.  The first sentences of the Bible and the myth of Adam as the human 
prototype, his quasi-divine power to name which has been borrowed from Judeo-
Christian God may be evoked alongside the historically contingent transformation of 
Greco-Latin language into the official language of Christianity.  The first point will help 
us to conceive the critical role of language through its almost-mystical power to name 
and, hence to let be things which would otherwise be undifferentiated and nebulous. 
Therefore, entrance to language means to crossing to presence and gain form, which will 
in turn lend the enunciator the position of master over things that he names. The 
nomenclature theory, which has single-handedly dominated the reception of language 
until structuralism, signals the symptom of obsession with origins when dealing with 
linguistic phenomenon. This provides us a partial answer for the deep-seated investment 
in language and the will to know the origins of language, thereby the search for proof of 
mastery over the phenomenon. The first step towards this goal is to sweep all 
heterogeneous and convergent relations between languages, to determine the degree of 
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purity and essence and hence declare the supremacy of Western-originated (whose 
origin was indeed messed up with “alien”, Middle Eastern and primarily with Semitic 
“origins”) language.  This desire to distinguish and to determine the language according 
to its origins and/or essence is simultaneously to construct an identity.  This analysis 
enables us to see  the nature of relation between the attempt on the part of Western 
scholars to seek the origins of language and purify its distinct essence, and the explicit 
religious drive, invested within,  which aims to differentiate and essentialize the 
Christian-Western identity that was in fact historically interacted and complicated with 
its Oriental predecessors  and neighbors. 
 
Then the operation of “ontologically and epistemologically constituted distinction”  
(Said 2) is no simple misunderstanding or prejudice but it is necessarily supplemental for 
the construction of European identity. This is one of the strongest and innovational 
aspects of Said’s analysis. The desire to know, name and  decide on the Orient, which is 
ambiguous, heterogeneous and devoid-of-totality in itself,  is to give it a form, a form 
that has its permanent traits and recognizable features. Only with this condition, the 
“knowledge” (in its specifically Western form) may gain its proper identity. Formulated 
as a static and/or arrested movement itself, knowledge may only reflect and represent a 
static and permanent phenomenon whose characteristics and essential traits it has 
determined. 
 
This is how Said’s remarks on the static, anachronistic and rigid conceptualization of the 
Orient may be read towards its limits. Actually, Said  claims that Orientalist discourse 
has created and circulated an immobile and ahistorical representation of Orient in 
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accordance to its own rigid methodology, which in turn signals the over-determination 
of the desire to determine Western course by movement, progress and historicity.  
 
The oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the 
insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as 
lamentably alien. […] If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals 
from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the “classical” Orient served to 
justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent 
Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly ( not to say invidiously)  male 
conception of the world. […] Moreover this male conception of the world, in 
its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed 
eternally, […] as if each man saw Islam as a reflection of his own chosen 
weakness. (Emphasis mine, Said, Orientalism 206-208) 
 
 
But this specific failure of Western epistemology and methodology might be used as 
lever to scrutinize a more general failure of knowledge, which has been turned into a 
success at grasping and arresting things. Knowledge in its self-legitimizing claim to 
bring its object into light is primarily dependent on the operation of distinction between 
the object and subject and such distinction is always already marked by power and 
supremacy of subject over the object. In this specific instance, Orientalism as a body of 
knowledge is marked by a desire and a claim on the part of Western subject to know, to 
bring its Oriental subject into terms within his cultural frame of values and beliefs. The 
desire to know Other leads simultaneously to the constitution of a counter-part, an 
opposite figure to define the Self better. This is what Said brilliantly exposes in 
Orientalist writing. 
 
The other point he discloses is how such operation gains the transparency of truth, 
excessively and collectively cited and referred in every instance to represent Orient. This 
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citational quality enables the circulation of Orientalist attitudes and, by the same token, 
they are not restricted solely to the realm of high culture such as scholarly work or art. 
This “regime of truth”, as Foucault would call it, sustains its validity as truth and 
supports itself partially depending on the respectful status of science and art. But it 
cannot simply be claimed that this wide circularity is a direct result of the 
institutionalized knowledge. Rather the dissemination and circulation of this 
recognizable mode to represent Orient signals two interdependent things at once.   
 
The first and most immediate diagnosis was one of the main engines of Orientalism and 
strikingly exposed by Said following Foucault’s theoretical frame of Power/Knowledge. 
It is the crisis of pure knowledge as Said shows how, by and to whom the knowledge of 
Orient has been historically produced and the extent that it supplements, enhances and 
complies with the colonial/imperial institutions and practices. This conception of 
knowledge and the genealogical analysis of its modes of production/circulation not only 
in policy sciences but also in supposedly free ones such as anthropology and philology 
over thrones the deep seated belief in the supposed independence and purity of 
knowledge production from the social and historical circumstances. In the specific 
instance of Orientalism, Said uncovers the individual ambitions of scholars, their 
mimetic rivalry with their predecessors, the sources of inspirations for the artists and 
state sponsored institutionalization of Oriental Studies which shape, transform and 
continually perpetuate the discourse. Indeed, Said’s attempt in Orientalism could be 
considered as a grand effort to go back to the immerse archive of Oriental studies to 
show its complex complicity with the ongoing development of colonialism. 
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The second important critique available in Said’s analysis derives from the common 
ground that has been shared by both high and low instances of Western culture, though it 
is much more subtle and implicit. It could be considered as a radical critique of Western 
epistemology and its lineage could be justly traced back to Nietzsche, who was also the 
inspiring start-point of Foucault’s reformulation of history. This radical critique, which 
grew mature and sophisticated with post-structural   intervention in diverse areas of 
theory and for which Said has an ambivalent attitude, is one of the central themes that is 
intended to be developed throughout this study. Though it does not exclusively aim to 
strip the Orientalist discourse, it would help a great deal to contextualize, re-locate and 
disclose its significant characteristics, its multifarious connections to a wide range of 
intellectual activity and to re-formulate and ground the political immediacy of a certain 
critique whose scope includes, yet extends beyond the limits of post-colonial critique. 
Such an extended project inhabits and determines the strongest points of analysis in Said 
and must be carried further to understand the far-fetching implications and interrelations 
that post-colonial critique  is to more expanded critique of Western metaphysics. In such 
re-formulation, colonial discourse will no longer be just another reflection of a 
correctable Western failure but a constitutive moment for its foundation.   
 
To construct an idea proper to a certain Orient is neither without a motive other than 
knowledge itself nor comes transparently and reflect an immediate truth about its 
presumed object. It is and will always be a certain representation whose means and ends 
will be determined according the culturally specific values of the society from which 
emanates. First of all, it will be defined by the ontological and epistemological bestell (if 
we recall an enabling Heideggerian terminology) that will give the very condition of 
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phenomenon and making knowledge of it. Western thought, in its hegemonic form, 
relies on a static (though this static quality can be formulated as instantaneous, which 
will formulate movement as a series of instants)   imagery/ vision of phenomenon which 
in turn gives its place to a certain conception of idea that has well-defined borders and 
hence a distinct shape. Because of the insurmountable movement and allusiveness of 
phenomena and also the disseminating nature of language that constantly distort this 
well-defined form of the concept/ idea, it must be consolidated and affirmed at each 
instance to assure its conformity with what it masters. Said explicitly reveals such 
zealous desire to borrow and repeat by citation in the specific instance of Orientalist 
discourse whose subject-matter is all the more disquieting since it is at once a site of 
desire for Western culture and due to the economy of this desire, it must be marked by a 
constitutive difference from the knowing subject.  Knowing subject gains such self-
mastery through forming himself in response to whatever qualities he yields to his 
object.  This perpetuation of the attempt to form, to give the Orient its proper name and 
traits to construct a proper Western self  is the signature of Orientalist discourse. 
 
Then, it can be claimed that Said’s most striking and enabling departure is his attempt to 
show what perpetuates and remains a more-or-less consistent body of work, while also 
giving a detailed account of how such discourse transforms, abruptly changes its course  
along with the changing regimes of power but remain recognizable. He describes this 
preference to emphasize the continuity rather than individual change in another context 
where he discusses Bloom, but which shed a great deal of light to understand his oeuvre: 
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If you see literary history as quintessentially embodied in the work of heroic, 
radical figures, whose importance is that their work is epoch-making, you are 
not misreading cultural history, you aren’t reading all of it. […].Instead of 
seeing culture as finally a more regular and regularizing process than not, 
Bloom holds to a notion that delegates  tradition ( and culture, by 
implication)  to individual figures; I am saying that poetry makes poets, 
whereas Bloom believes that poets make poetry. (Said, Diacritics 10) 
 
 
Here in this interview with Diacritics, controversially, Said also seems to engage in a 
debate on the nature of intellectual, which he pursues in numerous books such as 
Beginnings, Traveling Theory. He favors a much more overt political position for the 
literary critic (or the intellectual in more general terms), who has been more and more 
marginally institutionalized and whose work is dramatically confined to mere textuality 
and trapped in high and far peaks of theory that always tends to turn into “totalizing 
systemicity” when not checked and balanced with social “reality”. Rather according to 
Said, the critic must engage in the “world” and with immediate and present political 
consequences of Western hegemonic practices. To evaluate these remarks better, the 
phrases he uses such as “worldly”, theory and “textuality” should be taken with their 
face value with their “narrow sense”. At this level, Said’s critical warning and his step-
back from Foucault’s skepticism for the leading role of intellectual makes sense and 
justifies itself considering its  historical location and addressee to the hegemonic  
American academic context that normalizes even the most radical theory. (Said  86) 
 
However, when we move out from the here-and-now of academic debates and come face 
to face with his writing whose claims, partly because of the nature of writing activity 
itself, demand a generality that overarches any particular present, Said’s criticism should 
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be considered with more scrutiny.  Here, the condition of being “worldly” must be 
examined thoroughly since “worldly” cannot escape two interdependent problematic 
meanings. One is the inherent opposition dwell in the phrase where world and text 
stands opposite to each other as if world and what is “worldly” is out there and awaits 
the access of the intellectual who is receptive  and open-minded enough to take what it 
offers. From such position, a further implication of a certain ontological privilege is 
granted to a kind of brute reality lying at least partially independent from the textuality 
that surrounds and shapes it.    
 
Second point, which is the source of the strongest criticisms such as of Paul Bove, is the 
privileging of the status of intellectual by granting him/her an exit from and a rupture to 
the existing social and historical framework by an ability to launch a general critique of 
the existing political repression. Such a rework of the concept of intellectual as a 
generalist and pioneering political figure whose relations to the world must be in broader 
terms seems appealing when one considers Said’s own bifurcated career as  a 
respectable scholar in literature and a political activist and spokesperson of Palestinian 
resistance. However, such conceptualization may engender a certain dislike for 
seemingly too abstract practices such as theory, which in fact provides the very horizon 
of criticism and political action and that which cannot be thought on its own terms 
without its interaction with and potential to alter the “reality”. One may recall the 
citation from above to see the inherent and unresolved contradiction resides in Said on 
this matter. 
 
Paul A. Bove argues for this moment in Said’s theory and his later reserve on Foucault: 
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Given Said's concerns in "Traveling Theory", his criticism can, of course, be 
taken as a caution against the wholesale importation of Foucault into the 
academy and as a warning against the quietistic temptations of Foucault's 
textual practice. […] But there is another reason for it to be here. Although it 
was never possible to identify the Said of Orientalism  with Foucault because 
of their essential differences over the role of the individual subject vis-à-vis 
discourse, it does seem fair to point out that in this passage said is revising 
his own previous authorization of Foucault as an alternative to "metaphysical 
aridity" and in so doing is projecting a seemingly different image of himself 
as intellectual. […] And it is indeed a battle of authority that Said enacts in 
this essay between his own "unstoppable predilection" and Foucault and 
between this self-image and his other, "earlier" "Foucauldian" "self". (Bove 
48- 51)  
 
On the other hand, James Clifford’s criticism that similarly utilizes Foucault as a lever 
seems to miss the point that Said attempts to formulate.  Clifford argues that: 
 
One notices immediately that in the first and third of Said's "meanings" 
Orientalism is concerned with something called the Orient, while in the 
second the Orient exists merely as the construct of a questionable mental 
operation. This ambivalence, which sometimes becomes a confusion, informs 
much of Said's argument. Frequently he suggests that a text or tradition 
distorts, dominates, or ignores some real or authentic feature of the 
Orient.[…] Yet Said's concept of a "discourse" still vacillates between , on 
the one hand, the status of an ideological distortion of lives and cultures that 
are never concretized and, on the other,  the condition of a persistent structure 
of signifiers  that, like  some extreme  example of experimental writing, 
refers solely and endlessly to itself. Said is thus forced to rely on nearly 
tautological statements, such as his frequent comment that Orientalist 
discourse "orientalizes the Orient", or on rather unhelpful specifications such 
as :"Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or 
Orientalized)  writing, vision and study dominated by imperatives, 
perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient"(p.202) 
(Clifford 24) 
 
Nonetheless, this criticism seems to take Said too literally (which implies more than a 
simple misunderstanding) and ignores the central argument that gives the impetus to the 
critique of colonial discourse.  
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… 
[Clifford] finds a contradiction in Said between an argument of distortion or 
misrecognition (of a real Orient) and an argument of pure textual 
construction (of an idea of Orient). But given that this contradiction is self-
evident in his text, why, one needs to ask, does Said make this “mistake”? 
Should we not see the very economy of discourse here? Since the Orient is 
produced only insofar as it is displaced, Orientalism is also the production of 
the very difference between the real Orient and its concept, image, etc. There 
would be no Orient without this difference. Clifford’s criticism misses this 
crucial point, for he locates contradiction outside meaning. Contrary to what 
Clifford suggests, we should read in Said’s tautological expression 
“Orientalizing the Orient” not his but orientalism’s tautology. […] The actual 
Orient is not a natural guarantee of a non- or anti-Orientalist knowledge, for, 
as the site of a struggle, it is always already contaminated by representation. 
(Mutman, Sign of Orientalism 133) 
 
 
The problematic of the actual Orient returns at every instance of the discussion around 
Said’s work in particular and post-colonial critique in general. This condensation of 
discussions around the “actual”, the “real” or “authentic” Orient reveals how much have 
been invested to the persisting division between the text and the world, the actual and 
textual or the representation  and truth. This distinction haunts the discussion of 
Orientalism as discourse, its textuality and the gap that insurmountably persists between 
the Orientalized Orient and the “actual” one no matter how hard we try to denounce this 
duality (or how to draw such line properly). It is also same duality that Said’s arguments 
on the intellectual’s supposed task to dwell into the “worldly” issues, that is “human 
activity and its intricate relation to power relationships” rather than to habituate in the 
“ivory tower of technical criticism” constantly revolve around (Said, Diacritics 84). 
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I believe that such problematic will remain and (it should remain so for the sake of a 
critical alertness)   as a problematic and cannot be easily absolved by a sleight of hand 
that Clifford’s reference to Foucault seems to offer.  
 
Another related point that should be mentioned in Said’s work is his (dis)location of 
identity for the intellectual and his favoring of “going in and out” (Said  Diacritics 83 ) 
of cultural identities to be able to explore zones for criticism otherwise remain taken-for-
granted within a single cultural domain. By such positioning, he both advances his 
criticism of technical intellectual / academic and at the same time he formulates an 
identity for the intellectual, though not a quite proper one, that is located at the 
borderline between different cultures.  He attempts to invent a cultural/political space for 
the critic, whose borders are tangent to differing cultural domains and hence give him a 
non-proper place that may grant him/her access to a privileged critical vision.  Said 
seems to be content with such ambivalent cultural identity presuming that this marginal 
positioning would guarantee the individual the emancipation from the essential frames 
that these intersecting cultures (one of which must necessarily prevails and dominates) 
provide. This is the crucial point where the moment of humanism returns to Said’s work 
and grant the intellectual a privileged position  
This crucial turning point is not inevitable, (contrary to a more general and necessary 
“failure” to point to an Orient that lies outside of the discourse that engenders it to 
mobilize such critique) to enable the criticism of prevailing cultural formations. Rather 
where Said’s strong attack on the premises of Western thought returns and consolidates 
the seat of individual back to its omnipresent position in the name of intellectual who is 
supposed to be insurgent to the established norms. 
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2.2 Spivak and the Question of Subaltern  
 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who calls herself as a “deconstructionist Marxist 
Feminist”, is attentive to such paradoxes without eliminating their irreducible presence 
in every instance of enunciation for the part of the suppressed and colonized.  Her 
oeuvre is fragmentary and dispersed into a vast area such as philosophy, culture and 
literature. 
 
 Her work on the Subaltern Studies Group points to the blind zones of such valuation of 
the intellectual/critic and shows us how the production of these texts in the name of a 
subaltern are dependent on the impossible attempt to show the presence of subaltern 
insurgency that the Subaltern Group sociologist has to determine through the documents 
inscribed by hegemonic power that erases this very same presence. Then, the intellectual 
must assume a subaltern identity whose essence would be marked by a differential logic, 
which could be formulated in Guha’s words as “in a difference from elite groups”.  In 
the messy historical setting of imperialism the subaltern will eventually signify the 
heterogeneity as it derives its definition from a certain positionality, but then again, it 
could only be represented in reference to a certain essence.  Spivak calls this as 
“cognitive failure” for the part of the intellectual/ sociologist and states its inescapability 
for any inquiry that tries to represent who “cannot represent themselves” if we recall the 
famous proverb of Marx. 
 
  32                                                                                
 
Spivak’s complex attitude on the post-colonial critique in general, and the above 
mentioned debates within the field in particular should be mentioned briefly through her 
diverse and multiple works that are related on the ground that they constantly return to 
the ethico-political critique of  colonialism and its sovereign Western Subject.  
 
Firstly, her attitude towards what has been called as theory and textuality   which has 
been opposed to the concrete materiality called as “world” and “actuality” is different 
from both positions that Said and his critiques occupy. She conceives “textuality” as a 
certain inscription of the world, a certain kind of writing in the general sense as Derrida 
uses the term. Her alliance with post structuralism could be conceived as a “radical 
acceptance of vulnerability” (Spivak PCCI 23). She offers the Western intellectual: “Try 
to become as if you are part of the margin, try to unlearn [their] privilege”  
(PCCI 30). Contrary to Said, though she defends his skepticism for French thought, 
especially of Foucault’s ignorance of ideology, she thinks that Derrida’s body of thought 
is practical and enabling. “It is more of a way of looking than a programme for doing: a 
way of looking at the way we do things so that this way of looking becomes its 
doing.”(PCCI 133). Being the English translator of Of Grammatology, she insists on 
certain misconceptions that Derrida’s work seems to suffer from: 
 
Derrida is interested in how truth is constructed rather than exposing the error 
[…] Deconstruction can only speak in the language of the thing it criticizes. So 
as Derrida says, it falls prey to its own critique, in a certain way. That makes it 
very different from ideology-critique, even from auto-critique. The investment 
that deconstruction has to make in the thing being deconstructed is so great that 
it can’t be made simply as a result of a decision that something must be 
deconstructed. It is a matter of looking at how one is speaking, knowing that 
one is probably not going to able to speak in a very different way. […] The 
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only things one really deconstructs are things into which one is intimately 
mixed. It speaks you. You speak it. (PCCI 135) 
 
 
 According to Spivak, Said’s comparison between Foucault and Derrida, where he says 
that the latter’s criticism moves us into the text, former’s in and out” ( Said, Diacritics 
87) is due to a “profound misapprehension” on the nature of textuality: “When they say 
‘there is nothing but text, ; they mean the net/weave/ text that the subject is an effect 
within a much larger text of which ends are not accessible to us, and it is very different 
to say that everything is language (PCCI   23-24 ) textuality is not a pure category 
belong to the language, but the “category of language, then, embraces the categories of 
world and consciousness even as it is determined by them” (PCCI 55). Spivak argues 
that “textuality is also in the world and self, all implicated in an ‘intertextuality’” (PCCI 
55) and the text should be seen as “that area of the discourse of the human sciences 
(humanities) in which the problem of the discourse of the human sciences is made 
available” when considered in the narrow sense.  (Spivak, PCCI 54) When you define 
textuality in a broader sense, then all practice will turn out to be already pre-inscribed. 
“The privileging of practice is in fact no less dangerous than the vanguardism of theory: 
What is beyond practice is always organizing practice. No practice takes place without 
presupposing itself as an example of some more or less powerful theory.” (PCCI 2) 
Then, deconstruction, as the “persistent critique” that can “neither properly begin nor 
properly end (differance at the beginning and aporias at the end)” (136) aims to 
deconstruct what one cannot not want. (PCCI 28).  
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It is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into how 
truths are produced. That is why deconstruction doesn’t say logocentrism is a 
pathology, or metaphysical enclosures are something you can escape.  
(Spivak PCCI 28) 
 
Hence, her theoretical position within the project of decentralizing the subject is highly 
critical as one can observe in the famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988), 
where she criticizes both Foucault and Deleuze & Guattari for being deceptive in their 
formulizations. According to Spivak, both theorists try to avoid and even denounce the 
ideological, and hence secretly consolidate the Western “S/subject” by re-locating them 
into the subject as unconscious and subject as desire. Conversely, Spivak argues that 
Derrida is “not decentering the subject. The subject must identify itself with its self-
perceived intention. The fact that it must do so is not a description of what it is. That is 
the difference between decentered and centered.” (Spivak, PCCI 147) Since, it is not 
possible to decenter the subject. “The subject that is centered begins with that kind of a 
un-endorsened error. […] If it is, it has already, that first “yes” is, the auto position of 
the subject. The subject is, because it must give itself the gift of procreation, it is proper 
to itself. […] For Derrida is describing the necessary centering of a subject in terms of a 
paracentrality that cannot be yet makes the centering of being possible. (PCCI 147) 
 
Similarly, for the debate on essentialism, she employs the same deconstructionist 
attitude where she does not denounce the dichotomy but attempts to re-work and 
displace it. It is not simply possible to not-be an essentialist.  
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One , no rigorous  definition of anything is ultimately possible, so that if one 
wants to , one could go on deconstructing  the opposition between man and 
woman, and finally show that it is a binary opposition that displaces itself. 
[…]I cannot recommend that kind of dichotomy at all, yet, I feel that 
definitions are necessary in order to keep us going, to allow us to take a 
stand. The only way that I can see myself making definitions is in a 
provisional and polemical one. (Spivak PCCI 54) 
 
She will call later this provisional but necessary essentialism as strategic essentialism.  
One can see why she has drawn to the definition subaltern from the quotation above, as 
subaltern is truly a provisional, transitive and situational one (one hopes and also carries 
her doubt for one’s hope, of course). 
 
 To return to the problematic of intellectual, maybe it would be useful how she expresses 
her personal experience as an itinerant non-Western intellectual. One immediately 
senses how she is aware of the almost romantic tendency dwell in the subject whose 
cultural identity is subjected to the imperialist history. However, she relieves such 
temptation by gestures of joke (it is useful to remember the psychoanalytic definition of 
joke here since it may help us to understand Spivak’s position better): “I’ve been doing 
it for so long because it undermined some of the seriousness with which I was beginning 
to take myself. How seriously each institution takes itself! That was a wonderful anti-
dote for me. It was impossible for me to take myself seriously anymore in that sense of 
“I will save the world”, which begins to infect middle-aging academics when others 
want to listen to them.” (PCCI 37) Within the same interview, she also declares the 
difficulty she faces with when she is traveling between the institutions and languages 
because of not rooting in one place and one language. But, “this relation between 
languages compels me to recognize that neither is a natural nor an artificial language. 
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I’m devoted to my native language, but I cannot think it as natural, because to an extent, 
one is never natural. One is never at home” (PCCI 37-38). She seems to be an accurate 
example of Said’s remarks on the image of intellectual, who is never at home, but she 
does not seem to offer such homelessness as a home, she does not canonize such 
contingent and violent conditioning as the true locale for the intellectual creativity to 
flourish. Moreover, she prefers to situate the intellectual in the constant interaction with 
ideology and she chooses to expose the inevitability of “failure” and “misreading”, both 
of which are also the strengths of intellectual activity, which operates within a battlefield 
of ideology and discursive practice. “That you have to take seriously the fact that you 
could always be wrong. It is not just a rhetorical gesture.” (Spivak, PCCI 147)  
 
To give a better account of Spivak's position concerning these interdependent debates on 
the role of intellectual, the formulation of textuality and humanism, it is useful to focus 
on her  two major works on the Subaltern Studies Group and her Postcolonial Critique. 
These three texts carry the gist of her argument and give a novel insight on the 
formulation of oppressed, (the Oriental in our case) whom she prefers to call with 
diverse names such as aboriginal rural or urban gendered subaltern with a concern not to 
homogenize and hence objectify the other. She reads some of the major philosophical 
texts such as Kant’s, Hegel’s and Marx’s and literature to track the figure of subaltern 
whose presence is foreclosed, but not excluded, which in turn constitutes the very 
category of human for the Western post/enlightenment  thought.  
 
In her famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988), Spivak, firstly, brings a grave 
criticism to Foucault and Deleuze for their dismissal of ideology in their body of work. 
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According to Spivak, such dismissal of the concept of ideology re-consolidates the 
Western Subject by ignoring the condensation of power structures working on the agent, 
which in turn require the agent to subsist and survive. Her major criticism aims the 
implied opposition, uncritically accepted by both post-structuralists, between the 
consciousness and interest. Both thinkers strongly reject the notion of false 
consciousness and grant the subaltern a self-consolidating subjecthood. By such move, 
they inevitably strengthen the sovereignty of Western subject who is self-aware and 
whose interests are not alienated from self but flourish wherever desire dwells. Spivak 
argues that “These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive 
contradiction. In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the 
discourse of power.” (CSS 69) Similarly, these theorists reject the duality between 
theory and practice and declare that theory is itself an action, not representation of 
anything or anyone. Though Spivak agrees with such displacement, she investigates how 
such operation is taken by Deleuze and Foucault to the point where theory is declined to 
be a representation. She thinks that such radical rejection of ideology and the distinction 
between action and practice is due to a certain misapprehension or confusion between 
representation and re-presentation. 
 
Representation means standing for something and its meaning is akin to its legal and 
political usage while re-presentation is a mode of re-creation like in art. “Since the 
theory is only ‘action’, the theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed 
group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness.” and hence “ the 
unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience of 
the oppressed, while being so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual 
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[consolidating the international division of labor ], is maintained by a verbal slippage.” 
(Spivak, CSS 69-70)  
 
She, then, moves to the famous Marxian passage, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louise 
Bonaparte, to discuss and reveal the “shifting distinction” between these two senses of 
the term. Marx differentiates between vertreten (representation) and darstellen ( re-
presentation). Spivak reads Marx’s concept of class as not a natural category that should 
be recovered by a recognition but as something that is situational, transformative and 
differential to other classes and that is something “artificial and economic” and interest 
or agency ( subject) as “impersonal” (71).  
 
“Full class agency (if there were such a thing) is not an ideological 
transformation of consciousness on the ground level, a desiring identity of 
the agents and their interest – the identity whose absence troubles Foucault 
and Deleuze. It is a contestatory replacement as well as an appropriation   (a 
supplementation) of something that is artificial to begin with. […] Marx’s 
formulations show a cautious respect for the nascent critique of individual 
and collective subjective agency. […] Conversely, contemporary invocations 
of ‘libidinal economy’ and desire as the determining interest, combined with 
the practical politics of the oppressed (under socialized capital) ‘speaking for 
themselves’, restore the category of the sovereign subject within the theory 
that seems most to question it.” (Spivak, CSS 73)  
 
Spivak says that this operation of conflating the two meanings and hence consolidating a 
knowing subject who can speak for herself has consequences. One is the re-
consolidation of the intellectual who gains a new transparency, “for they merely report 
on the nonrepresented subject and analyze (without analyzing) the workings of (the 
unnamed Subject irreducibly presupposed by) power and desire. (Spivak, CSS 74) 
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Spivak, at this moment, adds Said’s criticism of Foucault  that “notion of the 
surreptitious subject of power and desire [is]  marked by the transparency of the 
intellectual” (CSS  75), which, I believe, strategically ignoring how Said also 
consolidates the position of the intellectual by automatically granting him a place of a 
kind of “privileged” homeless. Contrary to Paul A. Bove’s position that had been 
mentioned in the previous section, she argues that “Foucault’s challenge [to the leading 
role of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals as formulated by Bove] is 
deceptive precisely because it ignores what Said emphasizes- the critic’s institutional 
responsibility” (CSS 75). 
 
Further, Spivak reveals the implicit Eurocentrism for this re-formulation of subject 
whose intention/ interest and desire is equated and how such constitution of the Subject 
also helps the production of the “unnamed subject of the Other for Europe”. To give an 
account of such proposition she asks, rather rhetorically: “on the other side of the 
international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of 
the epistemic violence of the imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier 
economic text, Can the subaltern speak?” (CSS 79) And, she turns to the Subaltern 
Studies Group, whose aim is to bring a subaltern insurgent consciousness to ground to 
re-inscribe the imperialist history.  
 
She distinguishes the Group’s effort to represent a subject and a consciousness (though 
non- proper) from Deleuze and Foucault’s attempts to formulate a “pure form of 
consciousness” which they share with a certain ‘internationalist’ intellectual Marxism. 
One of the reasons for difference is the fact that “the colonized subaltern subject is 
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irretrievably heterogeneous” and its definition can be only an identity-in-differential, 
whose category, in Ranajit Guha’s words “represent the demographic difference 
between the total Indian  population and all those  whom we have described as the 
“elite”. (Qtd. in Spivak, CSS 79).  
 
At the first glance the subaltern group’s declared interest to “identify and measure the 
specific” is essentialist and taxonomic and seems to aim to represent and access to a 
subaltern consciousness as such.  However, “because of the violence  of the imperialist 
epistemic, social and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms 
must traffic in a radical textual practice of differences.” ( Spivak CSS 80) The object of 
study becomes a differential, “ a deviation from the ideal- the people or the subaltern- 
which is itself defined as a difference from the elite.” (Spivak, CSS 79) 
 
It is towards this structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather 
different from the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world intellectual. 
Whether or not they themselves perceive it, their text articulates the difficult 
task of rewriting its own conditions of impossibility as the conditions of its 
possibility. (Spivak, CSS 79)  
   
Listening to the silent zones and refusals of enunciation within the Group’s study, 
Spivak argues that the consciousness of subaltern is something that the Subaltern studies 
cannot properly define (CSS 82).  The consciousness of the subaltern is something that 
cannot be recovered from the imperial historical inscription. Neither the subaltern, nor 
the message has an ontologically verifiable, positivistic presence. Furthermore, the 
intellectual is far from being a transparent agent who may be able to read the lost text of 
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subaltern consciousness. These entangled positions bring a productive crisis to the 
operation.  
 
Firstly, there could be no nostalgia for the lost origins of subaltern, since it is not directly 
accessible and also the very definition of the subaltern is situational and differential. For 
what is differential, one cannot form a proper identity and origin to be discovered. 
Secondly, what is pursued, for its differential nature, would resist to be stabilized into an 
object for study and hence, it would disrupt the rigid discourse of knowledge. Thirdly, 
the intellectual will have to traverse along his own consciousness. “The postcolonial 
intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss.” (Spivak, CSS 82) 
 
However, this does not mean to hide behind an indeterminate sketching of the subaltern, 
which would mean sharing the violent success of imperial history, and then ostensibly to 
go silent to leave space for the non-represented to represent herself. Any critical study 
must show how such gestures are complicit with the imperialistic phallogocentric 
discourse, and even constitute its basic premises: “The narrow epistemic violence of 
imperialism gives us an imperfect allegory of the general violence that is the possibility 
of episteme” (Spivak, CSS 82)    
 
If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and 
cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.[…] On 
the other side of the international division of labor, the subject of exploitation 
cannot know and speak the text of  female exploitation even if the absurdity  
of the nonrepresenting  intellectual making space for her to speak is achieved. 
The woman is doubly in shadow” (Spivak, CSS 83-84) 
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Here, she introduces the ironical term “benevolence” for the part of the first-world or 
elite-indigenous intellectual by “constructing a homogeneous Other referring only to our 
own place in the seat of the Same or the Self towards the people whose “consciousness” 
we cannot grasp. To confront them is not to represent (vertreten) them but to learn to 
represent (darstellen) ourselves.”   (Spivak, CSS 84). The third-worldism of the western 
academic circles, which is confined only to the part of the third-world already inhabiting 
within the West  and executed by third-world intellectuals, is a very good example of the 
benevolence Spivak harshly criticizes. “This benevolent first-world appropriation and 
reinscription of the Third World as an Other is the founding characteristic of much third-
worldism in the US human sciences today.” (Spivak, CSS 84) 
 
When Spivak mentions the re-inscription of the (in actual fact very rare) practice of 
widow burning tradition, sati, she implicitly links the two versions of Western 
benevolence: “Imperialism’s image as the establisher of the good society is marked by 
the espousal of the woman as object of protection from her own kind” which exposes the 
fantasy of the Imperial subject formulated ironically by Spivak as “white men rescuing 
brown women from brown men”. (CSS 98) While on the other hand, the reversal of 
Imperialism,  the nationalist Hinduism represents the self-immolation act as  the sign of 
the free-will of woman and defend the tradition as a sign for freedom of  Hindu woman. 
Spivak argues that: 
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Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, 
the figure of the woman    disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a 
violent shuttling  which is the displaced figuration of the ‘third-world woman’ 
caught  between tradition and modernization” […] the case of suttee as 
exemplum of the woman-in-imperialism would challenge  and reconstruct this 
opposition  between subject (law)  and object-of-knowledge ( repression) and 
mark the place of ‘disappearance’ with something  other than silence  and 
nonexistence, a violent aporia between subject and object status. (CCS 102)  
 
Then, benevolence is not simply a covert violence coming from the Imperialistic western 
power, but also a strategy employed by the indigenous modernization policy to 
constitute the subject position that it requires to operate its power, whose structure is 
partially borrowed from the Western humanist/colonialist discourse and already sharing 
the same patriarchal ground.  
 
The postmodern critique of neo-colonialism reveals benevolence as a denial 
of difference and constitution of hegemonic subject. The production of 
Western sovereign self is disguised by other-ing the Third World 
disenfranchised as lacking appropriate agency. Thus, in benevolent discourse, 
difference is accepted and denied at the same time. […]  Rather than 
representing or helping the subaltern, benevolent discourse performs the 
hegemony of the neo-colonial subject and constitutes his/her world a 
naturally superior. This blocks the possibility of talking with the subaltern.” 
(Mutman, Encyclopedia 37-38) 
 
 
Spivak cites Said’s comment on Derrida and Foucault and his rather problematic notion 
of textuality, where he argues that Derrida’s criticism moves us into the text, Foucault’s 
in and out and calls such conception as a “profound misapprehension”. (87) 
Spivak, conversely, argues that Foucault’s seemingly political analysis “hides a 
privileging of the intellectual and of the ‘concrete’ subject of oppression” and hence she 
believes that Derrida, although his style is esoteric and demanding as he deals primarily 
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with philosophical texts, is “less dangerous when understood than the first-world 
intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for 
themselves.” (CSS 87) 
 
 “To render thought or the thinking subject transparent or invisible seems, by contrast, to 
hide the relentless recognition of the Other by assimilation. It is in the interest of such 
cautions that Derrida does not invoke ‘ letting the other(s) speak for himself’ but rather 
invokes an ‘appeal’ to or ‘call’ to the ‘quite-other’ ( opposed to the self-consolidating 
other), of ‘rendering delirious that interior  voice that is the voice of the other in 
us’.”(Spivak, CSS 89)  
 
With such deconstructive move that destabilizes the opposition between inside and 
outside, self and other, both are formulated as self-consolidating, we move towards a 
new politico-ethics and leaving the domain of humanism and a certain Levinasian ethics, 
which repeats the humanist failure by inversion; by means of granting an infinite 
transcendentality to the Other and hence an insurmountable distance between Self and 
Other. By maddening the interior voice in us, we can participate in “a persistent 
critique”, as Spivak would call, with an ongoing alertness for the privilege of the 
intellectual and his/her institutional/ discursive participation “ disgui(ing) itself in 
transparency” within the hegemonic power. (CSS 90) 
 
Maybe it is useful to return to her earlier essay “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography” (1985). Spivak reads the Subaltern Studies Group both for and against 
their grain and point how their methodology bears the same mark with what they attempt 
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to accomplish, that is to present a subaltern/ insurgent consciousness. This mark is the 
irreducible cognitive failure that the group shares with what they study and the 
paradoxical attempt to represent that cannot be represented, or that which once 
represented will lose its proper name and will be, inevitably, objectified and totalized for 
the seemingly disinterested investigating subject. The same failure goes for the insurgent 
or any other oppressed group that is supposed to achieve self-consciousness, since such 
misrecognition is inescapable and, indeed essential for recognition and representation of 
identity.Spivak insists that such misrecognition of identity for any class is irreducible 
and it is nothing to do with the failure or success of any discursive displacement 
attempted. It is rather as in the case of Orientalism, the “sophisticated vocabulary of 
much contemporary historiography successfully shields this cognitive failure and that 
this success-in-failure, this sanctioned ignorance, is inseparable from colonial 
domination” (208)  
 
Spivak clarifies this subtle point by referring to the Group’s attempt to excavate and re-
establish self-consciousness for the insurgent, that seems “at first a positivistic project- a 
project which assumes that , if properly prosecuted , it will lead to firm ground, to some 
thing that can be disclosed.” ( SR 211) However, as the Group dwells onto the project, 
such consciousness turns out to be “subject to the cathexis of the elite, that it is never 
fully recoverable, that it is always askew from its received signifiers, indeed that it is 
effaced even as it is disclosed, that it is irreducibly discursive.” (SR 212) 
 
Though the Group’s aim is to re-establish consciousness of the subaltern, their only 
method is to retrieve it from the texts of the counterinsurgent hegemonic elite. Such 
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method signals the “counterpoint” deconstructing the very foundations of the 
metaphysics of consciousness that the Group tries to re-establish for the subaltern. 
Spivak offers to read the Subaltern consciousness as a perfect allegory for all 
consciousness and thought. She argues that such attempt to retrieve the subaltern 
consciousness only brings about a subaltern subject-effect. By calling it subject-effect, 
the subject is relocated within a multi-layered and complex web of different inscriptions 
such as gender, language and economics that are inscribing and displacing such effect 
for the cause, as a “sovereign and determining subject”. Such misrecognition and 
replacing the effect for the cause is at the heart of metaphysics of the Subject and to a 
certain extend is inescapable. Spivak formulates such failure-in-success or, in other 
words, substitution of the effect for a cause as “strategic essentialism”. This term plays a 
significant role for inventing a place that will host a deconstructivist positioning in the 
essentialism debate, which, implicitly or not, dominates the post-colonial critique. 
Spivak formulates such position by reading Subaltern Studies against their grain: 
 
I would suggest that elements in their text would warrant a reading of the 
project to retrieve the subaltern consciousness as the attempt to undo a massive 
historiographic metalepsis and “situate” the effect of the subject as subaltern. I 
would read it, then, as a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a 
scrupulously visible political interest. […] this would allow them to use the 
critical force of anti-humanism, in other words, even as they share its 
constitutive paradox: that the essentializing moment, the object of their 
criticism, is irreducible. (Spivak, SR  214) 
 
Spivak’s reading reveals how the Group’s employment of consciousness, though not 
explicitly, exposes their “strategically adhering to the essentialist notion of 
consciousness, that would fall prey to an anti-humanist critique, within a historiographic 
practice that draws many of its strengths from that very critique.” (Spivak, SR 216) 
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Spivak locates an uneasy, yet responsible position for the intellectual as exemplified in 
the Subaltern Studies Group and contribute to the long-standing debate for the role of 
intellectual. She argues that “Subaltern Studies’ own subalternity in claiming a positive 
subject-position for the subaltern might be reinscribed as a strategy for our times.” 
(Spivak, SR 217)  
 
It [such reinscription] acknowledges that the arena of the subaltern’s 
persistent emergence into hegemony must always and by definition remain 
heterogeneous to the efforts of the disciplinary historian. The historian must 
persist in his efforts in this awareness that the subaltern is necessarily the 
absolute limit of the place where history is narrativized into logic. It is a hard 
lesson to learn, - but not to learn it is merely to nominate elegant solutions to 
be correct theoretical practice. […] Theoretical descriptions cannot produce 
universals. They can only ever produce provisional generalizations, even as 
the theorist realizes the crucial importance of their persistent production. (SR 
218) 
 
Spivak then opposes both positions that circulate and compete for the role of intellectual, 
one being the intellectual as the savior and representative of the ones that “cannot 
represent themselves”, a position more or less represented by Said’s later period on the 
debate; the other is a learned “refusal to represent and privilege the oppressed subject, 
who could seemingly speak for himself” as in late Foucault, which is lengthily discussed 
and criticized by Spivak in other occasions.  
  
Spivak here takes a critical attitude towards the globalisms and migrant hybridisms that 
plays with a sanctioned ignorance by an invocation of "globality"- a word serving to 
hide the financialization of the globe, or "hybridity"- a word serving to obliterate the 
irreducible hybridity of all language." (PC164) Enunciating a cautionary remark for 
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feminism that works with the notions of ethnicity only within the national boundaries of 
Western metropolitan centers and also for the post-colonial studies that attempts to  
un-do the subsisting difference by elaborating it with terms such as hybridity, Spivak 
urges us against such pluralisms and anti-essentialisms: “If Feminism takes its place 
with ethnic studies as American studies, or post-colonialism a migrant hybridity, the 
South is once again in shadow, the diasporic stands in for the native informant.” (Spivak, 
PC 169) 
 
Spivak, instead of engaging with proving the falsity of stereotypical representations of 
the indigenous figure, focuses on the very foundational texts of Western culture and 
locate the native informant, whose name has not been pronounced yet, clandestinely 
constitutes the category of the (Western) Subject. "In one way or another, an 
unacknowledged moment that I will call “the native informant" is crucially needed by 
the great texts; and it is foreclosed." (Spivak, PC 4) She borrows the term from Lacanian 
terminology for the purposes of both connoting the psychic aspect of the issue and to 
attract the emphasis to the rejection of an idea and together with the affect attached to it 
by the ego- consciousness. The name of the native informant is encrypted and buried 
within the psyche of the subject if we invoke a certain Abraham and Torok terminology 
as Spivak does. Then, Spivak proposes "encrypting of the name of the "native 
informant" as the name of Man - a name that carries the inaugurating effect of being 
human. […] I think of the "native informant" as a name for that mark of expulsion from 
the name of Man - a mark crossing out the impossibility of the ethical relation"(Spivak, 
PC  5-6) 
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Native informant, a term Spivak borrows from ethnography, designates "a blank though 
generative of a text of cultural identity that only the West (or a Western-model 
discipline) could inscribed" and such belief clandestinely operates beneath the 
"benevolent cultural nativists'" practice, " although the cover story there is of a fully 
self-present voice-consciousness". (Spivak, PC 6) Spivak prefers to read the foreclosed 
name of the native informant not in the ethnographic studies that somehow celebrate its 
figure as a pure and innocent human stage that have not yet contaminated by the 
civilization but rather in the grand Western texts that " take for granted that "European" 
is the human norm and offer us descriptions and/or prescriptions. And yet, even here, the 
native informant is needed and foreclosed." (Spivak, PC 6)  
 
 
Such operation of misreading adopts the deconstructive strategy as it necessitates the 
attentiveness to the silences and blind spots that deconstruction lends its ears and eyes. 
“We are deeply interested in the tropological deconstruction of masculist universalism. 
[…] We know the “correction” of a performative deconstruction is to point at another 
troping, and thus to another errant performance, that the critique must be persistent.” 
(Spivak, PC 168) This is the invaluable lesson of deconstruction: a never-ending 
oscillation between active-forgetting and remembering if we re-call a certain reading of 
Nietzsche , that never decides on neither side but becoming itself this movement that 
does not aim to find the safe shore since there is none. (Spivak OG xxi-xxxviii)   
 
We must be driven by a persistent critique (which at the first hand includes our own 
practice) in our attempt to disrupt the hegemony of phallogocentrism that must 
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inevitably habit within the language of what it criticizes. “Even as we join in the struggle 
to establish the institutional study of marginality we must still go on saying “And yet...”  
(Spivak, PC 171)Such is not ivory-tower theoreticism, but a strictly political practice, 
though without an end. Being as such, deconstruction is never reducible to a mere 
“textual” (in the narrow sense) analysis/critique of what it re-inscribes.    
 
This position will shape the discussion of the subject-matter throughout the study, 
actively disrupting each and every argument that compete to take over and claim the 
truth of its subject matter, which is film and inevitably introduce a critical attentiveness 
to the ways how films foreclose and are foreclosed by the discourse that surrounds and 
shape them.   
 
In the next chapter, Orientalism will be studied in its relation to Western philosophical 
“reflections” on the visibility and sound and in figuring the alterity, the Other, in our 
case the Oriental. Such reading will be enabled and in-formed by two recent films with 
Oriental settings of Ferzan Özpetek, a talented Turkish director living and producing in 
Italy.  
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3 ORIENTAL: FIXED IN FRONT OF “THE” MIRROR FOR 
ETERNITY 
 
 
 
It might be useful to remember Said’s remarks on the Orientalist discourse, how it is 
obsessed with the picturesque representation of the Orient; with bringing it visually to 
the foreground. Said’s analysis on the vast Orientalist oeuvre ranging from scientific 
records to literature and painting reveals a curious tension for the ambiguities and 
obscurities of the Orient that bewitches and fascinates the Western subject which, later 
on, turns into an immense effort to illustrate and depict the Oriental as clear as possible. 
Such tension plays out and signs almost each and every text from travel literature to 
Orientalist academic paintings.  
 
While Orientalist discourse has altered since nineteenth century with a series of shifts 
including topographical inscriptions that is necessitated by the historical and contingent 
breaks that colonialism/capitalism has gone through, this scopic drive to give a proper 
shape to the enigmatic Orient has persisted. Before dwelling more on this scopic drive 
that compels to bring the Other before the gaze of the luminous Western thought, it must 
be must noted here that by the term “visibility” and “scopic/specular regime”, it is not 
only referred to the realm of visual representations such as film or painting. Rather, what 
has been meant is the specific handling of phenomena in accordance with and dominated 
by a fixed gaze, that in turn fixes the subject of such eye. This fixed gaze upon the so-
called object distributes and assigns stable positions for both parties but always 
  52                                                                                
 
asymmetrically and in favor of the onlooker. However, such scopic handling of 
phenomena is not restricted solely to the literally “visual” fields of representation; it is 
rather a regime, an ontological inscription upon the world, or a “worlding of the world.” 
(Spivak qtd in Mutman, Shooting 3)  
 
Said’s extensive analysis on Orientalism revolves around a theme of an “urge to make 
visible”, which is not confined to painting but indeed shared by scholarly works and 
literature. Speaking of Flaubert’s grotesque spectacular descriptions of Orient, said 
remarks: “the Orient is watched […] the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is 
a watcher, never involved, always detached. […] The Orient becomes a living tableau of 
queerness.” (Said, Orientalism 103). For Napoleonic expedition, he writes: “the other 
part (of dominating Egypt) was to render it completely open, to make it totally 
accessible to European scrutiny.” (Said, Orientalism 83) to describe Orientalism, he 
again employs s specular vocabulary: “The idea of representation is a theatrical one; the 
Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures 
whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate.” (Said, 
Orientalism 63) This larger whole, as Said calls the collective Orient, “was easier for 
him [Marx] to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities.” (Said, 
Orientalism 155)  Despite the term “illustrative” here primarily designates the meanings 
of descriptive, exemplary and revelatory; still the visual quality of the term and its 
relation to theory cannot be undermined. When he mentions Sacy, one of the founding 
fathers of modern Orientalism, Said’s remark becomes most revelatory: “In Sacy’s 
pages on Orientalism –elsewhere in his writing he speaks of his own work as having 
uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. […] Knowledge 
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was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the 
construction of a sort of Benthamite panopticon.” (Said, Orientalism 127) 
 
This theatricality, this urge of making the Orient visually present, or clearly seen and 
illustrated is a common trait shared by literature, plastic arts and even scientific and 
scholarly studies. This curious common characteristic is a thematic of Orientalism 
(1979) that Said follows all along the book, even if he has not pursued as a constitutive 
aspect of the subject. It can even be argued that Said’s keen insight has detected the 
crucial importance of this visual and theatrical quality and hence he constantly revolved 
around the theme, however his critical attitude fell short before such perpetuating quality 
of its subject-matter to be “theoretically” developed. We may say that this visual, 
picturesque quality of Orientalist texts that has never theoretically contemplated by Said 
signs Orientalism from within but remains a tangential theoretical element.  
 
3.1 Where do Hamam and Harem Suare fit in? 
 
Before examining thoroughly this crucial visual quality that seems to be a constitutive 
common element of Orientalist discourse, maybe it is useful to defer it in order to 
introduce two texts, which inspire and inform this study. These two texts are two recent 
films by Ferzan Özpetek, a successful Turkish director who has been living and working 
in Rome for more than twenty years. Although his oeuvre consist of four films as a 
director, his first and second feature films will be of concern as their setting is 
topographically and historically located within the Orient, in his motherland Turkey. His 
first feature film as a director is Hamam or Steam: The Turkish Bath (1997) which 
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brought him international reputation and success. Being a common production of Italy, 
Turkey and Spain, it even found the chance to be distributed in U.S. and met with, a 
significant mark of international attention. Hamam has drawn a considerable attention in 
Turkey as well. His second feature film Harem Suare (1999), which is a common 
production this time of Italy, France and Turkey, earned praises across Europe and 
Turkey. Leaving aside the uncritical and popular celebrations in the name of “Art” 
which seems to point to a modernization anxiety of “we could do it better than you” and 
its complementary conservative reactions that seems to be obsessed with homophobia 
and a brute realism of the kind “It is not the “real” Turkish Bath, harem or Turkey”, 
Özpetek’s cinema has largely been denied any serious contemplation. Özpetek’s distinct 
film aesthetics that dissociates him from the commonly received “Turkish Cinema” as a 
migrant Turkish director and the rich textuality his films provide deserves more 
intellectual effort than the present reception that confines and reappropriates his cinema 
within the binary politics (modern versus conservative) that reign contemporary 
discussions.  
 
Before getting into detail of the singular narrative structures and fictional qualities of the 
two films that will be held in the next chapter, we must mention a subtle yet striking 
common visual regime that signs, over-determines and even grants their aesthetic verve. 
This visual regime could be best described as primarily a picturesque, sensual, almost 
tactile filmic representation of the Oriental setting sustained by low-key lightning and 
extensive employment of amber tones. Such lightning is supplemented by rich 
glamorous costumes in Harem Suare or employment of textiles such as tulle, lace and 
silk as it was the case in Hamam both of which invoke touchy-feely sensibility through a 
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dazzling visuality. The viewer comments illustrate such characteristic better: “[…] We 
have started to know throughout the story, being sucked into the gentle, demanding, 
chaotic, smoky, colourful and slow whirlpool that is this movie's Istanbul.”   
“In Italy, colors are bright and edges are sharp but life was just dull. In Turkey, the 
screen was inundated by drab colors, worn edges and crumbling buildings, but the 
humble people and surroundings were full of life.” “It is full of sumptuous and colorful 
costumes.” “Texture, smell, color, that's how I think this movie should be judged in 
terms of. See the rich golden tones surrounding the young concubine asleep by the 
fireplace, or the sweltering Turkish bath, and let it flood your senses with impressions of 
spice, coarse cloth, smooth skin, scented oils, flickering flames, satin rustle.” (IMDB 
2004) 
 
In both films, the Italy sequences were sharp focused, with high-key lightning and cold 
colors while the main Oriental sequences were shot in a soft focus with rich, melting 
colors and tactile sensuality, that give both films their significant visual style that seems 
to “mesmerize” (a word extensively used by IMDB commentators that imply a 
bedazzlement whose scopic reference cannot be ignored) a primarily Western audience. 
The word “bedazzlement” hints at the tension between visualization and counter-
visualization; in other words, between the extent from which camera deviates from what 
conventionally called clear-sight and the deferred and hence heightened moment of 
climax where the object of spectacle is revealed. Besides the soft focused and lush 
colored visuality, both films employ specific thematic-visual elements, which also 
enrich and develop the narrative: Steam, which becomes the English title for Hamam, 
that serve to hide the lovers from the camera till it comes close enough to pierce it 
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through;  and the immense fog covering and hiding Istanbul that has also become part of 
the poster of Harem Suare  together with a close still of  Safiye in veils made of white 
tulle, resembling the fog veiling Istanbul.  
 
Why in both films Orient plays a seek-and-hide game with camera, promising to reveal 
itself, promising its hidden and spectacular treasures for the camera? Why this deferral, 
this so-called resistance to well-focused clear sight heightens the pleasure of the moment 
of revealment all the same?  
 
3.2 Thought and Vision  
 
This anxiety to bring into light what seems to evade from grasp, that means mastering 
this evading phenomenon (that which appearing) by means of sight, is a major 
philosophical theme that cannot be adequately covered within the limits of this study. 
However it should be mentioned briefly as it is the constitutive moment for Orientalist 
discourse like it is for the very foundations of Western metaphysics which is primarily 
the discourse on presence and truth.  This ocularcentrism, as Martin Jay uses the term for 
the “cultures dominated by vision” (Jay 3), also constitutes one of the founding pillars of 
the Subject as posited against and over the Object.  Such point also would enable us to 
think cinema and its relation with the overlapping issues of race and gender. 
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3.2.1. The Quest for Light and Form 
 
 
Right from its (self-claimed) Greek beginnings, Western culture in general and Western 
philosophy in particular seems to have a particularly strong desire for the visible and 
related values attached to it. Hence, all that is associated with visuality such as light and 
the major light source that is sun and the major light receptor; eye enjoyed a significant 
privilege over and against other light sources, and  occasions where light  is seemingly 
absent with the extensive denigration of other senses such as smell and touch. “The eyes 
are the organic prototype of philosophy. Their enigma is that they not only can see but 
are also able to see themselves seeing. […] A good part of philosophical thinking is 
actually only eye-reflex, eye dialectic, and seeing-oneself-see.”  (Sloterdijk qtd. in Jay 
21) 
 
As Hans Blumenberg argues, “For Greek thought, all certainty was based on visibility. 
What logoi referred back to was a sight with form [Gestalthafter Anblick], i.e. eidos. 
Even etymologically, “knowledge” [Wissen] and “essence” [Wesen] (as eidos) are 
extremely closely related to “seeing” [Sehen]. Logos is a collection of has been seen.” 
(Blumenberg 46). One brilliant example is the cave of Plato, where the human beings 
are confined to live in, turned their backs to the source of light (whether to the fire or its 
primary and transcendent source that is sun as the source of ultimate Good and 
knowledge), and hence take mere shadows flickering on the wall for what is their true 
sources. Only the philosopher may step out of the cave that is the domain of mere 
appearances and may glimpse at the truth of appearances, in other words the Ideas.  “For 
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Plato, the truth was embodied in the Eidos or Idea, which was like a visible form 
blanched of its color. The human eye, he contended, is able to perceive light because it 
shares a like quality with the source of light, the sun.” (Jay 26) Hence, it can be claimed 
that Plato distinguishes between a clear vision washed with luminosity and a chimerical 
and illusionary one. Though, Plato seems to hold a subtle reservation for the human 
ability to directly confront the sun, or its synonym, Truth since too much light would 
blind one, he maneuvers to make a distinction between a “specular” vision that primarily 
depends on the third eye of Logos and its debased opposite, that is the imperfect human 
eye and its non-trustworthy perception. From such binary  (which shifted, dislocated or 
reappropriated throughout the history of philosophy but being reserved in one or other 
way), Plato proceeds to a hostile categorization and hierarchization of arts and expel the 
ones that which rely most visibly on mimesis, which holds for Plato a degraded and 
second hand copy that creates a phantasmal and illusionary resemblance to the model 
(though he cannot expel all mimetic action from Republic as mimesis is also the only 
possible  means for education of citizens). (Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography 124-128)  
Western philosophy has inherited this conception of light, its relation to truth together 
with the ambiguous Platonic duality of vision, which has later persisted as the decisive 
mark in its later phases as well. Martin Jay argues for a dual Western conception of 
light: Former, light as geometric, straight rays as Greek optics has privileged and latter 
being light as refraction. While the first “was seen as the essence of illumination and it 
existed whether perceived by the human eye or not” and called as lumen emphasizing 
form and outline , light as refraction stands for the actual experience of human sight, 
emphasizing color, shadow and movement  and is called as lux  and maybe called as 
perception or even sensation (29). “What might be called the alternating traditions of 
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speculation with the eyes of the mind and observation with the two eyes of the body 
provided fertile ground for the varieties of ocularcentrism that have so deeply penetrated 
Western culture.” (Jay 30) Such duality maybe also observed as vision and perception or 
as concept and metaphor, which could be multiplied under guise of different names and 
it is certainly related to the issue of mimesis, to be able to distinguish model (vision, 
essence, genera, Being) from copy (perception, substance, species, beings). However, to 
take such binary schematization too literal may lead one to ignore the clandestine 
anxiety to sustain such division proper through out the history of metaphysics.  The 
division between the concept as the bearer of proper meaning and the metaphor standing 
for its figurative substitution is the perfect example of such duality within the language 
of philosophy:   
 In accordance with the Greek etymology in play here, that meta-phorical 
“carrying-over” operates in both directions. If what we call “metaphorical” 
uses of a word are carried over from their “literal” uses, then we must say that 
those “literal” uses are also carried over from the “metaphorical” ones. So 
vision itself, “properly understood as a phenomenon of the body, is in truth 
merely an artifact of the metaphorical vision instituted by (and instituting) 
philosophy” (McCumber 235-236) 
 
Medieval philosophy has inherited and appropriated this specular characteristic of 
Classical Greek philosophy with complex shifts and even sometimes mysterious 
reversals, a debated and curious issue which unfortunately cannot be pursued here. It 
would be suffice it to note the privileging of divine vision of God whose power is 
intrinsically related to its eternally fixed gaze over beings, the world to see his own 
divine reflection on them.  
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With Enlightenment, ocularcentrism has taken a new twist   and becomes the dominant 
frame through which the modern ontology has been installed. Descartes, baptizing the 
vision as being the “noblest of senses”, has constituted Cartesian philosophy, stamping 
the modern philosophy and its visual/specular ethos. Cartesian vision acts as a 
mathematical schematization that undermines ordinary human vision for its vulnerability 
to illusion, for its “bad” visuality that cannot reach beyond mere appearances.  
 
Such division between ocularism and the mental vision do depend more on the alarmed 
differentiation between the good and bad vision both of which are inevitably doubling of 
what they represent.  The contemporaneous positivism/empiricism which could be 
characterized by John Locke and Francis Bacon, though rejected the Cartesian idea of 
innate intuitions that dwell in cogito and emphasized the observer’s passive reception of 
what lies outside of him, nonetheless shared its ocularcentric conception of idea and 
truth. “Both maintained a faith in the linkage between lucidity and rationality, which 
gave the Enlightenment its name”. (Jay 85)  Voltaire and Rousseau, the most prominent 
rival figures of this luminous era, have shared this specular philosophical ground. 
Voltaire “shared a duality of consciousness and matter” and like Descartes used “idea” 
as internal, clear and district representations (images) of the mind while also holding the 
positivist belief that these images of mind are constituted by the perception of external 
objects. (Jay 85) Rousseau, on the other hand, has driven by the pulse to make man 
“become completely transparent to each other and to himself, to become absolutely 
authentic to himself” (Jay 91) and shared the Platonic hostility to mimetic arts and 
political representation, which seeks the utopian state that will abolish the theatrical 
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distance between “the represented and the representer, the object seen and the seeing 
object” and substitute it with a festival “without masks”. (Derrida, Grammatology 307)  
 
The early nineteenth century also witnessed a certain reversal of light/darkness binary 
and a revaluation of night by the Romantics contrary to the increasingly strengthening 
tendency of “the third eye of mind”. They primarily emphasized the activity of mind and 
its “production” (rather than re-production) and hence produced a powerful position for 
the subject. 
 
However, as usual with all reversals, romantics could not escape a certain “eidaesthetics, 
as Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy call it, the yearning for a plastic representation 
of the Idea” (qtd in Jay, 109).  Hegelian dialectics, which is “often said to present the 
fulfillment of metaphysics, its end and accomplishment” (Derrida, Margins 73), sublates 
(Aufheben) the sensory immediacy (sight) with the help of sound (or more properly  with 
the language which could be claimed to be super-visual compared to the inadequate and 
imperfect visuality that common sight offers) to attain the representative power of mind 
By the same token,  Hegelian dialectics let mind to come to itself and declare mastery 
over itself. With Derridean critique, it turns out that “in spite of Hegel’s attempts to 
critique vision, knowledge for him, even philosophical knowledge, basically a form of 
theoria” (Mccumber  237), with the determining endeavor to attain the ultimate form of 
B/being and presence.  
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3.2.2 Challenging the Thought as Image  
 
 
In twentieth century, which has witnessed a gigantic proliferation and domination of 
visuality in almost every realm ranging from the panoptic machines of state to the 
nickelodeons and world fairs, the issue seems to hold and even strengthen its crucial 
importance and emerged as an issue on its behalf to be critically contemplated by many 
philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, all of which diagnosed and 
further criticized the ocularcentrism traversing  and marking the Western philosophy. 
Though each one tried to replace this visual paradigm and break through the 
metaphysics in their singular way, phenomenology as their common epistemological 
ground lead them back to the operation of “unconcealment” of Being and presence 
together with the persisting quest for origins.  
 
 
As Lacoue-Labarthe have laboriously demonstrated, in Heideggerian philosophy 
unthought, which resides in every thought and conceals itself from the investigating 
mind that seeks to bring it into total light, is formulated as if it is something “unique and 
distinct” and hence have a certain form and totality. Thought  and concept as having  
deliberate and distinct form and Being as totality whose outlines are implied to 
constitute a form no matter how it conceals itself, these are the moments for Heidegger 
in particular and  phenomenology in general to lead back to  what Lacoue-Labarthe calls 
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the specular/spectacular paradigm,  from which  Heidegger  claimed to break through. 
(Lacoue-Labarthe Typography 63-96)   
 
Western philosophy and culture shares this major characteristic of philosophical 
thought’s affinity with visuality and each philosophy has posited itself vis-à-vis this 
axiomatic trait, taking their sides between an external or internal light and a mysterious, 
sometimes horrible shadow, night or twilight veiling the eye and hence requiring other 
sensory organs (prominently ear and touch) like Nietzsche’s small ears or keen nostrils. 
However all philosophy, necessarily operating within language, is primarily a pursuit of 
giving form to presence and being. This pursuit of form, which is claimed to be the truth, 
remains inevitably specular/speculative.  
 
 
The hegemony of visuality over thought became the target of extensive criticism for the 
radical philosophies of many such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and they 
have contributed much to its crucial relation to the constitution of subject/object 
dichotomy and the violent operation of mastery and reification.  Phenomenology of 
Husserl and prominently Heidegger has inspired many thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty 
to surpass and overthrow such binding relation between thought and visuality. However, 
in all the replacements and reversals we could claim that the basic relation between 
thought and its inclination towards form, which is basically thought’s will to bring out 
and retrace the form of its subject matter predominantly with sight, its desire to reveal 
and represent its object of study has  incessantly returned at each constitutive moment of 
their philosophizing. It would be convenient to argue that each attempt to overthrow the 
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domination of visuality have found itself embracing it eventually, since each time 
thought has denied its impulse to form its subject matter and try to replace its most 
prominent model, which is visuality, with something (mostly with sound or more 
conveniently with speech-sound that assures the immediacy of self-presence maybe 
better than mere sight) that is assumed to have a better access to presence and its truth, it 
has fallen back to the very thing it evades, that is the desire to have/give form and order 
to the presence and being.  Neither an easy submission nor a fierce negation of this 
seemingly invincible inclination-to-form,  (following Lacoue-Labarthe , we could say 
that negation in the end always ends up with sublation that is repressing the negative and 
circumvent it to attain the positive,  the immediate access to truth) could handle it with 
the gentility and vigilance it necessitates.(Typography 43-138)   
 
It requires an altogether different logic, an obsessive willing to inspect what cannot be 
contained yet what is attempted to foreclosed in each philosophical discourse and a 
special attentiveness to blind spots that define and limit each ocular representation from 
within. Such reading also necessitates a constant watchfulness against the temptation to 
hastily decide on whether we should leave image as thought behind. Perhaps that is why 
Martin Jay places poststructuralist thought and deconstruction in particular in an 
ambivalent locale within his schematization of ocularcentric tradition throughout the 
Western philosophy and argues for: “Derrida’s vigilant refusal to valorize one side of a 
binary opposition, such as sensible, over another, such as intelligible, meant he was just 
as critical of theorists who believed visual experience could provide illuminations of 
truth. […] For Derrida, the yearning to do away entirely with representation- politically, 
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theatrically, or imagistically- turns out to be another form of the metaphysics of 
presence.”  (Jay 506-507)  
 
3.2.3 Deconstructive Critique of Ocularcentrism  
 
Though it is not possible to deal properly with primarily Derridean and generally 
poststructural/deconstructive contribution to the critique of phallogocularcentrism   
within the scope of this study, a vague sketching of the basic points would be needed 
since it will provide us with a larger network of what is consolidated and what is at risk 
in this connection between visuality and thought. Once such web of cross-cutting 
interests is illustrated, we will be able to get its innate relation with Orientalism which is 
actually a “textual” attitude that defines the intellectual and affectional and hence very 
much material relationship with the territory and people of the places geographically 
marked as Orient. Only after such detour, we will find the chance to ask the crucial 
question with a different accentuation: Who operates this marking or naming (that is 
equivalent to say figuring and forming) in which interests?  
 
This instantly brief annotation of persisting ocularcentrism in different guises throughout 
the Western philosophy has only revealed a seemingly binding relation between thought 
and vision up to this moment. However, the main issue at stake here is not confined to 
vision per se nor perception which has been perceived as its phenomenological 
equivalent and time to time its opposite.  Yet at the same time, it is not possible to argue 
that “mere” phenomenological visuality is not strategically related to the heart of this 
matter. One must be watchful neither to reconcile visuality with nor to oppose it to 
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perception.  Maybe it is altogether more plausible to denounce the very category of 
perception as such as Derrida does: “I don’t know what perception is and I don’t believe 
that anything like perception exists” (Qtd. in Jay 497) which aims to denounce the 
category of substance as biology or as a realm proper to body antedating, supporting 
from beneath and engendering the culturally oriented visuality. Perception as the pure 
un-marked site proper to biology and nature is to assign it as the origin for visuality 
which is always culturally informed as if such a pure state could ever been experienced.  
Then, what has been meant by ocularcentrism, that which sometimes Martin Jay seems 
to restrict solely to the phenomenal conception of visuality and its western 
representations such as perspective, should not be restricted to the 
conceptual/metaphorical abundance of light and vision within Western philosophy .  
Derrida traced this (meta-) metaphor/concept within the history of Western thought from 
the works of prominent philosophical figures such as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger to the 
social thinkers and “scientists” such as Rousseau and Claude Levi-Strauss. “This 
metaphor of shadow and light (of self-shadowing and self-hiding) [is the] founding 
metaphor of occidental philosophy as metaphysics …The entire history of our 
philosophy is a photology.” (Qtd. in McCumber 235). Derrida’s analysis leads us into 
some fundamental issues invested within thought’s so-called natural relation to 
sight/vision.  
 
First of all, Derridean analysis reveals that this ocular model is constitutive of Western 
thought and it is primarily related to its inclination towards (self) presence; towards “the 
copula is” as Said would call it. (Said, Orientalism 109)  What is meant by presence is 
the ontological certainty and stability that has been granted to phenomena sustained with 
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intelligible form and order which is accessible to consciousness.  Such notion of 
presence also implies the privileging temporal immediateness, as the “independence of 
the present moment from past and future” for the reason that “self-presence should 
produce itself in the undivided unity of a temporal present.” (Derrida qtd. in McCumber 
236).  
 
This  double operation guarantees two things at once; one is the simplicity and clarity of 
the world’s out-there-ness with a certain order and form in which everything has its own 
place and reason  no matter how sophisticated these reasons are for the mind to 
appreciate fully. In other words, consciousness is sustained the indisputable and fixed 
ground on which it can stand upright. The other which has been induced from such 
indisputable transparence of self-presence of things to themselves is the very self-
presence of the consciousness that perceives and thinks that which lies outside of itself.  
In other words, consciousness gains its properness by reflecting on that which lies 
outside of itself. We can easily see the consequence of such double maneuver, the 
constitution of the world and the consciousness that situates itself external to it.  Such 
double gesture depends on form before everything else and that is why idea has its 
Greek roots in Eidos, that means which appears. Derrida argues that 
 
Only a form is self-evident, only a form has or is an essence, only a form 
presents itself as such. All the concepts by means of eidos or morphe have been 
translated or determined refer to the theme of presence in general. Form is 
presence itself. Formality is whatever aspect of the thing in general presents 
itself, lets itself be seen, gives itself to be thought. That metaphysical thought is 
a thought of Being as form, that in metaphysics thought thinks itself as a 
thought of form, and the formality of the form […] is nothing but what is 
necessary. (Derrida, Margins 158) 
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This formality that thought pursues in order to come to itself is supposed have clarity 
and distinctness that allows for its recognition, it requires an intelligible pattern that 
would help the mind to differentiate from what lies outside of such form. Then we could 
argue that each attempt to recognize form (the same that equals to itself, self-presence) 
and to take it out from a totalized and undifferentiated ground is to produce a figuration 
of the world for and within mind. If form is what gives things their essence whose 
borders must be fixed enough to get recognized as they truly are, the contemplation of 
form will give mind its own form and hence the self-proximity in such circumlocution. 
Since form could only be retraced by reflection and such operation necessitates a degree 
of distance and separateness that would enable such reflection, mind could only attain 
form by positing itself apart from what it contemplates. Self-proximity of consciousness 
is paradoxically depended on this distanciation. Form that requires a separation and 
distance for recognition is the only way to achieve self-proximity, the presence itself. 
Circumlocution enables the Subject of consciousness to come to itself, to gain its 
immediacy to itself and the name of such circumlocution is re-presentation antedating 
each presentation. Metaphysics, as the constitutive moment for Subject and its Other to 
be born, has to erase and bypass this anterior delay and call what is already always 
representation as presentation.  If one could catch a glimpse of such hyperbolic relation 
that forces logic, one could get an insight what Lacoue-Labarthe conceives of the 
etymological relation between theory and theater that having the same etymology in 
Greek:  
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      The theater is a place where we go to see. What? What must present itself, present 
itself, so that there should be things present and so that we should be able to, we, 
ourselves, be present, and present to these present things: so that there should be 
gods and men, family and city, culture and wildness, war and peace, desire and hate, 
freedom and servility […] For this miracle, […] which is the very possibility that 
there should be a world, the Greeks had a word for it: techne. (Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Theatre des Realities 115) 
 
Techne indicates production that is used for both art and knowledge, “knowledge in 
general” as proposed by Heidegger. Such conception of knowledge reveals the intrinsic 
relation between knowledge and representation as “In its most eminent sense, such 
knowledge indicates art […], i.e. meaning the connection of knowledge to the present 
and to the presence, which Greeks spoke of as mimesis” and mimesis here is not 
confined to its Latin substitution imitatio.  (Lacoue-Labarthe, Theatre 115) Following 
Lacoue-Labarthe we can argue that what is at stake is the immediateness and 
transparency  that knowledge claims for  and hence the very reason it  posits itself 
superior to art, whose representative nature is condemned for being mere imitation of 
nature or worse,  for being distortive and illusionary,  that falls away from self-presence. 
In fact, “mimesis  “precedes” truth in a certain sense; by destabilizing it in advance, it 
introduces a desire  for homoiosis [self-adequation] and makes it possible, perhaps, to 
account for it, as for everything  that might be its effect, up to  and including what is 
called the subject.” (Derrida, Typography 27). “There appears in [onto-ideo-logy’s] 
contours what must be called, in all rigors, onto-typo-logy” which could be equally 
called as mimesis, “fictioning and (re)presentation, Darstellung, including –even 
primarily- auto- (re)presentation (Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography  55:122).  The whole 
metaphysical tradition beginning with Plato, “stages the programming of non-mimetic 
discourse.” (123)  and efface this non-originary origin and instead “theorize” mimesis 
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restricting it to domain of visible where it will occur safely as mere imitation of its 
model whose form is fixed and stabile.  Hence, mimesis or the mimetician will be frozen 
and installed, it will be theorized as the trickster playing with mirrors, “to reduce his 
disquieting and prodigious power by simply revealing that it rests only upon a play of 
mirrors and is therefore nothing – or nearly nothing: a mere sleight of hand.” (Lacoue-
Labarthe 94) What is so disturbing about Darstellung or mimesis is the implication that 
“repetition is “originary”, representation precedes presentation. Yet, what is more 
dangerous is that “pure and disquieting plasticity which potentially authorizes the 
varying appropriation of all characters and all the roles […], which doubtless requires a 
“subjective base”- a “wax”- but without any other property than an infinite malleability: 
instability itself. (Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography 115)  
 
What follows this effacement of instability and plasticity is the reduction of mimesis to 
“what Derrida calls “mimetologism”, a visual version of logocentrism.” (Jay 505) where 
the re-presentation or reflection is conceived by reference to its originary referent or 
model. By the same token, the signified, which could be rightly named as presence, 
gains the privileged ontological status of the referent, the origin and self-containment, 
the stability of form. But, indeed, “for what is reflected is split in itself and not only as 
an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it 
doubles.” (Derrida, Grammatology 36) Following such argument, we can conclude that 
the hegemonic conception of form or figure whose borders are visually fixed and 
stabilized presupposes the Idea [of Subject], or in Lacoue-Labarthe’s words Gestalt 
presupposes the Platonic determination of Being as eidos/idea. (Typography 54) 
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A whole network of interests is invested within such desire of form and its revealment. 
The desire of form and an intelligible order is first of all about rendering an 
immediateness of the subject to itself, to grant self-presence. The only way to grant such 
positive attribute of being is to stabilize its form  and to give it a figure by drawing clear-
cut borders between what it is and what it is not. “It is by no means obvious that self-
identity presupposes that there be an other, because, to put it quite simply, the other also 
presupposes identical. The Hegelian formulation of the dialectical principle, according 
to which identity is the identity of identity and difference in fact, presupposes an original 
attribution of identity. As long as the speculative logic, [...] underpins the interpretation 
of mimesis, one can only ever move endlessly from the same to the other- under the 
authority of the same.” (Lacoue-Labarthe, Art and Politics 81). However, mimesis 
presupposes an impure malleability, a constitutive instability before the subject arrives, 
and that is why it has to be confined to imitatio under which it could be domesticated as 
a guaranteed relationship between model and copy, whose aim is to guarantee primarily 
the originary and stability of the model itself. Then, such metaphysical installation or 
figuration does always work in favor for the subject of consciousness to give way for its 
birth and later efface the delay and substitute it with immediateness to itself. This 
belated birth of subject, whose date we can never truly indicate since it does not 
“happen” in positive terms, is the pure trace which cannot be confined to the 
fundamental duality between absence and presence. So, it is about thinking of mimesis 
in an entirely different way: “The difficult thing is, as ever, to think an originary 
secondarity- or rather to think the origin as second, as initially divided and deferred, 
which is to say in differance.” (Lacoue-Labarthe, Art and Politics 84).  Identity derives 
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from the mimetic appropriation, the Same always derivates from the Other and subject is 
always indebted to the object, and the will to immediate presence could never entirely 
get rid of this “original supplementarity, that is the very structure between physis and 
techne.” (Lacoue-Labarthe, Art and Politics 83).  
 
Eidetic thought tries to confine representation (or mimesis) to a degraded duplication or 
re-production of the essences which carry the true form of substance. And again, in its 
disguise of Platonic reversal eidetic thought thwarts  this potentially infinite operation 
into self-engenderment, where the paradoxical logic of mimesis or representation 
teleologically brought to a halt in order to stabilize an originary subject as in the case of 
Hegel or Heidegger and even of  Lacan  as Lacoue-Labarthe  argues. (Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Typography 137-207)  But this constitutive delay never happens at once and cannot be 
situated only at origin, “differance is inherent in the subject, forever preventing it from 
being subject (or, in other words from being a stable essent) and essentially determining 
it as mortal.”(Lacoue-Labarthe 83) Figuration first violently splits then freezes the  
subject /object to death. 
 
Then, what to do with this ocularcentrism, or specular/speculative logic that seems to 
return at each attempt to overcome it? How this mirroring device of thought could be 
stopped from freezing of what it reflects on for eternity?  As it is not possible to do away 
with re-presentation, this mirror could not be shattered, nor it is ever able to reflect itself 
unless one reflects its own image onto another mirror, perhaps that is why Derrida 
argues: “If light is the element of violence, then one must contest light with a certain 
other light, in order to avoid the worst violence.” (Writing, 117)  This is to ceaselessly 
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attempt at displacing the conceptual order of each production which is “necessarily a 
text, the system of a writing and of a reading which we know is ordered around its own 
blind spot”, then deconstruction is a vigilant attentiveness to these blind spots that 
authorize each text. Pointing towards this blind spot, which is “the not-seen that opens 
and limits visibility”, is the remedy against the totality of the reflection. Gasche calls this 
disruptive strategy as looking through the mirror and revealing its tain:  
 
In this first step of the deconstruction of reflection and speculation, the mirroring is 
made excessive in order that it may look through the looking glass towards what 
makes the speculum possible. To look through the mirror is to look at its reverse 
side, at the dull side doubling the mirror’s specular play, in short, at the tain of the 
mirror. It is on this reverse side – on the tinfoil – that dissemination writes itself, 
remarks Derrida. […] on this lining of the outside surface of reflection, one can 
read the “system” of the infrastructures that commands  the mirror’s play and 
determined the angles of reflection. (Gasche 238) 
 
But this tinfoil is only semireflexive and “the mirror’s play cannot accommodate [the 
structurally limitless play of undecidables] without at the same time relinquishing the 
telos of its operation: the actualization of the unity of all that is reasonable. […] In all its 
perfection, the specular play shows itself incapable of reflecting, of sublating its limits”. 
(238) This is where deconstruction differs from the dominant understanding of critique: 
 
Derrida’s criticism does not reject reflection and speculation in favor of total 
immediacy, nor does it presuppose an originary unity by virtue of which the 
traditional problems of reflexivity can be dialectically overcome in absolute 
reflection or speculation […] Focusing on  an analysis  of those heterogeneous 
instances  that are the “true” conditions of the possibility of reflection and 
speculation without being  susceptible to accommodation by the intended 
totality, Derrida’s philosophy reinscribes , in the strict meaning of this word,  
reflection and speculation into what exceeds it: the play of the infrastructures. 
[It] takes reflection’s exigencies seriously. It is the only way to trace the limits 
of reflection without falling prey to the fictions on which it is based. (Gasche 
239)  
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We have to take representation quite seriously since it renders things present before 
presence arrives at its place,  and without which no truth or identity could ever be 
possible. Hence, it is strictly necessary to destabilize its modus operandi to undo its 
violence. 
 
3.3 Will to Figure: Cinema and Orientalism intersects  
 
 
After such long detour, if we turn back tour initial concern of the locus where cinema 
and Orientalism intersects, the implications are quite clear.  To begin with Orientalism, 
we have to understand that this desire to give a form by means of visualizing the Orient 
is the constitutive moment for Orientalism to operate, since it strictly depends on a 
specular/speculative dialectic where the Western Subject of representation may attain its 
absolute form or identity by reflecting on what is outside of itself. Unless it can 
guarantee the other-ness of what lies external to itself by giving it a distinct form and 
name, it would not attain its so-called unity of identity whose borders are always 
threatened by the constitutive instability. “The Orient and Occident are then not just 
words, but names, proper names constructing identities which become territories. It [the 
Orient] is a differential term which defines what is not Western. It defines the West 
negatively, so that the Occident as a category cannot exist without the Orient.  Inversely, 
the Orient will then exist only from the Western vantage point.  The western surveying 
gaze somehow constitutes itself as Western when looking at the Orient, at the other.” 
(Richon 242). However, what should be emphasized here is not only the Orient’s 
reduction to a certain type of Western representation, which brings it into the sphere of 
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“presence”, and self-identicality. What remains crucial in such critique is Western “self-
presence”, that is to say identity comes also after such figuration of the other by negating 
all the values and predicates he himself attributes to the other. But this coming to itself 
of subject by negation-sublation could never attain the moment of absolute self-
reflection. Abiding the very law of endless and abysmal mimesis, engenderment of the 
subject as such is necessarily deferred.  The violence of metaphysical figuration of the 
Orient as an eternal, ahistorical, statuery figure must be understood as the signal of the 
immerse anxiety and repression for the instability that dwells within the dialectical 
process.  
 
This constitutive destability is not only monstrous for the Western subject but also for 
his Other(s) that seeks recognition and restitution of their subjectity. That is one of the 
reasons, I guess, Said avoids the task of dealing with the intrinsic relation between 
visuality and Orientalism, since when this relation has been carried to its end, his 
critique that shares some ground with humanism would get serious damage as well. 
However, one must be careful to note that the issue would not lose a slight bit of  
ethical-political importance if it would be handled by such deconstructive alertness, but 
for the reason that it would lose the secure ground of humanist trust on the figure of 
individual/ intellectual (a Gestalt figure once again frozen in front of the mirror of 
theoria). Even more so, it would introduce a persistent doubt that will go along and 
simultaneously disrupt the longing for recognition which is something that “one cannot 
not-want” as Spivak would say. (PCCI 28)   
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If the figuration of Orient by specular/spectacular tools of Western representation 
renders the Orient as an anachronistic and fixed tableau, one must not question whether 
the Orient does really change or not, but instead why the Western 
reflection/representation of (a totalized and unified) Orient resists and survives 
otherwise enormous historical changes. It has recognizable persistent characteristics that 
could be traced at least back to Greeks. It is better to note here that such tracking back 
does not presuppose Occident’s self-claimed origins lying at Ancient Greek, but points 
to the mimetic rivalry between post-renaissance West and a certain installation of 
ancient Greece. Lacoue-Labarthe cites from Pericles with a literal translation:   “We love 
the beautiful with frugality and knowledge without softness”. For the second part of the 
sentence Hannah Arendt offers: “We philosophize without the barbarian vice of 
softness.” (Qtd in Art and Politics 97-98). Lacoue-Labarthe argues that “softness” 
indicates surely “the supreme barbarian vice, i.e., the Oriental vice.”  Such dictum 
clearly demonstrates that the Greek Polis is engendered, given self-birth by the negation 
of what has been attributed to the Oriental vices: the lavish luxury in arts and softness in 
thought.  
 
The extravagance and material abundance on one hand, the ambiguity and metaphoricity 
of Oriental thought lacking the firmness and formality of proper (Western) thought  
together with feminization and servitude (which could be very well disguised under the 
name of “hospitality” in the modern context as we can see in  the movie Hamam)  on the 
other are easily recognizable traits  through out the whole Western oeuvre of arts and 
philosophy, constituting a common model shared by Orientalist painting,  travel 
literature  and popular cinema.  
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Likewise, Richon argues for the Aristotelian usage of the concept-name “despot”, which 
originally designates the domestic mastery of Greek male citizen over his slaves and 
women, for Oriental governments where “people are said to be slaves by nature. It 
follows, therefore, that the Greek has a right to command the barbarian, just as the 
political is superior to domestic.” (Richon 253)  One should remember the Western 
obsession with Oriental despots and their seemingly infinite power over his subjects that 
are a current theme of paintings and literature, which later becomes a powerful theme for 
cinema - i.e. Rudolph Valentino’s series of Sheik. While the despot is seemingly a 
ridiculous but horrible figure that threatens the sacred democratic values, it appeals to 
sexual phantasms of Western phallogocentrism with all the material abundance and 
polygamous sexuality he seems to enjoy.  
 
Another common characteristic is the double gesture of staging the Orient either in the 
so-called documentary style where the immediacy of image is attempted to get a reality 
effect, or else in a pompously fictional manner where the Orient becomes the semi-
mythological, almost surreal site where mysterious masquerade, unleashed eroticism and 
even sometimes a romantic revival of   most rigorous Western values takes over.  As 
Said brilliantly exposes in works of major Orientalist scholars, this type of hyper realism 
is obsessed with collecting and relating overwhelming data about the ways the Orient 
exist, to present a total picture of Orient for the reader with rich details and anecdotes. 
Such representative mode claims to have transparency of immediate observation and 
actual experience and hence it stays away from narrative techniques that reveal fictional 
quality. One of the correlatives of this literal mise-en-scene is, as Richon argues, 
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nineteenth century photography, “that has been denied the status of image: It is not 
picturesque, it is not a picture. A negation which gives to the photograph the status of a 
pure trace, an indexical fragment, a metonymical clue brought back to the mother 
country, where it could be endowed with metaphorical value: this is the Orient, bare, 
untouched   and deserted.” (255) The argument above is equally plausible for the late 
nineteenth century invention of cinematography and such ruse of transparency still holds 
its heyday for mainstream photography/cinematography that is extensively used by news 
media and  ethnographic documentaries.  
 
In the second case, Orient becomes a pre-historical fairy locus that preserves the Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian origins of the mighty Western civilization, waiting patiently 
for the pilgrim to unveil its most intimate secrets and hence host the rejuvenation of the 
Western subject.  The romantic aesthetization of Orient in the works of Goethe and 
Flaubert are only two examples that can be given. Such romantic aesthetization and 
mystification of Orient should also be considered with the reaction against the violent 
exposition of the world picture with Enlightenment that gave way to a re-valuation of 
what holds adversary value: since Orient belongs to night, to evading mysteries, the play 
site of spirituality and sensuality and holds the origins of “man” at its reserve, it 
becomes the perfect site for the Western traveler to re-discover himself by losing 
himself.  Artists like Delacroix  “found in the Orient a new myth of origin: a new model  
in an older civilization […] the Orient becomes  like an exaggerated Italy.[…] All these 
references  to an immutable past, frozen in the eternity of  marble-like figures, build up 
representations  of an harmonious  beginning.” (Richon 248) 
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One can sense the proximity between these seemingly two opposite textual attitudes 
towards the Orient.  The anthropologizing attitude of the former and the mummifying 
mystification of the latter do share the common presupposition that the Orient “is” only 
and only for the Western subject to find his own origins, which he left behind thousands 
of years ago. “A standard constructing an idealization: a view of the Orient as an 
archaeological field; a museum in nature, nature as a museum offered to Western 
scrutiny.” (Emphasis mine, Richon 255). Then, Orient serves as the mythical foundation 
of Western culture, an eternal natural museum that reserves the origins of Western 
civilization for the Western spectator. Considering this heavy burden, it comes no 
surprise that Orient was a real disappointment for these artists who traveled far enough 
to cross Italy in  pursuit of direct observation of Oriental miracles. They have to retreat 
to their initial pictorial models that they have acquired in motherland as it was difficult 
to find a match equivalent to the extravagances of their imaginary.  
 
The mythical representation of Orient in both forms, either as an uncontaminated state of 
nature where the prehistorical man lives or as a great outdoor museum where the 
beauties and vices of great antiquity waits for their true proprietor, provides the Western 
imaginary the coordinates of its origins and the chance to constitute itself by a 
movement of sublation, where the origins are repressed and incorporated to be exceeded. 
“References to antiquity, to an harmonious origin, become the mark of a beginning 
which is unlikely to be fully rediscovered, just as it is to be forgotten. The origin is like a 
vanishing point and consists of the forgetting of the negation which is constitutive of its 
very existence” (Richon 245).   And the notion of origin, by definition, necessitates a 
precise stability, almost a punctual existence that is incapable of  motion so that it may 
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enable  perceiving movement and change, which are the two characteristic virtues 
attributed to West. However, such notion of movement necessitates static conceptions of 
both terms so that it would enable the very measurement of that movement. With this 
double movement, West appropriates itself.   
 
Orient becomes the scenery of   ancient memories or the grotesque stage of frenzy 
dreams and as dreams and memories do, it primarily informs us about the dreamer not 
the dream itself.  Just like memories, Orient does not refer to an objective past that 
memory draws its content, but to an “originary deformation which is the only formation 
which informs us about the past” (Richon 246). Just like dreams whose form “is that of a 
de-formation that dissimulates its deformative character by creating a representational 
façade,” Orientalist representation achieves the persuading effect of transparent 
presentation of its object matter. “‘Darstellung’ thus becomes one of the means by which 
the dream achieves its goal of ‘Entstellung’ [distortion]” (Weber, 79). That is why 
Orientalist clichés cannot be simply fought by factual corrections as dissimulation or 
deformation is the very engine of Orientalist representation.   
 
Orient as the vanishing point of Western perspective, passively returns the gaze and 
consolidates the superimposition between the monocular and un-blinking eye (“I”) of the 
representation and the spectator. 
 
Perhaps that is why cinema, from its very beginnings, was fascinated by the images of 
Oriental. Camera, abiding the renaissance rules of perspective and depth more than 
proving their adequateness to reality, provided a panoramic and monocular vision and a 
  81                                                                                
 
single point of view for the spectator to be identified with.  Preceding the invention of 
camera and birth of cinema , the nineteenth century panoptical machines such as 
panorama (1792) and diorama (1823), as Orr argued, offered the spectator a virtual 
spatial and temporal mobility, whose success was dependent on the relative immobility 
of spectators and the creation of illusion of unmediated referentiality. (Orr 23) These 
protocinematic devices do share the sheer exhibitionism and persuasive pseudo 
mobilization   with the newly emerging tourism industry and world fares that display 
exotic products and freaks like Hottentot’s Venus thanks to full-fledge colonialism. 
Perhaps it is plausible to argue together with Tom Gunning and Orr that early 
filmmaking, before the arrival of conventional narrative, was “closer to the bold visual 
display of the fairground attraction than it was to a storytelling form, […] and this form 
of spectacle display did not disappear  when narrative film became more dominant”, but 
rather goes underground as a component of narrative films.(Orr 89)This increasing 
mobility that reached its apex with the invention of cinema  rendered the temporal and 
spatial mastery over the world enjoyed by the spectator, who has been paradoxically 
immobilized in front of the screen.  Such imaginary mastery of the world as picture 
should be thought in relation to the real colonial expeditions that is enabled and fueled 
by (also, without any contradiction, enables and fuels) this scopophilia.   As Jean-Louis 
Comolli argues, “if the social machine manufactures representations, it also 
manufactures itself from representations.” (Comolli 121).   
 
Comolli also speaks of a frenzy of the visible beginning with late nineteenth century, 
one of whose effects is “of something of a geographical extension of the field of the 
visible and the representable: by journies, explorations, colonisations, the whole world 
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becomes visible at the same time it becomes appropriatable.” (123) Comolli  argues that 
the technological  innovations such as sound, deep focus and color  were not mere 
technological innovations per se , but  the very renewal and  transformation of  what 
formerly renaissance perspectives and humanist ocularcentrism  alone managed to grasp: 
the analogical representation,  the perfection of  a structurally deficient verisimilitude, 
“the perfectionment and redefinition of the impression of reality.” (132) Such perfection 
of impression of reality, which indeed required the replacement of codes of reality 
already inscribed within image, aims “to reduce the gap which the “yes-I-know/but-all-
the-same” has to fill.” (133) However, such gap is irreducible and always requires a 
certain degree of disavowal from the spectator, an inevitable “process of repression of 
which the otherness of film to the real is the object” from the spectator. (Comolli 135). 
Comolli argues: 
The most analogical representation of the world is still not, is never, its 
reduplication. Analogical representation is a false repetition, staggered, 
disphased, deferred  and different; but it produces  effects of repetition analogy 
which imply the disavowal ( or the repression)  of these differences and which 
thus  make of the desire for identity, identification, recognition, of the desire for 
the same, one of the principal driving forces of analogical figuration.(Comolli, 
138) 
 
Comolli’s  remark is of great value since he goes right through the  heart of  cinematic 
apparatus and exposes its intrinsic relation with the  ideological  without  reducing  
neither the cinematic medium to its mere content  nor the notion of  ideology to the 
antonym of  truth. Rather he points to the cinematic unthought which limits and enables 
its working towards the simultaneity and immediateness of the category of realism. 
What Richon argues for specular realism in Orientalist academic painting holds value 
for cinema as well: “The ideological message is by no means educed to the ‘content’ of 
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the image, but is the effect of the means of representation and signification at work.” 
(Richon 246) 
 
Cinema, more than any other visual medium preceding it, blurs, yet in such blur  
conserves  the distinction between the real and its impression. “The whole edifice of 
cinematic representation finds itself affected with a fundamental lack: the negative 
index, the restriction the disavowal of which is the symptom and which it tries to fill 
while at the same time displaying it. […] It is what resists cinematic representation, 
limiting it on all sides and from within, which constitutes equally its force; what makes 
it falter what makes it go.” (Comolli 141)  This structuring disillusion, this present index 
of an absence, of the lack of another image, as Comolli calls it, is ,at the same time, the 
strength of cinema to work against  the completing, reassuring  representations of 
ideology and this strength of disillusion is needed if  “cinematic representation is to do 
something  other than  pile visible over visible, if it is,  in certain rare flashes, to produce 
in our sight  the very blindness  which is at the heart of this visible.” (141). If cinema is 
allowed to reveal its own limit, if it is allowed to point to its blind spot that constitutes 
the very illusion of its verisimilitude to immediacy, then it would launch the most  
effective and perhaps the only critique of its own.  For that critique to be possible, it 
must be vigilant and persistent, most of the times situational and strategic, even 
counterfeit to undo cinema from within.   
 
 Perhaps it was this persuasive claim to transparency of cinema based on the strength of 
visuality has provided the perfect locus for Orientalist discourse to adjust and reform 
accordingly to the coming century.  What Mary Ann Doane argues for the construction 
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of blackness in late nineteenth century West seems to hold truth for Orientalism as well: 
“whether in the colonial discourse of photography, […], or the aesthetic languages of the 
nineteenth century, the hyperbolic sexualization of blackness is presented within a visual 
framework; it is a function of ‘seeing’ as an epistemological guarantee- Nana’s 
blackness emerges to the surface so that it an be seen and verified. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the cinema as an institution would embrace the colonialist project and 
reinscribe its terms within its uniquely optical narrative logic.” (450) If difference is 
already embedded within Western understanding of visuality as perceiving distinct form, 
then the ontological /epistemological difference of Oriental could be articulated best in 
visual terms and cinema would be a perfect medium to perform it. 
 
By prosthetically extending human perception, the apparatus grants the 
spectator the illusory ubiquity of the “all-perceiving subject” enjoying an 
exhilarating sense of visual power. From the Diorama, the Panorama, and the 
Cosmorama up through NatureMax, the cinema has amplified and mobilized 
the virtual gaze of photography, bringing past into present, distant to near, […] 
affirming the European spectator’s sense of power while turning the colonies 
into spectacle for the metropole’s voyeuristic gaze. (Shohat 103-104) 
 
 
Cinema, whose birth coincided with heyday of imperialism and basic conventions were 
settled by the leading colonizing nations of West,  inevitably descended and mobilized 
the imperial ideals and desires that were already absorbed by the majority thanks to 
popular fictions, tales of expeditions, government sponsored patriotism  together with 
myths of promised lands in the colonies attracting the urban poor.  Cinema takes over 
the novels and newspapers’ function to re-adjust coordinates of time and space and to 
suture a meaningful narrative out of history to be fulfilled for the reader.  “The cinema, 
as the world’s storyteller par excellence, was ideally suited to relay the projected 
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narratives of nations and empires.” (Shohat 101) Other than this well-known function of 
creating national identity through narrative, cinematic image also served for ethnography 
and anthropology to bring home undisputable records that served evidence for their 
scientific claims.  
 
As the product of both science and mass culture, cinema combined traveling 
knowledge with traveling spectacles, conveying a view of the “world itself as 
an exhibition.” The study of hypersexualized “other” in scientific discourse 
was paralleled by the cinema’s scopophilic display of aliens as spectacle. 
(Shohat 108) 
 
Cinema, informed with the long traditions of art such as architecture, literature, painting 
and theater to fuse and utilize their effects in its singular way, has created the greatest 
spectacle ever with the most persuasive approximation to reality. Considering this 
advantageous position with the singular capacity of photographic reproduction of time 
and space, it becomes no surprise that cinema invoked much enthusiasm for the imperial 
states and later totalitarian regimes such Nazi Germany to cement unified national 
identity and doctrine. Syberberg, even argues that cinema is the perfect match for the 
total work of art ( Gesamtkuntswerk) which was primarily a political-aesthetic  project 
whose lineage could be traced back to the Greek “dream of the City as work of art” if we 
follow Lacoue-Labarthe on that matter.( Art and Politics 64) The total work of art is the 
unified and absolute art form that “should be a celebration of the national community, it 
should be the religion.”  Precisely at this point, Syberberg argues that Hitler’s 
enthusiasm with film medium was more than instrumental; his whole project was 
essentially cinematic which makes him the “greatest film-maker of all time” (qtd. in  
Lacoue-Labarthe, Art and Politics 64-66) since he initiated  the most  extravagant 
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spectacle  that has been witnessed ever with carnivalesque mobilization of masses  and 
the most theatrical stage of  industrialized genocide. Early cinema reveals a close 
affinity with emerging war technologies like aerials, exhibitionism of world fairs, desire 
to make visible of science and medicals for what remained hitherto invisible and 
fascination with accelerating mobility that has been primarily fueled by imperial 
expansion. (Virilio 11-29) In close relation and even collaboration with those other 
fields, cinema, right from its beginnings, was a spatio-temporal rearticulation of the 
world in preeminently visual terms. This visual mastery meant at the same time spatio-
temporal mastery and immense mobility across time and space which has paradoxically 
required immobilization and fixation of spectator. “Cinema thus became the 
epistemological mediator between the cultural space of the Western spectator and that of 
the cultures represented on the screen, linking separate spaces and figurally separate 
temporalities in a single moment of exposure.” (Shohat 93)  
 
As we have seen, cinema and Orientalism share the ocularcentric common ground that 
introduces difference always in terms of same. For cinema, it operates, first of all, on the 
level of filmic experience that disavows the difference of repetition or representation to 
substitute it with an immediate reciprocality to reality. Secondly, in its historically 
Western dominant form, cinema was always fascinated with the exhibition and 
representation of Oriental figure to a principally Western audience this time with a hyper 
difference from the Western norm. Such figuration of radical difference is naturalized 
and made transparent by the disavowal of re-presentational nature of the spectacle. 
Visuality served the perfect means to engender such proximity to reality thanks to the 
Western metaphysics that conceives presence and thought through a specular-
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speculative logic which engenders and stabilizes the position of sovereign Subject and 
his clear-cut identity.   
 
On the other hand, this self-engenderment and stabilization of Subject via dialectics of 
mirroring cannot be guaranteed at once, since the success of operation depends on the 
disavowal of anteriority, instability and repetition that in fact constitutes the very 
identity and stability. Representation is the only means to present oneself thus it cannot 
be simply effaced. It persists as the remainder of primary repetition and hence preserves 
the risk of loss of Subject, that is why representation has to be constantly mastered and 
disciplinized by such repressive logic. 
 
Thus, repetition and citation is the last common characteristics that have been shared by 
both. Orientalism has piled a massive archive of representations that each 
disciple/enthusiast may first refer, then re-adjust and contribute to. This discursive 
signification process that circulates by repetition and adoption, before everything else, 
points to the primary repetitive frame from which Orientalist knowledge and art 
establishes its object.  At the same time, it refers to a hidden anxiety to sustain the 
intelligibility and predictability of the form of its subject matter that simultaneously 
grants stability and authority to the investigating subject.  Repetition is necessary to 
relieve anxiety and to sustain the representational configuration that assigns sovereignty 
and mastery to Western Subject vis-à-vis the Oriental object. Yet, at the same time, 
repetition, by definition, carries the risk of opening these representational schemata to 
destabilization and alteration especially when it is carried to its limit and exposed as 
such. 
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Likewise, cinema has inherited and adopted much of its techniques from older arts, for 
instance narrative styles and themes from novel and theater, inspiration for light, color 
and composition from painting and  such inspirations came along with already 
circulating models for representing race and geography. Besides this exchange, 
circulation and adaptation between cinema and other forms of art, cinema also 
articulated a vast amount of reference of its own. Genre film perfectly illustrates 
cinema’s reliance on citation and repetition. Genre’s success depends on the reiterability 
of certain visual narrative elements and the ability to reproduce and enhance the pleasure 
attached to these elements.  Keeping in mind the common characteristics of repetition 
and citationality that film medium and phallogocentrism as in its specific instance of 
Orientalism share, it comes no surprise that the most persistent and influencing film 
genres were prominently about mastering the Other that invoked ambivalent feelings of 
fascination and fear for the Western Subject. While Westerns and Oriental staged travel 
adventures (from Lawrence of Arabia  and  the Raiders of the Lost Ark to the upcoming  
Hidalgo) reflect  explicit expressions of  Western  hostility and  oversimplification of 
other cultures, in genres like science fiction and horror, the fascination  and fear of 
Western Subject with  his other(s)  becomes encrypted, displaced  and amplified in 
encounters with imaginary creatures.  A vast literature has been devoted to the 
manifestations of White male anxiety against the sexual and racial difference and how 
such anxiety signs and grants the perversive pleasures found in these films.  For 
instance, studies on King Kong films reveals that fear of hypersexualized black male and 
possibility of miscegenation together with projections of rapist fantasy were the primary 
sources of attraction. (Shoat & Stam 90-1,106 ) 
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To sum up, where cinema and Orientalism intersects, we witness a visual narrative that 
depends primarily on the epistemological and ontological distinction set between East 
and West and such distinction has been inaugurated principally in visual terms. In most 
films taken place in Orient, even if we leave aside the attribution of movement and 
progression singularly to Western protagonists and the centralization of film’s concern 
solely around Western-oriented issues and desires such as self-actualization based on 
individual performance, sexual maturation and entrepreneurial abilities, the visual 
regime and the handling of camera posits the spectator to be identified with protagonist’s 
point of view that depicts the Orient as a tableau.    
 
Moreover, the filmic representation of Orient is indebted to prior Orientalist conventions 
and they demonstrate a persistent and repetitious employment of these conventions 
throughout the history of cinema. 
 
3.4 Hamam and Harem Suare: The Delayed pleasures of Seeing the Other 
 
 
If we have a closer look at Hamam and Harem Suare, we may detect certain significant 
continuities with Orientalist tradition of representation. However, we must note that both 
films, at the same time, carry out considerable disruptions that transgress the given 
borders of conventional Orientalist framework.  Yet, whether such transgressive 
refigurations of Orient do succeed to seriously question and destabilize the established 
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configuration that install Orient primarily as an anachronistic site of fantasy vis-à-vis the 
Western Subject deserves more thoughtful discussion. As we will see later, the promise 
of sexual transgression and a revaluation of Orient on the basis of its aesthetic and moral 
virtues may not suffice to break away with the binary structure of Orientalism whose 
initial violence starts with an ontological distinction that posits Orient as the site and 
object of Western desires to know, penetrate and master the other.  
  
As mentioned earlier, both films employ a stylistic aesthetization of Orient with 
employment of diffuse lightning, sensual colors and carefully chosen settings that will 
suit to the portrayal of Orient in its difference to West.  In Hamam, cross-cutting scenes 
back to Italy are visually distinguished with more focused sight, with more luminosity 
contrary to the dim and soft quality of light sustained by low key lightning that 
dominates the film’s Oriental atmosphere. While camera is posited conventionally to 
depict Francesco’s house in Italy largely on a perpendicular axis that gives an easy 
orientation to the spectator, both indoor and outdoor scenes in Istanbul are disorienting. 
Camera movements support the disorienting and intimately interconnected architecture 
of the house that has been consisted of many doors and interconnections to its outside 
like the communicative front window, like the secret passage way to the bathhouse. 
Spectator lost himself and his private sphere together with Francesco in this warm and 
intimately connected house and neighborhood. Likewise, both Francesco’s and his wife, 
Martha’s wandering through the city of Istanbul was dazzling since Istanbul was 
depicted as consist of narrow streets  and passageways that lead to desecrated  buildings 
with apparently open doors still preserving the most personal items of the former 
resident  and  tangled streets get Francesco to mysterious Turkish Bathhouses.  
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Likewise, the neighborhood that Francesco dwells with Turkish family seems to have no 
clear distinction between public and private domains.  The street place becomes the 
locus for the circumcision feast and the carnivalesque contribution of people with dances 
and abundant food.  Istanbul seems to offer to the traveler a fairy place where there 
remains no actual distinction between inside and outside, between public and private, 
and between past and present  where all difference is melted into an extensive 
domesticity and an ever-present  that claims the secrets of past.  While, another Istanbul 
with busy streets and huge modern buildings is hinted with a panoramic view from the 
office of the mysterious and powerful businesswomen, this (already-happened) version 
of Istanbul has been strongly denied access to vision with an implicit criticism of the 
corporate capitalism, which has been conveyed within the narrative via neighborhood’s 
resistance to evacuation (which, surprisingly inaugurated by an Italian not a native 
resident). Questioning the authenticity of this portrayal of Istanbul will be inevitably 
misled, as it is an enormously complex city that inhabits innumerable different 
architectural facades and ways of living like any other big city in the world. However, 
why specifically “this” Istanbul is chosen to be portrayed as “the” Istanbul and is put 
into opposition with a high-urban and corporate Istanbul is worth questioning. Why 
specifically this aesthetization is found more suitable to narrate the story of an Italian 
man who discovers himself in Orient?  Why this staging is necessary?  The bitter mark 
of Francesco’s wife could be useful to partially illustrate this issue: “No, don’t tell me 
you care for these people and this place. I know you very well, you only care for 
yourself.[…] You have come here because you could never dare doing the things you 
found the chance to do here back in Rome.”  (Hamam) The core of the story, which is 
Francesco’s sexual awakening, required “another” kind of place where he would find the 
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chance to temporarily forget his former and partially castrated (by the powerful 
femininity figure of  his wife) identity to re-discover his authentic being.  This highly 
stylized visual representation of Istanbul was strictly necessary for the narrative to move 
and persuade the spectator. So, like Francesco, spectator may playfully venture through 
the mysteries of Orient and unveil its hidden treasures that promise themselves to the 
Western protagonist.  Hence, the alleged resistance of Orient to proper Western vision 
that has been carried out by soft focus, melting colors, bewildering setting and veiling 
themes such as steam helps heightening the delayed pleasure of seeing.  The climax 
scene where Martha peeps at her husband and his lover’s kisses and the choice of poster 
image of the couple through the blurring steam exposes the success of such strategy.  
     
Likewise, in Harem Suare, we are allowed to enter one of the most enigmatic and 
fantasmatic Oriental spaces, the harem. This time, the story takes place at the early 
twentieth century Istanbul, mostly within the walls of Yıldız Palace. Harem, again 
contrary to the cold and metallic colors of the train station scenes in Italy, is depicted 
with rich and melting colors in amber and gold tones. The interior is again disorienting 
with numerous doors, blinds, screens, and passageways to secret rooms that will open to 
well-calculated picturesque mise-en-scenes of beautiful concubines with rich costumes.  
Camera again invites the spectator to steal a glance of the naked bodies of concubines in 
bathhouse, the joyous nights with food and music, terrible secrets and most intimate 
moments between lovers while it was arching through numerous obstacles like blinds, 
veils, texture and obscure light.  Harem Suare, even more gloriously than Hamam, 
depicts Orient as a mysterious, masquerading site that promotes both excessive joys of 
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life and danger, tragedy and death. Both films construct a visually appealing, sensual 
and mysterious Orient for the spectator and protagonist to be unveiled.  
 
Another significant point is that Harem Suare employs pictorial and narrative references 
from Orientalist tradition. One might clearly see the influence of Orientalist painting on 
mise-en-scenes of bathhouse and collective compositions of concubines in harem. 
Indeed, Özpetek, in an interview, mentions how he had made an extensive research on 
harem   before shooting the film,  and it is plausible to argue that a considerable amount 
of his references were no doubt famous Orientalist paintings, fictitious biographies of 
sultans and favorites together with more contemporary studies on the social life of 
harem.   This extensive research might also have inspired the director of his progressive 
and reformist moments for depicting harem as a complex socio-economic institution 
where women are actively contesting political power instead of depicted as passive 
pleasure slaves of Sultan. Though less significant, Hamam do share narrative and visual 
themes with the Orientalist tradition. The traveler who has dissatisfactions and problems 
in his homeland and discovers the sensualities of Orient with transgressive sexual 
encounters is a known theme in travel literature.  In short, both films cite and recycle 
some visual narrative elements that they borrow from the extensive Orientalist oeuvre 
when dealing with the Orient. 
 
Both films call yearning for an authentic orient that is on the brink of getting lost. In 
Hamam, an Istanbul as the lively reserve of traditional social affiliations and locales 
such as bathhouses, and neighborhood “kahve”s is favored and presented as the 
authentic Istanbul opposed to the emerging post-industrial giant metropolis. Likewise, in 
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Harem Suare, the absolution of harem by Turkish revolutionaries is depicted as 
tragically traumatic. Safiye and Nadir gets lost under the dense fog when they finally 
leave harem and take a walk in Istanbul.  Although, both instances can be taken equally 
as sound critiques of the hidden patriarchy and cruelty of modernization, the naïve 
affirmation of the past carried out by romantic aesthetization vis-à-vis the upcoming 
wave of modernity is suspicious. It is suspicious because it attributes an essence and 
authenticity to Orient that should not be violated by change, as if these same structures 
belong to past are not themselves productions of a complex historical political 
articulation.  Behind such yearning is the desire to grant an essence and identity to 
Orient in its difference from the West. And when the roles are distributed accordingly, 
Orient becomes confined to being a stage for the Western subject to move and change.   
 
In both films, camera identifies with and primarily tells the story of Western 
protagonists who seek social success, power and sexual fulfillment in Orient (Both 
protagonists are Italians; Safiye is indeed an Italian who had been sold by her parents to 
slave traders. Besides both roles are played by Europeans, a fact which remains 
peripheral to the filmic reality itself but has been surely noticed and articulated by the 
spectator).  Hence, the essentializing and aesthetization of Orient as principally 
belonging to some other time and place is not without interest. Yearning for the loss of 
an essential orient is indeed a yearning for the loss of subject who has gained his own 
essence and identity in this very difference.  In both films, the actual dissolution of 
Orient or its mere threat accompanies the partial or complete dissolution of identity of 
protagonists. In Hamam, Francesco is violently killed by hired gangsters for his leading 
role in the collective resistance to evacuation.  Though, such evacuation have not taken 
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place, since his wife takes over the guardian role of bathhouse and the neighborhood, it 
still plausible to argue that Francesco’s death is due to the threat of Orient becoming 
westernized and hence losing  its essential traits. Again, in Harem Suare , both Safiye, 
the concubine and Nadir, the eunuch is going through tragic times following  the  first  
important wake of modernization in Ottoman Empire. Orient, that sustained the very 
movement and change for the protagonists by being a static background, leads them into 
void by gaining movement itself.  Both locales, chosen for the film setting, provide the 
timeless atmosphere where layers of time are echoing each other and connecting 
protagonists to their predecessors.  Both places are represented as a receptacle of distant 
memories of older generations whose stories and tragedies echoing the protagonists. As 
the peripheral stories are revealed by parallel editing and voice-over, the spectator may 
easily perceive the thematic resemblances between the main plot and the subplot of past 
characters. The doubling of stories implies a kind of eternal repetition that can be 
attributed to both locales.  In sum, both films invoke nostalgia for an authentic Orient 
that is on the brink of death and represents the Orient as essentially belonging to past, as 
somewhere that should stand eternally as it is.  Such nostalgia that operates through the 
exaltation of Orient as a mysterious and sensual locale that should be discovered 
petrifies it in front of the mirror of spectacle for the viewer to contemplate its 
mummified beauty.   
 
Then again, Orient becomes a tableau, a pure spectacle that has been raised for the 
spectator and protagonist to reflect and enjoy what has been hitherto restricted from 
themselves.  Besides, this sacred eternity of Orient, which should not be violated, 
soothes the subject and relieves the anxiety of death. Richon argues for academic 
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Orientalist paintings: “The petrified bodies of academic painting and the visibility 
achieved by specular realism consolidate the belief against an anguish of destruction 
which would amount to the annihilation of specular representation: the decomposition of 
the body in death.” Yet, a paradox emerges, as Richon says, “in this sense the obsession 
of specular realism to make things “true to life” can be taken as a negation: in order to 
look live according to the canon of verisimilitude, bodies are erected into petrified poses 
and are made to resemble marble-like figures, marble being the metaphor for a timeless, 
that is lifeless substance.” (Richon 247-8).  The aesthetization of an eternally same 
Orient where different layers of time reverberate helps the subject to soothe and relieve 
the feelings associated with death. Francesco’s wife, at the final scenes, mentions an 
Istanbul breeze that takes away her sadness and melancholia with the cigarette-holder 
that belongs to Anita, Francesco’s deceased aunt, in her hands.   Istanbul becomes a 
place where the deceased may inhabit without disquieting the living.  Francesco’s wife 
inherits Francesco and his aunt’s mission to keep the bathhouse and their fascination 
with Orient. A child is given Francesco’s name, his place is substituted with his wife and 
bathhouse keeps its existence, everything repeats and hence stays the same.  
 
The marble statue at the center of bathhouse, that camera exposes for several times, is 
swallowed by a shadow following Francesco’s murder.  The stillness of the figure is 
disturbed by the violence of death and merges into darkness. The change, even the most 
radical one that is death is denied in/to Orient. Such negation is possible only by fixing 
the Orient eternally, by denying it the change. That which cannot die cannot be alive 
either, thus it is not altogether incongruous to argue that Orient is itself figured as a dead 
place.  Following the groundbreaking terminology of Abraham and Torok , we can argue 
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that Orient/al is  encrypted within Western Subject and raises as an “exquisite corpse”  
that neither truly alive nor dead,  with which the subject can disavow death  and may 
sustain the rigid boundaries of his identity. (Abraham and Torok 107-138) 
 
Such fixation is closely related to the attribution of origin to the Orient. Francesco’s trip 
to Istanbul is initially a recovery of his own past via his aunt’s hitherto remained 
unknown life and her reasons to move to Istanbul. There, he discovers via his aunt’s 
letters about his own history and he inspires from her the idea to run the bathhouse. 
Similarly, the old Italian lady in Harem Suare, being a former concubine of the last 
harem of Ottoman Empire, revisits her glorious past in Orient and shares it with the 
young lady in the train station. In both films, Orient is constructed as an origin, which is 
itself out of time and should remain so, from where the subject is engendered.  That 
gives another explanation why the Orient is petrified and invokes nostalgia for its loss.  
In both films, the protagonist should actually venture through  this site of origin as in 
Hamam, or as in Hamam Suare to recall it out of distant memories of past in order to be 
able to narrate him/herself.  But for the narration to be possible, Orient itself must be 
muted, or effaced in a certain way to provide the monumental and picturesque setting 
required for the narrative to gain its dramatic strength.  
 
Keeping in mind these visual narrative themes and forms that the two films share with 
Orientalism, would that be enough to claim those films are emancipated from the 
phallogocularcentric ideology by simply calling the director’s indigenous identity?  First 
of all, one must be attentive to the complex process of filmmaking where the 
director/scriptwriter has to negotiate with institutions and cultural expectations that 
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insert varying degrees of influence on filmmaker’s choices. Ferzan Özpetek’s aforesaid 
films are the end product of a complex process where producers, art directors, 
distributors and many more contribute to the overall form.  As films are not productions 
solely of directors/authors, they are open to different discursive formations that are 
already operating within the society.  Since directors are again members of society that 
they are living in, they are again subject to hegemonic discourses that write themselves 
under the sign and authority of Subject.  
 
Subject is, indeed the effect of the discourses inscribing him down, not the cause of 
them. Certainly, we deal here with the authorial signature not the person who has been 
called as “Ferzan Özpetek”, since his signature bears the mark of cross-cutting and 
intersecting discourses that precede him.  Since the subject is born into language that 
both precede him and that will subsist long after he perishes, all actions that we attribute 
to him are indeed the subject-effects of diverse discursive formations. 
 
To consider the representation of Orient in those films as truth-speaking on the basis of 
director’s ethnicity is a common symptom of (primarily) Western audience. As many 
audience responses do reveal, those films also operate as a touristic invitation to 
Istanbul.  Although Özpetek’s stylized visual regime and non-linear narrative techniques 
dismiss documentaristic realism and emphasizes the fictional qualities, it does not 
suffice to break the audience’s tendency to substitute fiction with transparency and 
immediacy of truth especially when there is already a tradition to depict Orient as a 
fantasmatic and anachronistic space.  As we have mentioned earlier, brute realism and 
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romantic aesthetization are the two seemingly opposing manifestations of the same 
ambivalence of anxiety and desire.  
 
Although there are important moments of transgression and implicit criticism within 
both films directed to the common Western imaginary that equates Oriental with the 
grotesque, the revaluation of Orient via fancy aesthetization on the merits of 
mysteriousness, sensuality and as site of ancient origin unfortunately repeats and 
consolidates the Orientalist frame, that primarily foregrounds Orient as the object and 
static background of/for the Western subject.  To sum up, we can argue that both films 
fit into the Orientalist scheme and reproduce its basic assumptions in an admittedly more 
flexible way.  Their aesthetic and narrative power comes from their ability to meet the 
Western desires and fantasies that are already in play within Orientalist representations.   
Both films are prominently based on more or less classical narrative structures that 
demand transparency and an unquestioned commitment to the filmic reality from the 
spectator. This adherence to story telling function of film strengthens the transparency 
and immediateness of representation that is an almost inevitable quality of film image as 
Comolli’s arguments on the disavowal of spectator reveals.  Nevertheless, different from 
cinematic apparatus theory’s claim that spectator takes the filmic events for real ones 
and cinema being an ideological illusion of truth, an argument which depends on a clear 
distinction between film fiction and reality; it is plausible to argue with Tom Gunning 
that: “whether we watch The Wizard of Oz or Salt of the Earth, we experience a similar 
absorption in the world of the fiction, an involvement with the events enacted and the 
characters portrayed. Although  the use of stylized sets and unusual color schemes and 
star performances  in the one film contrasts  with the location shooting  and use of many 
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non-professional performers on the other, the cutting, composition, and creation of a 
dramatic continuity in both films  solicits our emotional and imaginary investment in the 
story as it unfolds on the screen.” (Gunning 52) 
 
Hence, a cinema that does not think upon itself, that does not attempt to disrupt the 
totalizing effect of its own power by pointing towards the discontinuities and blind 
spots that are generated by its representative frame, results in the total immersion of 
image to its object. It is not surprising that audience, although very well aware of the 
fictional/ representational quality of films, disavows such inevitable gap between the 
represented and representation and substitutes Istanbul with its image on both films.  
Such desire for immediateness of representation of Orient is also fortified by the ethnic 
identity of the director.   For the reason that he is himself an Oriental, his portrayal of 
Orient gains double naturalization and transparency, since his cinema  gains the power 
to represent  a non-Western culture on its behalf.  We can see how an unproblematic 
submission to essentialist thought and identity politics is closely related to the 
interested claim of immediacy of truth. By attributing to the native informant (who is 
already subject to the dominant Western discourse by appropriating its means of 
representation and whose enunciation is not free from its effects) the alleged right to 
represent himself, Western discourse validates itself as truth. Since the Orient proper 
comes into being by being refracted and reflected on the mirror of Western 
representation and such marking requires and just as enables the position for the 
Western subject, all the visual narrative conventions are already there before even the 
director/ scriptwriter starts scribbling his first ideas. Özpetek is truly a talented and 
creative director who has succeeded to develop a distinct filmic style of his own with a 
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subtle camerawork and visuality both lucid and mysterious. He must be also 
respectably given credit for his deliberate representative politics that grants 
sympathetic access to marginalized identities such as homosexuals, immigrants and 
taboo issues such as miscegenation between different races. Nonetheless, his attempt 
to reverse the binary couple of East and West by re-valuing and replacing the former 
with the latter operates essentially within an Orientalist frame whose structure cannot 
be shattered by simple turnarounds.  Both films give us an insight into how the 
Western discursive formations stamp and mark from within even the radical and 
indigenous attempts of representing the Orient via letting the native informant speak.   
By letting him/her speak, the violent operation of inscribing the Orient as an eternal 
figuration, as being the other site persists. Such operation is a perfect instance of how 
Orient is “Orientalized” as Said subtly formulates. (Orientalism 49-73)   
 
These films also enable a striking critique of Said’s reliance on the model/figure of  
critical intellectual whose condition is characterized as the homelessness as home, as 
the wanderer who is forcefully situated at the borders between different cultures  from 
where he can have the privileged critical insight on both cultures.  As Özpetek’s 
oeuvre signifies, such ambiguous cultural identity of intellectual does not essentially 
guarantee an ever-ready vigilance to discursive inscriptions at play in cultural 
productions.   If different cultures compete for representation and gain circularity on 
the basis of their asymmetrical forces, then the very frame through which intellectual 
renders his/her critique will be structured on unequal basis of forces that will grant 
indisputable advantage to the hegemonic cultural formations.  Before rushing to 
celebrate the transgressive moments that the films promote and certainly do have, one 
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must constantly  turn  around  the question  what economy enables their enunciation 
and  primarily for whom.  
 
In the next chapter,   I will go through what I have left out so far. Sound-speech is the 
essential part of film as it is actually an audiovisual medium and it also constitutes one of 
the founding pillars of “self-presence” that Western metaphysics foregrounds. A discussion 
around the function of sound as speech and voice-over in two films will be initiated to relate 
its significance to the question whether the Other “can speak”, or to put it more adequately:  
Who speaks to whom? 
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4 THE VOICE OF THE OTHER 
 
 
Both Harem Suare and Hamam uses frequent voice-over and  musical score to connect 
interdependent and thematically analogous events of plot that are scattered between past 
and present, between East and West. Such transition is supported with the juxtaposition 
of scenes disguised with smooth camera tracking in horizontal or vertical axis between 
different filmic spatio-temporalities such as the long establishing shot following the 
metallic blue panel up through to reach the golden-amber opera balcony of Yıldız Palace 
at the beginning of Harem Suare. But mostly, voice over is employed to actualize 
spatio-temporal transitions and to create a resonation between past events and filmic 
present.  In Hamam, we observe the voice-over takes up the mission to communicate 
Francesco’s aunt’s story (that are actually written on her letters) as an underlying guide  
for us, firstly, to get information about the past events and secondly, to understand the 
protagonist’s emotional  condition in the actual time.  The voice-over of the deceased 
aunt primarily informs us about the filmic present by creating a totalizing analogy 
between two independent events, more specifically between Francesco and the deceased 
aunt’s experience of Orient. The subject of voiceover changes hands at the resolution of 
the movie to emphasize the reallocation of the guardian role from Francesco to his wife 
Martha. Following Abraham and Torok’s analysis on  the psychic processes of  
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incorporation/introjection, we may also argue that such alternation of subjects of 
voiceover also signify the incorporation of  the deceased beloveds,  Francesco and Anita, 
by Martha,  one of which manifestation is the cigarette holder that appears in her hands.. 
(Abraham & Torok 107-138)  
 
In Harem Suare, we have again two different subjects that perform the voice over, one is 
the old woman who is actually Safiye, and other is Gülfidan (Serra Yılmaz).   The main 
voice-over belongs to Gülfidan, whose voice enables the transition between overlapping 
stories that actually take place in different layers of time and space.  Citing the narrative 
conventions of Oriental fable, Gülfidan tells a story that resonates with different 
women’s forbidden passions and love affairs but mainly figures the sad story of Safiye. 
Her voice, different from Anita, Martha or Safiye, functions as the anonymous narrating 
voice that actually tells the stories of other women, who were beautiful and powerful 
concubines unlike Gülfidan who was a mere steward or servant lackingthe feminine 
charms.  It must be noted that, with the single exception of Gülfidan, all the subjects of 
voice-over are Western protagonists. For instance, we hear nothing of the other, 
essentially Oriental characters in both films, which is especially striking in Hamam’s 
exclusive privileging of Western voice. The film suffices to view and hear them from an 
external objective position to venture through their emotions. (Safiye should be 
considered as being Western before everything else since she is actually and also, in 
film, she is denoted to be an Italian in a brief notice, which is expressed incessantly in  
all synopses  e.g. “Safiye,  actually an Italian, […]” (Cannes 2004) ) 
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The voice-over belonging to Gülfidan is of crucial importance for the following 
discussion. Since her voice actually sutures the whole narrative by enabling the 
transitions and shifts between multiple series of events and actually leads our selection 
and processing of what we should see and experience from the not-totally- controllable 
visual information brought by the film, her voice-speech is a structurally necessary 
narrative element that bind the whole fiction together.  
 
As one of the ex-favorites feels too depressed to tell another fable/story to the 
concubines gathered around her as usual, Gülfidan breaks into the gathering saloon and 
is suddenly offered to tell that night’s story. Camera tracks in to have her puzzled face in 
close-up, she exclaims: “Me? But, I cannot tell a story, I have never told one.” After 
hearing excessive demands from the girls, she agrees rather in an involuntary fashion 
and says “all right … I will.”  Through her narrating, the main plot unfolds and gains the 
proliferation and synchronization of multiple sub-plots.  Yet, the story she tells is 
primarily of an encounter between an old and young concubine that spirals by other 
stories inside the other, echoing primarily Safiye’s, also resonating with other 
concubines’ and the encounter between two women in the train station. Through all the 
dissimulation of voices for she gives her own voice to be engendered, one cannot find 
any proximity whatsoever to hers or Kara Nergis, the mute black servant, whose 
character we will discuss later on.  Her story and all the romance and sensuality it 
emanates functions on the basis of the effacement of her own, which is disguised under 
the promise of speaking. By the action of speaking, Gülfidan gains access to presence, to 
be a character rather than a walk-on, however this accidentally emerging opportunity to 
speak and narrate both reveals and hides the irrecoverable silence of the others including 
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her own. They are muted either with the horrible bodily mutilation or with the assigned 
role of telling a story that through speaking of others keeps the negative mark of the 
story-teller’s own silence.  We may formulate Gülfidan’s voiceover as a speech-act that 
bears the mark of this silence or gap, which it partially succeeds to efface. 
 
Her silence-within-speech is not recovered and is never totally recoverable even though 
it was her own story because of the irreducible and necessary gap/delay of 
representation. But, what is crucial here is that this silence constitutes the very 
possibility for the emergence of the S/subject of narrative, who was, not surprisingly, 
Western. By letting Gülfidan speak, her immediate presence is granted, she gains her 
identity proper which could, only then after, reduced to be the origin from where the 
subject of narrative could flourish with the high cost of robbing Gülfidan even of her 
silence. As the true silence would alarmingly signal a certain resistance, she is allowed 
speech that will enable to disavow such blind point/silent zone. Indeed, following 
Spivak, we can ask if Gülfidan can speak. 
 
But, through which sleight of hand, her being is taken for granted and, at the same time, 
violently effaced? Such gesture of privileging speech as the guarantee of self-presence 
and   imposing positivity and immediacy by effacing the quasi-negativity of the 
deferment of representation does share the same interests with the specular/speculative 
thought that privileges vision. To understand the relation better, we may refer to the 
deconstructive critique that has been articulated by thinkers such as Derrida.  
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4.1 “Hearing-Oneself Speak”  
 
Such conception of speech sound has two interdependent effects; one is seemingly the 
immediacy of its perception that strengthens the illusion of an unmediated presence 
opens itself up to thought of the listener. Second one, which derives from the former, is 
the constitution of the subject through the immediacy of speech. Derrida has diagnosed 
such appropriation has been shared by the major philosophers such as Hegel and also by 
the more recent structuralism through the works of Levi-Strauss and Saussure.  
 
As already noted, Derrida criticized the effect of hearing one’s  own voice  as the 
justification for speech’s  alleged preeminence  over writing. It was on the basis 
of this experience that Hegel could claim that hearing was even more ideal, more 
dialectically effective than sight. For whereas the latter always acknowledged the 
existence of the object prior to and after the event of seeing, the former identified 
sound entirely with its being heard. It could thus serve as the model of perfect 
sublation, preserving both objectivity and interiority. (Jay 512)  
 
Although Hegel seems to subject vision to sound, it is more like reaching a hyper-vision 
through sound which is itself conceptualized according to the same logic of form that 
informs philosophical vision. “For the moment, it is clear that the same metaphysical 
tradition which has delivered us vision as the vision of form- a vision “filled and 
satisfied by presence”- has delivered sight over to sound, vision to the disponibility of   
the speaking voice. But this subjection of vision to voice is not one-sided, because in it 
vision is subjected to a sound which fulfills its own visionary imperative. […] Hence, 
we have here a bilevel hierarchy in which vision, to the partial assimilation of known to 
knower, is completed by their full identification in voice.” (McCumber 238) By 
privileging speech-sound, the circle closes on itself via bringing forth the subject as the 
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knower of himself “through hearing himself speak”. Derrida argues that hearing oneself 
speak constitutes the absolute spatial-temporal proximity of self to itself, hence voice 
becomes the ideality of the object for which “the subject does not have to pass forth 
beyond himself to be immediately affected by his expressive activity” and remain in his 
pure interiority.  Thus voice gains an apparent transcendence by effacing its very 
phenomenological body at the moment it comes out, the signifier (the real sound) is turn 
into phoneme and becomes the “very from of the immediate presence of the signified”. 
(Derrida Reader 21) 
 
Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being 
produced in the world a pure auto,-affection, it is a signifying substance 
absolutely at our disposition. […] This auto-affection is no doubt the possibility 
for what is called subjectivity or the for-itself, but, without it, no world as such 
would appear. For at its core it supposes the unity of sound (which is in the 
world) and phone (in the phenomenological sense). (Derrida Reader 23) 
 
But exactly at this point, Derrida shows that for such operation of voice, “auto-affection 
supposed that a pure difference comes to divide self-presence.”  and this pure difference, 
“which  constitutes the self-presence  of the living present , introduces into self-presence  
from the beginning  all the impurity putatively excluded from it” ( Derrida 26) Thus, 
speech becomes an originary supplement, whose “addition  comes to make up  for a 
deficiency, it comes to compensate  for an originary nonself-presence.” 
 
And if indication – for example , writing in the everyday sense- must 
necessarily be “added” to speech to complete the constitution of the ideal 
object, if speech must be “added”  to the thought identity of the object, it is 
because  the “presence” of sense and speech  had already from the start  fallen 
short of itself. (Derrida Reader 28)   
 
  109                                                                                
 
Likewise, in Of Grammatology, Derrida initiates a thorough reading of Levi-Strauss’s 
encounter with the primitive people, the Nambikwara   in light of Levi- Straus’ 
theoretical indebtedness to Rousseau.  Derrida detects  in both thinkers a  search for an 
originary human culture which was not contaminated with  representative practices such 
as writing  and the following evils of  civilization that are violence, deceit and  
hierarchization. The Nambikwara is formalized as essentially good and innocent people, 
whose presence was much closer to an originary authenticity where they live in the 
immediacy of an absolute self-presence. According to Derrida, Levi-Strauss’ 
formulation that represents the other culture as essentially good and innocent primarily 
depends on his belief that language as speech lies strictly outside of writing, grapheme, 
whose nature implies a primary violence and distinction that tears apart the presumed 
immediacy of the signifier from the signified, in other words that exposes the very 
representational quality of presence. Saved by the anthropologist from the evils 
associated with writing, the Nambikwara culture is reduced to an originary immediate 
self-presence enjoyed by the hegemony of speech and hence has been posited as the 
originary condition from which by pure accident, for instance a foreign intrusion, 
writing   and associated representative practices have been produced. The implication of 
such theorization is the clandestine ethnocentrism that reduced writing to its Western 
phonetic form. “A fatal accident which is nothing but history itself.” (Grammatology 
135) 
Non-European peoples were not only studied as the index to a hidden good 
Nature, as native soil recovered, of a “zero degree” with reference  to which one 
could outline  the structure, the growth, and above all the degradation of our 
society and our culture. As always, this archaeology is also a teleology and an 
eschatology; the dream of a full and immediate presence closing history, the 
transparence and indivision of a parousia, the suppression of contradiction and 
difference. (115)   
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4.2 Gülfidan: Can She Speak? 
 
 
The implications of such critique for our discussion is almost clear, voice of Gülfidan 
signals multiple concerns. To begin with, with granting her the voice that encompasses 
and sutures the narrative, she has been posited as the originary point, or the contentless 
center from where the story could spring forth, the plot could develop in multiple 
directions in order to be united by the repetition and convergence of different layers of 
subplots.  Through Gülfidan’s voice here and there, year 1903 and year 1960, Yıldız 
Palace and Italy, different generations of women and their most secret passions could 
resonate each other. Through her self-effacing and self-constituting speech, the film 
could attain the spatio-temporal totality and unity it requires.   By this structure, the film 
brings forward a meaningful narrative together with a historical scheme in which 
heterogeneity of different lives gain an intelligible form.  Such intelligible form is 
sustained by the repetition, the same unfolding of events for different generations but 
through a false dialectical movement that forecloses the narrative in the order of the 
same. It is highly symptomatic to inaugurate the voice of the other to give the otherwise 
heterogeneous course of events an intelligible and recognizable scheme. Gülfidan’s 
voice operates as the “zero degree” of the film’s narrative, a centre of origin, which has 
itself of no value, other than holding the narrative on its back,  supplying it the very 
ground  so that it could  state upright. Posited as the centering and suturing point of 
origin, she could be left outside this scheme, figured and frozen in her own voice.  This 
double gesture veils the fact that Gülfidan’s voice operates as the “supplement” of the 
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narrative by positing her outside of the main course of events. The sequences gain their 
own independent signifying value as soon as her voice fades out and hence the effect of 
objective record of events takes over.  It is plausible to argue that the possibility of 
watching the film starts at this moment of repression. If we cannot leave the voice-over 
and the fact that she is actually fictioning a story for the concubines, we cannot immerse 
into the filmic event. Although her voice is actually the source of suturing the filmic 
event into a unified whole of narrative, the subject, the proprietor of voice has to be left 
outside and must be effaced for the experience of film to be possible. She becomes the 
anonymity, the nameless that has been left outside of (hi)story for the reason that she 
enables such historicity.  Then after, she must be relocated within the economy of the 
same, by having the proper name that makes her a “mere” woman lacking the charm and 
talents that would enable her to become the subject of some story. She is the mere 
woman that tells the story of other women who deserved narrating.  She is just Gülfidan, 
who accidentally enter the room when a story was in demand and the usual story teller 
was not in her moods. Actually, the particular choice of the story teller is a necessary 
move for the film’s narration to be steady and persuasive. By making Gülfidan present 
with her voice, the actual non-presence of her story could be covered at once. We know 
nothing of her desire, nothing of her story; her subjective history is forced into the 
silence from which the whole filmic discourse could thrive and command the 
heterogeneity across time and space. Her minimal contribution to the course of events 
sustains the belief that what she tells is from a rather objective point of view. She does 
not participate in the pursuit of love and power like the concubines she tells the stories 
of, she is just there to see, observe and, later tell the story. In this double move, she is 
given the role of a transparent medium by granting the role of the story teller, she is 
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made present without any doubt, and by the same token, she is driven to the outskirts, to 
the margins of the narrative. The track-in that brings Gülfidan from the long-medium 
shot to a close-up and the following words “me? But, I cannot tell I’ve never told one...” 
seems to be emphasized as an implicit political gesture that would enable Gülfidan 
speak. Nonetheless, one should be careful about the unthought of such gesture that has 
been veiled by its emphasis on the immediacy and intimacy of speech.  Such gesture 
first of all represses the irreducible difference between the concubines and the other 
harem workers in terms of their status and share within the politics of harem. Even if 
they share the same locale, obviously, servants such as Gülfidan and Kara Nergis do 
experience a totally other, certainly more depressing relation to the power structures. 
They are at the bottom of the hierarchal order, whose labor does not have a slightest 
chance of appropriating the phallic power unlike the competing concubines. To take 
Gülfidan’s act of story telling as an act of speaking herself is to efface this difference 
that would result in representing Harem as a site of egalitarian and hence utopian 
sisterhood. If Gülfidan had a story that would reverberate her own experiences , it would 
not fit into this lavish and sensual setting that demand stories about the pompous love, 
ambition and fears of concubines, or more appropriately to the already inscribed 
expectations of the audience.  The only way for her to make herself heard is to efface 
herself from the story.  The language she inhabits is not formed to tell stories of such as 
herself, since her story does not promise the charm that Safiye could evoke. For that 
very reason, the subject of voice-over has to dissimulate herself, having herself no 
proper narrative to be told, she has to masquerade endlessly, to become the perfect 
mimetician or the echo of the subject.  Gülfidan’s own story cannot be recovered, 
nevertheless she resists in that very place she has been violently posited as the 
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indifferent origin of narrative.  Gülfidan is not the subject who speaks and she does not 
present herself in the immediacy of her speaking and it would not be so even if she was 
telling the story of her own. From the margin she has been expelled, her performance 
most explicitly reveals that the subject, even in the seeming immediacy of speaking, is 
already fictioned and is fictioning herself. And the form of this fictioning is already 
inscribed and embedded within the matrix of power.  
 
Besides, the undertaking of voice-over within the film strengthens the anachronism that 
has been attributed to the Orient. Contrary to the usual employment of voice-over in 
most films, Gülfidan’s voice-over enters the narrative not right in the beginning but, just 
before the time shifts from the year 1908 to 1903 which will a bit later leap onto year 
1963 Italy with her voice going off-screen and gains the form of usual voice-over. 
Although the actual time of the story-telling takes place in 1908, her voice informs us 
about the encounter between the old Safiye and Anita in an Italian train station and 
pursue the whole story of Safiye long after the harem is dissolved.  We return to the 
scene where Gülfidan is on-screen narrating the story after old Safiye and Anita’s brief 
encounter in the station café is over.  Hence, by implication, the scene where we  have 
seen the concubines gathered around Gülfidan to listen to her story about a story that has 
been told by an old favorite to the newcomer, does transgress the linearity of time and 
the distance between  Orient and West.  The ambiguous temporal location of Gülfidan’s 
storytelling contributes to the common Western textual attitude that mystifies Orient by 
pushing it out of time and space. Thus, Orient becomes the eternal scene where even the 
time goes astray and freezes.  
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To sum up, lending voice to Gülfidan is a double gesture that constitutes her identity and 
self-proximity with the persuasive apparent immediateness of sound-speech through 
constituting such immediate self-proximity of voice it succeeds to ruse the underlying 
violence that effaces and reduces her difference and alterity.  First of all, by the ruse of 
constituting her as a subject immediate to herself, the film represses the antedating 
inscription of her subjectity that exiles her to the margins of her own fictioning, since 
history did not develop a taste for stories such as hers so far. The only role that suits to 
the Oriental narrative schema for women such as Gülfidan is to be a loyal and obedient 
servant of Harem ladies and the only stories she could tell are the stories of their 
masters. The mastery that seems to be enjoyed by the proprietor is indeed the ruse that 
covers up her exclusion from time and space, out of movement and change. The scene 
where Gülfidan speaks seems to be located outside of history, frozen in the picturesque 
composition of beautiful concubines gathered around the servant, who took her chance 
to accommodate the throne of the usual story-teller. The apparent omnipresence and 
mastery of the voice-over presents Gülfidan as the loyal transmitter of the great 
spectacle/narrative, a place within which she could accommodate her presence without 
disquieting the fetishization of the Orient. If she cannot be turned into the eroticized 
spectacle, then she could be utilized as the de-sexualized voice stripped out of her body.  
She has been muted by her own voice; she has been effaced to invisibility by being 
rendered immediately present here and there, past and future. She goes unheard while 
mobilizing and suturing the whole narrative. Yet, there is a remainder which could not 
be entirely abolished: if it is through her fictioning we could participate in the story and 
could get a chance to leap from one layer to another, if it is only through her voice we 
could make sense of the story narrated by the film, then there the whole regime of filmic 
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reality is indeed structurally indebted to her enunciation and her enunciation is an 
endless mimetic masquerading, voice giving voice to other voices, endlessly deferring 
her own.  
 
Yet she leaves a disturbing mark of suspicion about her presence. “The young concubine 
asks: ‘why you have told me your life instead of giving advice? The old woman replies 
without hesitation: ‘I’ve told you my life; because I know that we can only validate and 
make sense of our lives through telling it to ourselves and others. Is there any way to 
make sense to all the grief and pain that we go through other than narrating?’” How does 
one resist this logic that decently reveals the dependency of presence to representation? 
Yet, by implication, is not there a secret irony, an almost unconscious yet powerful 
critique that short-circuits the whole regime employed by the film? If that is so, could 
we ever speak of a life, a presence that can be attributable to Gülfidan?  She brings about 
the most striking critique by echoing the words of an other; she reveals the hidden 
violence that erases her by the unnoticed dismissal of her life.  
 
 
The critical studies on voice-over narration in film usually demonstrate a hostility for the 
method on the basis of its being a literary device that does not add up any innovation to 
the filmic medium. Such attitude reveals how film has been conceived prominently as a 
visual medium that should communicate primarily through the image. Then, the verbal-
speech is understood as an imposition inserted upon the image, which is otherwise free 
of charge that the word brings.  Such hostility or suspicion is linked to the image’s 
supposed superiority over words to convey ideology-free and objective meaning and the 
film’s long mimetic rivalry with theater. Fundamentally, the undervaluation of voice-
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over narration in film is linked to the attempt to ascribe an essence to film, which 
singularly depends on visuality. (Kozloff 8-22)  However, such positioning  forgets that 
vision itself is an inscription that already comes with its own socio-cultural charges and 
it is always already a distortion  not a presentation that operate within the realm of 
language. Sound, as an added value that lends itself to the image, strengthens, 
dramatizes, temporally mobilizes and sometimes disrupts the image to convey meaning. 
(Chion 3-25) 
 
According to Kozloff again, in fiction films (such as Harem Suare), the employment of 
third-person narrators, do occur very rarely and when such technique is employed, one 
of the possible reasons for that is “ to impart a great deal of expositional information  or  
unify a story that ranges  widely in time and space.[…]  Furthermore, precisely  because 
it is oral , voice-over  can remind viewers of traditional storytellers , and  so evoke the 
proper atmosphere for the legendary  or pseudo-legendary  subject-matter.”  (Kozloff 
73). For the third-person narrator, she argues that “heterodiegetic narrators […] remain 
unseen, unearthly, throughout the text” and though not very occasionally, the third-
person narrators could be located not only as frame narrators but could go on screen. 
“Whenever a character launches into a story in which he or she does not participate, that 
character, like Scheherazade, is an embedded heterodiegetic narrator.” Kozloff argues 
that the participation here means less of telling a story of oneself but on “whether he or 
she exists in the same fictive world as the characters, whether he or she could possibly 
know them and they know him or her.”  However, such strict categorizations that have 
been attempted throughout her study seems to fall short to be able to categorize the 
voice-over narration in Harem Suare, since  voice-over in this film is neither telling a 
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story of herself nor  her minimal appearance within what she tells could be counted as a 
participation. Since the voice-over is in the form of a fable that works by analogy to the 
characters and events depicted on one level and directly illustrates the events on another.  
Her dubious position cannot be entirely categorized to schemes of voice-over in use.  
Following Kozloff’s inquiry on characteristics of third-person narrators in film, the 
voice-over in Harem Suare shows a certain omnipresence, that “enable film-maker to 
traverse continents or decades without fear of leaving the viewer behind. The overt 
presence of the narrator, who speaks from a privileged vantage point and knits together 
all those loose threads, allows for any number of shifts of focalization without strain.” 
(80). Though such omnipresence ,and its technical importance for films to connect 
different time periods without causing conflict  could be easily detected in Harem Suare 
, such omnipresence does not always means an omniscience as Kozloff seems to infer 
rather quickly. As it is the case in Harem Suare, this omnipresence also means a 
clandestine non-presence, an impotency, a weakening marginality that cast out the 
narrator from the story narrated, turning the proprietor of the voice into a passive 
transmitter of the events.  It strengthens the belief in a subject position that can situate 
itself out of the representation, that is itself not inscribed but being the immediate 
manifestation of herself, veiling the calculated pre-inscription of the narrator embedded 
at the margin of the text before she begins to speak.   
 
Feminist scholars such as Mary Ann Doane and Kaja Silverman focuses on the relation 
between female voice and the narrative as a synchronization of female voice with her 
image that confines woman’s enunciation within the narrative. “Silverman shows how 
women’s voices are narratively taken away from them, held within the diegesis and out 
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of their control.” (Lawrence 180) Similarly Mary Ann Doane argues that the 
synchronization of image and voice conveys “the ideal of a coherent, unified text which 
mirrors the fantasy of a coherent, unified spectator:  
 
The aural illusion of position constructed by  the approximation of sound 
perspective and by techniques  which spatialize the voice  and endow it with 
“presence  guarantees the singularity  and stability of a point of audition, thus 
holding at bay  the potential trauma of  dispersal, dismemberment, difference. 
(Doane qtd in Lawrence 179) 
  
Then, the synchronization of female voice and image in classical film is understood as a 
sleight of hand that covers the material heterogeneity “not only in order to guarantee the 
cohesiveness of any subject but specifically to shore up male subjectivity”. (Lawrence 
179) 
 
However, if we remember Kozloff’s study of voice-over narration, which is typically 
conceived as an asynchronization between image and sound, it also serves the purposes 
of unification through knitting different spatio-temporalities. Moreover, Kozloff argues 
that the “voice-over serves to naturalize the strangeness of cinematic narration; an odd 
impersonal agency is thus humanized and tamed.” (Kozloff 128). Apart form this 
naturalization of the cinematic medium’s underlying machinism: 
 
It also creates a special relationship with the viewer. […] Thus the narrator 
implicitly acknowledges the spectator’s own existence and personhood; such an 
acknowledgment is a pleasant form of flattery. Moreover, because the cinematic 
body is now being consciously, deliberately displayed to the spectator, the 
spectator is placed less as a voyeur and more as an invited confidante. (Kozloff 
129) 
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Amy Lawrence draws our attention to the rather easy submission of feminist theory to 
the binary of good asynchronization and bad synchronization. (Lawrence 181)  On this 
basis of conception, Silverman advocates a certain disembodiment of voice from the 
body to escape from the confinement of female voice to her body that in turn signifies 
lack. “ [ Female voice] never assumes  the privileged  and transcendental qualities  of  a 
traditional voice-over, or even the  much more limited powers  of a traditional voice-off” 
(qtd in Lawrence 181)  Such advocating of disembodiment is in line with the more 
general  intellectual  impulse, as Chion diagnoses with the easy celebration of  
audiovisual counterpoint. Chion points that:  
 
Audiovisual counterpoint, which film aestheticians  seem perennially to 
advocate, plead for and, and insist upon, occurs  on television every day, 
though no one seems to notice.[…] there exists  hundreds of possible ways  
to add sound to any given image. Some are wholly conventional. Others, 
without formally contradicting or “negating” the image, carry the perception 
of the image to another level. And audiovisual dissonance is merely the 
inverse of convention, and thus pays homage to it, imprisoning us in a binary 
logic that has only remotely to do with how cinema works. (Chion 37-38) 
 
However, as Chion exposes in a different but related context, such easy submission to 
binary categorizations that valorizes the divorce of sound from image is not a guarantee 
of progressive film-making. “Strangely, the disjunctive and autonomist impulse that pre-
dominates in intellectual discourse on the question (“wouldn’t it be better if sound and 
image were independent?”) arises entirely from the unitary illusion we have described: 
the false unity this thinking denounces in the current cinema implicitly suggests a true 
unity existing elsewhere.”  (Chion 98) 
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Michel Chion distinguishes the voice-over as textual speech to differ it from the diegetic 
voice that turn out to be theatrical speech in his productive terminology and he argues 
that the voice-over “acts upon the images.  Textual speech has the power to make visible 
the images that it evokes through sound - that is, to change the setting, to call up a thing, 
moment, place, or characters at will.”  (Chion172) 
 
Thus, the voice-over narration does not automatically bring emancipation or a chance of 
free enunciation for any oppressed identity such as women, Orientals or both. The very 
investment and belief in enunciation operating above narrative to transcend the diegetic 
universe is to ignore the forces and power structures that pre-inscribes such enunciation. 
Transcending the narrative does not automatically mean a privilege and freedom; on the 
contrary, the strengthened illusion of transcending the narrative may lead to grave 
misconceptions that posit the proprietor of the voice as the immediate source of 
narration. Such attitude exposes the reliance on speech-voice as the evidence and 
possibility of presence and identity undisturbed by what lies external to it.  Even if we 
accept that the synchronized voice, that accompanies the image, in principle, puts 
forward a granted presence, voice-over where the sound and image diverts from each 
other and implies the disembodiment aims no less a guaranteed presence and mastery of 
the subject over the image and herself.  The exceptional employment of voice-over 
narration in Harem Suare demonstrates that lending an outwardly commanding voice to 
the other does not necessarily mean a radical departure from the metaphysics of subject 
and the consequent ideological formations that are constantly at work in bringing about 
the subject of enunciation.   Unreservedly celebrating the voice-over narration would be 
to ignore the underlying onto-ideological assumption that privileges voice as the 
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effective and instantaneous signifier of a unified presence and essence. As long as voice 
is conceptually understood by formal principles that also authorize the vision, we have 
to be skeptically engaged with what it silences as well as what it makes heard.  
 
Besides, as mentioned with the citation from Sarah Kozloff, the voice-over narrator 
could veil and ease the principally voyeuristic relation of spectator with the sound-image 
and replace it with the comforting feeling of participation. Such function obviously 
consolidates and conforms the spectator’s position rather than problematizing it.   
 
Moreover, the voice assigned to Gülfidan leaves no place for the differences between 
women depicted within the movie including the irreducibly radical position of herself 
and Kara Nergis and inevitably leads to a monolithic figuration of Oriental female 
identity.  Such figuration fits very well to the dominant Western feminism and similar 
progressive tendencies that conceive other cultures and other women as a 
undifferentiated unity vis-à-vis the Western subject no matter the gender difference.  
 
Mohanty describes how the speech of the stereotypical Third-World Woman 
has been privileged in Western feminist works as that of the “truth-teller”. In 
this conception women transcend history as well as cultural indoctrination 
and consequently possess “a privileged access to the ‘real,’ [and] the ‘truth’” 
(Lawrence 184) 
 
  
Although Harem Suare is a highly stylized, almost fable-like visual and narrative 
formation, the truth-telling function of the narrator is still there though in a complicated 
and disguised form.  As we have mentioned Gülfidan actually tells a fable-like story 
when we see her on-screen.  However, when she leaves the frame, the sequences solely 
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take over the narration to convey the story. The voice-over, no matter what she tells is an 
overt form of fiction, is a vehicle that guide the spectator to attain the overall meaning 
and truth of the story.  Chion argues that:  
 
The textual speech of a voice-over narrator engenders images with its own 
logic (i.e., not that of continuity editing) just long enough to establish the film’s 
narrative framework and setting. Then it disappears, allowing us to enter the 
diegetic universe. We might not be reminded of the narrator’s presence for the 
next quarter of an hour into the film, even an hour. Of then the story in between 
has become completely autonomous from the textual speech, in creating its 
own dramatic time, in creating its own dramatic time , and in showing us 
scenes  that the voice-over narrator could not possibly have seen.” (Chion 173) 
 
 
Mary Ann Doane, similarly argues that “ if the ideology of the visible demands  that the 
spectator  understand the image as a truthful representation of reality,, the ideology of 
the audible  demands  that there exist simultaneously a different truth and another order 
of reality for the subject to grasp.   […] Sound and image, ‘married’ together, propose a 
drama of the individual, of psychological realism. “Knowledge” of the interior.” (Doane, 
Sound 49&55)   
 
Further, by evoking intimacy and implicit acknowledgment of the presence of the 
spectator through appellation of voice, the narrator helps the spectator to immerse into 
the film setting and the characters’ most intimate thoughts without any doubt, fear or 
reflexive criticism.  Both films aim to appeal initially to the Western spectator by 
offering him to get access to the most mysterious and sensuous locales of Orient that 
have been the object of intense interest long before the invention of cinema.  Both films 
are celebratory aesthetizations of Orient, that attempt to persuade the spectator of an 
Orient with unbounded passions and eroticism on one hand, with authentic  and  non-
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alienating  social relations on the other. The employment of voice-over narration 
echoing the tales of Arabian nights is an explicit strategy to appeal to the Western 
spectator by offering a sense of being-there-ness, which veils simultaneously the 
principally voyeuristic character of spectatorship. The distance between the spectator 
and the diegetic universe is covered successfully and the entry to the privacy of a 
different universe is made less traumatic. By the same token, the spectator is soothed by 
the narrator’s (Serra Yılmaz) phonogenic voice implicitly  calling his name or simply 
identified with Francesco (respectively, her aunt and finally with Martha), could enter to 
the private lives of Orientals with the invitation seemingly coming out of  their own 
mouths. Such invitation masks the very condition of the spectatorship and the 
asymmetrical power relations embedded within such desire of the Western 
protagonist/spectator to come in and grasp the Orient.   Thus, the voice-over operates in 
both films as complementary rather than disruptive to the visual regime that brings 
forward an essentially picturesque, anachronistic and fantasmatic Orient.  Sound in both 
films, which cannot be confined to the speech, works as an added value, whose 
phenomenon, according to Chion, “is at work in the case of sound/image synchronism, 
via the principle of synchresis, the forging of an immediate and necessary relationship 
between something one sees and something one hears.” (Chion 5)  By synchresis, which 
combines synchronism and synthesis, Chion means “the spontaneous and irresistible 
weld produced between a particular auditory phenomenon and visual phenomenon when 
they occur at the same time.” (Chion 63)   Such synchresis is not solely the outcome of   
the apparent synchronization of sound and image as in sound film, but also exposes the 
underlying rhetoric under the voice-over narration that does not challenge, subvert or 
distort the meaning conveyed by the image. However, one must be careful not to 
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conclude that the voice-over or conventional sound-image synchronization are 
automatically oppressive means of ideology. As Chion demonstrates persuasively, there 
is no essentially “good” method in handling sound to guarantee the critical 
demystification of the audiovisual medium or the rigorous challenge to the models of 
film-making and viewing, which radical films pursue.  
 
4.3 The overall sound regime  
 
 
If the analysis of sound employment in both films is extended beyond sound-speech to 
cover soundtrack, background noise and etc., one finds  further convincing evidence of 
Orientalism. Both films  are strategically  interested in  building  up an Oriental setting, 
that is dream-like, chiaroscuro  and  ephemeral; a place where past and present, dead and 
alive could be in touch eternally and where the most hidden desires  and  transgressive 
sexual fantasies could be projected and experienced without  the possible burden it 
would bear on the protagonist back in fatherland. The timeless composition of Orient fits 
well to the aesthetics of nostalgia that constitute the imprint of director’s style which is 
observable in his other films La Finestra di Fronte  and  Le Fate Ignoranti  as well.   
 
 By the help of Michel Chion’s terminology, it can be inferred that both films evoke an 
audio-visual setting that contribute to the sensual and fantasmatic atmosphere that 
Orientalist frame requires. Besides the theatrical speech (film dialogue) and textual 
speech (voice-over) that has been examined so far, the specific employment of 
soundtrack and environmental sound should be briefly mentioned to demonstrate how 
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they contribute to the total aesthetic effect achieved by both films. First of all, both 
films, even if in an economical way especially to express intense emotions, do heavily 
depend on sound-speech and almost totally ignore the background noise. Such  
hegemony of speech  is a characteristic of feature films, as Chion argues:  “cinema is 
primarily vococentric, I mean that it almost always privileges  the voice, highlighting 
and setting the latter off from other sounds[…] Sound in film is voco- and verbocentric, 
above all, because  human beings  in their habitual behavior as well.” (Chion 5) Comolli, 
similarly, makes a complementary point: “In fact, the intelligibility of the dialogue 
allows these words and voices to be heard as though one were with them; there is a 
direct interpellation of the spectator who is set the stage on which the dialogue takes 
place.”  (Discussion 57). Speech as the dominating sound in film contributes heavily to 
the intelligibility of the film, adds its value upon the image to communicate the web of 
meaning better and to veil the distance between the spectator and the spectacle. Both 
Harem Suare and Hamam do not challenge, do not even discomfort this hegemony, 
unlike, for instance, films of David Lynch or Jacques Tati.  
 
When we look at the film music, we see that music is extensively used to enable 
transitions that are actually huge leaps in time and place. As Chion demonstrates, “the 
most widespread function of film sound consists of unifying or binding the flow of 
images. First, in temporal terms, it unifies by bridging the visual breaks through sound 
overlaps. Second, it brings unity by establishing atmosphere as a framework that seems 
to contain the image, a” heard” space in which the “seen” bathes. (Chion 47). Both 
screen music, whose source is located within the frame, that could be exemplified by 
Abdülhamid’s  piano playing  Harem Suare ( this scene is also an example of back 
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voice) and the circumcision  fest music in Hamam; and the pit music, “that accompanies 
the image  from a nondiegetic position, outside the space and time of the action” (Chion  
80)  are working  primarily to intensify  the ambiance  of the Oriental setting. The 
energetic drums  that accompany  the public scenes, where Francesco and  Mehmet were 
playing backgammon  in a smoky café  and the  sad and moving theme  that reaches its  
climax  when Francesco is murdered following the cut to the marble statue that slowly 
merged into shadow do demonstrate how pit music is used to intensify the dramatic 
quality of images. In Harem Suare, we hear pieces of opera, which seem to be 
contradictory to the conventional image of Orient at first, but this hints at the 
modernization pulse that slowly takes over the empire and lead the harem to its sad end.   
 
To sum up, music, as in the way it is used in both films, totally obeys, complements and 
intensifies the dramatic logic of the narrative whether it is pit or on-screen music. They 
let the spectator to immerse into the dramatic unfolding of plot rather, empathetic music. 
This is in Chion’s words, “from the word empathy, the ability to feel the feelings of 
others and that can directly express its participation in the feeling of the scene, by taking 
on the scene’s rhythm, tone and phrasing; obviously such music participates in cultural 
codes for things like sadness, happiness, and movement. (Chion 8) Such effect is very 
different from the anemphatetic music, which remains indifferent to what actually 
happens within the scene or intensify and amplify it with creating a contrast.  According 
to Chion, anemphatetic music essentially unveils the indifferent and automatic 
unwinding of projection, that is part of each film and which should hide itself and be 
forgotten by conjuring up the mechanical texture of this tapestry of the emotions and 
sense. (9)   
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Moreover, music in both films function as the   spatiotemporal turntable if we refer to 
Chion’s productive terminology.  
 
Music enjoys  the status of being  a little  freer of barriers of time  and space  
than the other sound and visual elements.[…]  music can swing  over from pit 
to screen  at a moment’s notice, without in the least throwing  into question 
the integrity of diegesis, as a voiceover intervening  in the action would. Out 
of time and out of space, music communicates with all times and all spaces of 
a film, even as it leaves them to their separate and distinct existences.” 
(Chion 81) 
 
We can witness the peak expression of  this function in both films of Özpetek, since both 
narrative universes aim at a circular structure, where past, present and future should 
overlap at some point to attain the unification of  different generations under the same  
destiny. Hence, the soundtrack music abide to such narrative structure and indeed 
contribute greatly to attain it by uniting different layers of spatio- temporalities in 
advance of the cinematic image. Indeed, we can go so far to say that both films’ real 
challenge is to bring about such unity over the narrative and they solve this challenge by 
heavily relying on empathetic music and voice-over. Such excessive utilization of this 
function of music points to an anxiety of difference, discontinuity and dissonance. Both 
films, more or less successively controls and represses any element that disturb the unity 
and continuity that plots demand.   Both films owe their praised ambiance that brings 
about a fantasmatic and mythical Orient greatly with the help of such sound design. Both 
films also reveal almost a total absence of materializing sound indices, (M.S.I.) a term 
again forged by Chion to define “ the sound’ that cause us to “feel” the material 
conditions  of the sound  source, and refer to the concrete  process of  the sound’s 
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production”. (114) Their absence or “sparsity can lead to a perception of the characters 
and story as ethereal, abstract and fluid” and this is exactly what has been required to 
create a soft, tender and sensual Oriental setting that could  take away and embrace the 
protagonists as well as spectators with promises of  intimacy and eroticism.(114)  
 
But such seemingly flattering aesthetization and valuation of Orient is not a new scheme 
for representing the Orient, rather it has a long and persisting duration in Western 
representative tradition. Özpetek’s films do not bring about a radical disruption to the 
Western Orientalist representation, nor do they seem to have an interest in doing so. 
Rather, it could be argued that both films exploit these conventions and the unconscious 
literacy of the film spectator of these conventions to produce the successful artistic 
setting and framework that their story requires. There is no doubt that both films are 
triumphant in attaining the right aesthetic formula to produce the desired effects by the 
film-maker. Nonetheless, such aesthetization carries the burden of being complicit with 
the Orientalist figuration that operates by exclusion, repression and trivialization of what 
is discontinuous, incongruent and different from what the Western frame wishes the 
Orient to be.    And the ones that pay the price are always the most disadvantageous in 
terms of gender, race and class.  
 
Neither Safiye, the Western woman masquerading as the Oriental concubine, nor 
Gülfidan who superficially enjoys enunciation in order to tell the story of her masters are 
subject to the same scope and degree of representative violence as Kara Nergis, the mute 
black servant.    She is not only robbed of her voice and left outside of language (in 
order to be safely incorporated back to it by being taught writing so that she can inform 
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her “lady” about the news of Nadir, the eunuch) where she can be pure spectacle, but at 
the same time she has been forcefully inserted within a fantasy of reciprocal desire.  The 
bathhouse scene where Safiye gives Nergis an erotic massage in turn of her usual 
services of washing and messaging is indeed a secret message by analogy for Nadir who 
peeps Safiye through the veils and principally works by creating the impression of a 
reciprocal desire on the part of Nergis.  She is not the actual desired person by Safiye but 
is merely exploited as a spectacular message for her real beloved, Nadir. We are given 
almost no chance to even question whether Nergis wants such ambiguously erotic 
encounter with Safiye.  Inferring from the camera work and the point of view shots, we 
are situated either with Safiye or Nadir who watches the scene behind the blinds.  She is 
not only excluded from the realms of speech, but also from the possibility to have a 
visual perspective. Nergis is located (a)historically to her usual place without slightest 
concern of thought, where she has been left mute and blind. What we are able to 
perceive of her is what the medium enables and although it seems at first a kindhearted 
and benevolent gesture that depicts her almost positively (loyal, capable of learning 
“writing” which is the mark of high civilization and worthy of her lady’s caressing), it is 
the same benevolent gesture that hides the vested interests of the Western subject.  
Meanwhile, what she wants and what she makes of with the gift of writing other than 
informing her former master goes without a single bit of curiosity from the spectator.  
What she wants has been taken for granted to be congruent with what Safiye wants. She 
is there to hint at Safiye’s benevolence and kindness which return to her as lifetime 
respect and loyalty.  If Gülfidan is the voice that could cling to the textual universe by 
effacing her difference and by masquerading with an unstable mimesis, Nergis is the 
total  absence of voice where she has been posited as the spectacle  submissive to 
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whatever is demanded from herself.  It must be clear that the old duality of image versus 
word, that made the film aesthetics busy for quite along time, is indeed a misconception 
that ignore how both could be employed separately or in complicity to set forth a politics 
of representation that stabilize the self and other essentially  for the advantage of former. 
Or else, both could work together or against each other to bring destabilization and 
ambiguity to what the classical film narrative takes for granted. 
 
In the next chapter, I will read both films in the light of sexual difference and gender 
roles within the framework of Orientalist schema.  Though both films provide an almost 
infinite source for discussion, due to the limit and scope of the study, only few would be 
mentioned basically around the Oriental locale of harem in particular and the Oriental 
setting in general for what enables the experience of transgressive desires and what it 
may imply for the general economy of Western subject vis-à-vis his Oriental other. One 
of the main issues will be the role of women in both films.   
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5 ORIENT ORIENTALIZED: A DARK STAGE FOR WHITE 
FANTASIES 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I have discussed the persisting quest for distinct “form” in both 
visual and aural terms within the tradition of Western metaphysics   and its intrinsic 
relation with the Orientalist discourse in two films of Özpetek. This discussion led me to 
the conclusion that both films are still said to be operating basically in favor of the 
Western subject position, even though they bring transgressive moments to the 
conventional Orientalist schema,.  The Western subject appropriates and consolidates 
itself by means of a game of de-appropriation and re-appropriation that essentially ought 
to take place in an Orient whose difference is culturally and geographically marked.  
Such marking necessitates a series of representational strategies that, in our case, to 
make present the Orient as the site of mythical origin and the locus of the most 
appealing desires of the subject /proprietor to cast them on Orient.  The strategies of 
representation should be under a high degree of control with excessive stylization of 
both visual and aural elements, since these two constitute the dominant means for the 
endeavor to give form; hence a static essence,  presence and identity both to the subject 
and  the other(s).  In order to establish this game of difference to attain the same, this 
time the Orient has been staged as an appealing and inviting place for the western 
subject to discover himself.  
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This endeavor to give an essential, unified and distinct form to the Orient, performed 
primarily via sound and vision, helps to appropriate and secure the sovereignty of the 
Western subject upon his other.  Hence, Orient should be necessarily different from what 
has been attributed to the West in order to sustain the nursing and restitution of mastery 
to the Western subject. This play of difference is not an acclaim of difference on its 
behalf but determined according to the Western standards of sameness and identity.  If 
all the effort to give Orient a static figure is actually about to sustain the identity of the 
Western subject, than we must consider the issue of sexual difference as one of the 
constitutive instances of such endeavor. Since the quest for this subject is initiated and 
greatly shaped by the hegemonic forces within Western culture, it comes to say that this 
quest for self-actualization and appropriation is primarily of a male subject considering 
the phallocentric ground  
 
5.1 Feminism With and Against Orientalism  
 
It might be argued that there is actually no single Western subject, instead numerous 
opposing, intersecting and overlapping interests determined by nation, gender and class 
that  renders necessarily unstable, shifting and sometimes contradictory  subject-
positions. Yet, what is meant by the Western subject is the suppression of this 
difference, multiplicity and contradiction in favor of a unified and stabilized self-
presence. Orientalist discourse is structurally necessary to engender such Western 
subject; it transforms otherwise heterogeneous and ambivalent subject positions into the 
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full-fledged unity of being Western by constructing the truth and image of Orient. We 
can say that Orientalist practice before everything else aims to occidentalize the occident 
by means of orientalizing the Oriental. Yeğenoğlu effectively formulates such operation 
as:  
 
The peculiarity of a colonial discourse such as such a Orientalism may be 
said to reside precisely in the westernizing (as well as Orientalizing) 
operation itself.  This is a process by which members are instituted as 
Western subjects. The operation I call is “Westernizing” consists in the 
fashioning of a historically specific fantasy whereby members imagine 
themselves as Western. This engendering and fashioning of the Western 
subject thus has a fictive character. But the fictive character of this position 
does not mean that it is not real; on the contrary, it produces material 
effects by constituting the very bodies of the subjects that it subjects. It 
refers to the historical inscription of a particular identity. To put it in 
different terms, the process of “becoming” a Western subject refers to its 
members becoming ontologized. (Yeğenoğlu 4) 
 
 
 
This ontologized subject gains the self-mastery and sovereignty only through 
consolidating his subjectity by means of attaining mastery over others. One can easily 
notice the similarities between the positioning of women and Orientals vis-à-vis the 
sovereign Western subject, whose determination is shaped greatly by White male 
individual and this constitution, is made up of his fantasies, desires and fears. Such 
masculine conception of Western subject is historically and culturally tied to the 
phallocentric structuring of Western cultures and it is engraved not only in cultural 
representations and the core of social organizing but also in the ostensibly indifferent 
and/or bias-free meta-narratives such as philosophy, science and history. Indeed as the 
major fictioning machines of subject, such meta-narratives are the true engine that sign 
cultural representations   and artistic productions.  The metaphysics of Western subject 
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is always already marked by sexual difference and is built upon the general logic of 
binarism that valorizes and centralizes the socio-culturally hegemonic term. The second 
term is conceptualized negatively with reference to the former on the basis of   what it 
lacks and/or excesses, in other words how it deviates from the standard set by the 
attributes of the former term.  When this binary logic is exposed, the intrinsic relation 
between under-valued positioning of women and Oriental/non-Western people becomes 
clearer.  And it comes no surprise that like the long-seated analogical attribution of 
nature to femininity, the conventional  pattern of feminization of the Oriental, the hyper-
sexualization of Oriental setting and the erotic compulsion/attraction generated by 
Orient  reveals the analogy between sexual and racial difference  built and articulated 
through the discursive practices. To understand the dynamic of such relation, it is useful 
to remember the distinction between two types of Orientalism introduced by Said. He 
distinguishes “an almost unconscious (and certainly untouchable) positivity” that he 
calls latent Orientalism from “the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, 
literatures, history, sociology, and so forth” that he calls as manifest Orientalism. 
(Orientalism 206) Furthermore, he adds that “latent Orientalism  encouraged a 
peculiarly ( not to say invidiously)  male conception of the world” and remarks how the 
scholarly Orientalism as a branch of academic art and knowledge was an exclusively 
male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed 
itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders.” (207) said also keenly remarks on how 
this exclusively male conception dominating Orientalist discourse, “tends to be static, 
frozen, fixed eternally.” (208) Although he launches a close reading of some Orientalist 
texts  to reveal the sexual connotations of widely-adopted words such as  penetration, 
conquering the wild and virgin lands etc. , he does not theoretically pursue  the 
  135                                                                                
 
overlapping  interests of  sexual and colonial mastery by means of a psychoanalytical 
approach.  
 
      Said assigned an important role to exoticism in the discursive representation      of 
the Orient. Because exoticism is relevant not only in the representation of the 
Oriental, but in the representation of alterity in general, the usefulness of his theory 
goes much beyond the Orient and it may be applied to postcolonial representations 
almost anywhere. According to Said, Western discourse created a particular Orient 
in order to justify its economic, intellectual and moral superiority over its territory 
and its subjects. In Orientalist discourse colonial and postcolonial, particularly 
female subjects tend to be represented by an ambivalence of desire and disdain. They 
are mysterious yet untrust-worthy, sexually arousing yet not quite clean, intriguing 
and yet uninteresting. Although Said’s work is fundamental in postcolonial studies, it 
has its limitations in demonstrating how sexual difference operates in the production 
of Orientalist discourse. MeydaYegenoglu’s Colonial Fantasies: Towards a 
Feminist Reading of Orientalism (1998) comes to mind that fills this void. (Nagy-
Zekmi, 172) 
 
 
Yeğenoğlu’s study is crucial not only for exposing how the Oriental female was the 
locus of desire of Western subject to penetrate through knowledge, whether disguising 
under the name of knowledge and science or explicitly seeking to conquer the sexual 
mysteries of the oriental women, but more importantly how the issue of sexuality is 
intrinsically related to the heart of Orientalism. “Thus, in referring to the scene of the 
sexual and the site of unconscious, I do not simply mean the ways in which the figure of 
the Oriental woman or Oriental sexuality is represented. I am rather referring to the ways 
in which representations of the Orient are interwoven by sexual imageries, unconscious 
fantasies, desires, fears, and dreams. In other words, the question of sexuality is cannot 
be treated as a regional one; it governs and structures the subject’s every relation with 
the other. Understanding this (double) articulation in Orientalist discourse therefore 
requires an exploration of the articulation of the historical with fantasy, the cultural with 
the sexual, and desire with power.” (Yeğenoğlu 26)  
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Her study is not a survey of stereotypes and specific representative strategies of 
Orientalism articulated this time from the point of view of feminist agenda, but an 
effective maneuver, that has been neglected by Said, to expose how the question of 
sexuality is a constitutive instance of Orientalist misrecognition. She uses Said’s 
definition of latent Orientalism as a lever to reach an enabling conception of 
unconscious of the discourse underline the intersection of sexual difference and 
Orientalism. According to her, psychoanalysis might be helpful in reaching this goal of 
unfolding sexual difference and thus avoiding a “psychologization” of colonial logic. 
Facilitating a reading with and against Homi Bhabha’s articulation of sexuality into 
colonial discourse, she presents an analysis of the Orientalist construction of Orient that 
“needs to be understood as being structured by the fantasy framework in the Lacanian 
sense, which provides the coordinates of the subject’s desire for the other.”  
 
Bhabha brings question of racial stereotype in line with Freudian notion of fetish as the 
signifier and the remedy of lack, while soothing the male subject it is also the constant 
remainder of lack that fuels castration anxiety.  
 
The scene of fetishism functions similarly as , at once, a reactivation  of the 
material of original fantasy- the anxiety  of castration and sexual 
difference- as well as  a normalization of that difference and disturbance in 
terms of the fetish object  as the substitute for the mother’s penis. Within 
the apparatus of colonial power, the discourses of sexuality and race relate 
in a process of functional overdetermination.” (Bhabha  398)   
 
Yeğenoğlu criticizes Bhabha on the rather obscure translation of the psychoanalytical 
treatment of fetish into the issue of racial/cultural difference. “Given that castration 
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anxiety and hence the threat it constitutes is key in theory of fetishism, it is not clear 
how the perceived lack (all man do not have the same skin/race/culture) of the cultural 
other constitutes a threat for the colonizer. Moreover, it is not clear how a specific color 
is translated into lack ” and also “ the question of a gendered colonial subject is not 
worked out in detail, but simply regarded as a metaphor of colonial ambivalence in 
Bhabha’s analysis.” (Yeğenoğlu 29)  Being itself a culturally specific theory that aims a 
certain universality and the status of science especially in Freudian instance and a more 
elaborated, yet persisting metaphysics  of  truth and identity in Lacanian schema, 
psychoanalysis is a theoretical tool that should be utilized with an attentive critical 
attitude that constantly disrupt its otherwise potentially thwarting  tendency to foreclose 
its subject-matter. Satisfying this ongoing alertness, it would provide a very powerful 
instrument “to pose the question of the itinerary of man’s desire in an attempt to 
deconstruct the imperial European subjectivity.” (Yeğenoğlu 55)  
 
At this essential injunction of sexual and racial difference, a new productive disruption 
is needed for post-colonial and feminist theories to articulate different sometimes 
contradictory interests. Spivak convincingly argues for the ongoing debate between 
feminisms, particularly exposing how French feminism could be complicit with her 
notorious Anglo- American sister when the issue comes to locate the colonial woman 
within feminist discourse.  
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      However unfeasible and inefficient it may sound, I see no way to avoid insisting that 
there has to be a simultaneous other focus: not merely who am I? But who is the 
other woman? How am I naming her? How does she name me? Is this part of the 
problematic I discuss? Indeed, it is the absence of such infeasible but crucial 
questions that makes the “colonized woman” as “subject” see the investigators as 
sweet and sympathetic creatures from another planet who are free to come and go; 
or, depending on her own socialization in the colonizing cultures, see “feminism” as 
having a vanguardist class fix, the liberties it fights for as luxuries, finally 
identifiable with “free sex” of one kind or another. Wrong, of course. My point has 
been that there is something equally wrong in our most sophisticated research, our 
most benevolent impulses. (Spivak, IOW 150)    
 
Mohanty, in her influential essay, argues that Western feminism’s endeavor to 
theoretically deal with the third-world woman carries crucial symptoms that could give 
us how Western feminism constitutes its subject-matter ( Western “women” ) in her 
difference from a monolithically conceived third-world “woman”: 
 
Universal images of ‘the third-world woman’ (the veiled woman, chaste virgin, etc.), 
images constructed from adding the ‘the third-world difference’ to ‘sexual 
difference’, are predicated on assumptions about Western women as secular and 
liberated and have control over their lives. I am referring to a discursive self-
representation, not necessarily to material reality.  If this were a material reality there 
would be no need for feminist political struggle in the West. Without the ‘third world 
woman’, the particular self-representation of Western women mentioned above 
would be problematical. I am suggesting in effect, that the one enables and sustains 
the other. (Mohanty 214) 
 
 
 
These cautionary remarks that expose the attempt of Western theoretical representation 
to bring a bout a monolithic colonial subject, however- should not obscure the 
persistence of the critique of colonial discourse on the basis of each culture’s unique 
experience of it. As Meyda Yeğenoğlu effectively points to this subtle point: “In 
insisting on retaining the general category of colonial discourse or colonialism, I am in 
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no way suggesting we see its unity as a simple harmonious totality. Rather, what I am 
suggesting is that we see the complexity within such a unity. […] It is the citationary 
nature of Orientalism that maintains its constancy, unity, and hegemony. […] The 
colonial episteme is maintained by a reiteration or citation of certain statements and 
representations. It is this citational nature of colonial discourse that guarantees its 
“factual” status, its “naturalness”, while simultaneously concealing the conventions upon 
which it is based. […] But if it is citationality that is essential in the sustenance of 
colonial discourse, it at the same time constitutes the possibility of its subversion and 
displacement.” (Yeğenoğlu 38)  
 
 
5.2 Discussion of films  
 
 
Both Harem Suare and Hamam provide a prosperous ground to discuss how sexual 
difference is articulated to and embedded within representations of Orient.  The 
discussion below will be held around two themes. Firstly, the basic strategies of films to 
represent women will be investigated with some crucial questions in mind.  One of the 
main concerns will be how the different positioning of Western and Oriental women is 
uttered and the possible consequences and reasons behind such difference. Second,  the 
crucial role of Oriental women in Orientalist discourse  will be discussed around  the 
theme of Harem as  the over-determined site of desire  and how this frame is related to 
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the films.  The role of Western women becomes crucial here to understand how the 
liberal feminist impulse could be articulated to Orientalism without a critical alertness.   
 
Second theme that will be pursued is the general economy of Western homoeroticism   
and its fascination with the Oriental within the context of Hamam. It would enable to 
disrupt the hasty celebration of (homo)sexual liberation (the right to expose and 
represent what has been hitherto repressed and excluded) and re-locate it  within the 
rather uneasy ground of   history, culture and politics of colonization. How the Oriental 
male is positioned with reference to the Western female and male will be questioned by 
means of the figures of eunuch and the Oriental male who has been feminized or hyper-
sexualized. 
 
5.2.1 The question of woman  
 
 
In Hamam, which actually concerns with the homoerotic awakening of the Western 
protagonist in Orient, we witness a double and surprisingly phallocentric standard 
employed to figure Western and Oriental women.  With Francesco, who lands on 
Istanbul and meets with a Turkish family that lives for years with his aunt, we find 
access to the Turkish domestic site. The camerawork and the narration mostly follow the 
point of view of Francesco at the first two-third of the movie and we gather our first 
impressions of Orient with and through him. The Turkish family he met in his aunt’s 
estate welcome Francesco with great enthusiasm and hospitality. They open their house 
to this total stranger and accommodate him with full service as if they have waited all 
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their life to meet with the grandson of Madam, whom she had mentioned all the time to 
the family though she actually had never seen or met with Francesco. After the long 
walks of Francesco that leads to the dizzying and promising experiences of Oriental 
public space, the narrow streets take him one time to an old church at another to an 
ancient bath house where there are naked Oriental men with incessant eyes on him, he 
finds shelter in the comforting house where Aunt Anita and the family lived. After the 
unease of the initial encounter is over and Francesco accepts the dinner offer of Perran 
(the mother), Francesco quits his hotel room and starts to live with the family. He 
occupies the prime seat  at the dinner table and the upper room Anita used to live.  When 
first Zozo, the estate agent and Francesco knocks the door, Füsun, the young and 
beautiful daughter opens the door.  Right from the start, camera enjoys the spectacle she 
offers and stays on her a bit longer hinting at Francesco’s desiring look upon her.  The 
camera each time lingering on Füsun’s face also helps to amplify the shock of the climax 
scene where we witness Francesco and Mehmet caressing each other by means of 
Martha’s sneaking to the bathhouse since the camera hints frequently how Francesco 
likes watching Füsun with enduring and intense close-ups. However, her face in intense 
close-up is a hint and invitation for the spectator to contemplate her beauty along with 
Francesco.    
 
Perran is depicted as a hard-working house woman   and an ideal traditional mother 
figure that runs around to look after everyone. Both women of the family are shot mostly 
within the walls of the house or within the borders of the neighborhood. Though, 
respectively Francesco and Martha becomes the central figures of movement and action, 
both Turkish women are shot in confined and repetitious movements, they are mostly 
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fixed to a domestic locus.  Throughout the movie, both Turkish women laboriously help 
the main figures of action by supplying food and psychological encouragement. The 
almost redundant scenes where both women are coming to the door and calling 
Francesco (“the tea/breakfast/dinner is ready!”) explicitly renders an Oriental women 
who has a natural softness and talent in serving and soothing the phallic power of men.  
Though, the character of Perran is given some window-to-window action with which she 
could exchange information and organize neighborhood resistance for the upcoming 
threat of evacuation, her role within the main course of events is a minimal  rather than a 
contributive one, like the rest of the Oriental characters within the plot. Both women are 
positively represented in their virtue of empathy, motherly care and enthusiastic support 
for Francesco’s renovation project of Anita’s hamam (which means metaphorically a 
self-reconstruction at the same time). While Füsun is made available  for the pleasure of 
returning  the gaze of  protagonist ( but not the camera, since it would  make apparent 
the mechanic presence of the camera and ruin the transparency of the story)  by exposing 
her  distinguished beauty, the  bathing women in hamam are turned into an anonymous  
spectacle of eroticism  and  enable the first intimate  touch between Francesco and 
Mehmet for now they share the guilt and joy of secretly peeping through the hole 
forbidden scene of  naked Oriental women in hamam.   The exclusively domestic and 
submissive portrayal of Oriental women becomes almost a celebration of authentic 
womanhood when we compare their tenderness and care with the cruel, selfish and 
ambitious illustration of Martha who does not seem to care for the needs of her husband 
but only her career.  Martha is a strong, ambitious, and almost an over-whelming figure 
of femininity who is sexually and socially active. She enjoys the power to mock and 
sexually recline her husband and thus she leaves Francesco impotent. Her castrating 
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figure is put to sheer contrast with the soothing femininity of Turkish women when 
Martha comes to Istanbul to visit her husband.  When Francesco asks Martha how she 
found the Turkish family, she answers: “Well, they are very nice and friendly people. 
And Füsun is a very smart and beautiful girl” though her gestures hints at something not 
avowed. It is obvious that she finds such naïve hospitality and servitude a bit 
overwhelming and annoying indeed.  
 
As the subjective point of view of the unsteady camerawork slowly leaves  the airport 
and comes out to the blinding daylight, Martha slowly emerges to be the new dominant  
subject that camera identifies with, following the events  after her arrival in Istanbul . 
This substitution of Francesco with Martha will be completed at the final scene where 
she speaks over the panoramic view of Istanbul off-screen.  As Martha becomes the 
main figure that the camera identifies with, she starts to go over a transition like his 
husband that will eventually lead to choose to stay in Istanbul as Francesco and Anita 
did.  She becomes the new guardian of the bath house together with the old 
neighborhood, which obviously stood for everything about the good old Istanbul that 
should be preserved at all costs.  When she completes the transition, she becomes 
milder, more compassionate, more “feminine”, finally leaving her cold and selfish 
identity behind. As she yields more and more to the proper roles assigned for an ideal 
woman such as desiring and understanding her husband, the more rhetoric of camera 
turns in her favor.  It is only after Martha gives away her self-confidence and her 
decision to break up with Francesco, she could fill the subject position that her husband 
occupied. Only after such compromise she could deserve empathetic representation and 
claim the role of the pilgrim who watches over her dear Orientals and enjoy the freedom 
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and power hiding behind such benevolence.  Such exchange of power from the Western 
male to Western female is actually a temporal stabilization of the phallic order and it is a 
very symptomatic characteristic of the Western woman’s dubious positioning with 
reference to the hegemonic Western male subject before the inferior Oriental man and 
woman.  What Maria Heung argues in the context of her analysis of Indochine 
(1992) is also valid to interpret how the phallic power passes to Martha in Hamam: 
“While the film seems to posit a reciprocal exchange of cultural valences, between 
women, these differences are valuated hierarchically, so that European protagonist is 
placed in apposition of narrative authority, whereas the “other” woman occupies the role 
of  the visually subordinated  and the silenced.” (172) 
 
Likewise Ella Shohat argues for this transference of phallic power: “Although the 
imperial narrative is ultimately masculunist, the ambiguous role of European female 
characters complicates the analysis. […] here the intersection of colonial and gender 
discourses generate a shifting, contradictory positioning. […] In many films , colonial 
women become the instrument of the White male vision, and are granted a gaze  more 
powerful than that of non-Western women and men.[…] In sum, the colonialist 
discourse on gender has Western women occupy a relatively powerful position on the 
surface of the text, but only as the bearers of a gaze more colonial than sexual.” (Shohat 
166) 
 
5.2.2 Harem: The Locus of Desire 
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We can find a similar gesture of such relative empowerment of Western woman vis-à-
vis the Oriental men and women in Harem Suare as well. Harem is perhaps the most 
attractive Oriental site for the Western imagination and fantasy. Shohat makes a sharp 
distinction between two types of attitudes to represent harem.  In its wide-spread 
Eurocentric form, “authorizing a voyeuristic entrance into an inaccessible private space, 
the harem dream reflects a masculinist utopia of sexual omnipotence. […] Whereas 
Eurocentric discourse has defined the harem as simply a male-dominated space, a sign 
of “Oriental despotism”, other accounts have emphasized the harem as a privileged site 
of female interaction and even of Sapphic fantasy. “ (Shohat 161-163) If we attempt to 
locate Harem Suare to this two-fold schema, certainly we will face with an ambiguity 
that will render such categorization difficult.  Since Harem Suare differs from the 
stereotypical Western handling of harem that could be best illustrated with eighteenth 
century Orientalist paintings, Hollywood productions and pornographic/erotic films in 
its narrative handling, though the visual strategies do certainly resemble the conventions 
that has been set up by these earlier forms.   However, if we focus more on the narration 
and script, the film certainly fits into the second category through which the harem is 
depicted as a complex institution where women do contribute, challenge and share the 
power and politics. The harem of Harem Suare has a completely different story than the 
classical composition of the despot surrounded by the concubines.  If the first, one which 
is obviously coded as the regressive category, is characterized by the significant 
emphasis on the omnipresence and infinite sexual power of the despot, Harem Suare 
extraordinarily departs from it. Since the Oriental despot/sultan, who is played by Haluk 
Bilginer as Sultan Abdulhamid, has been posited marginally on the border of the text. 
There are very few scenes where the spectator could see the Sultan himself and most of 
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them are visually impeded circumstances where the camera captures his image only 
partially or with a constraint that bans the spectator to see him completely (for instance 
the shot where we see him playing piano from his back, or the quick and partial glances 
of camera that does not capture him at full front).  It is as if the sultan, though it has been 
hinted that he has a vast authority and evokes grandiose and confusing emotions such as 
fear, respect and adoration, is a kind of a distant and marginal figure in his own private 
domain, which could be counted as a more historically accurate version of the relation 
between the Ottoman sultans and the institution of harem. Although the character 
remains marginal or only adjacent to the main plot, his almost invisible and inaudible 
impact and influence authorizes the unfolding of the protagonists’ faiths from this off-
screen position.  Such subtle audiovisual strategy portrays his presence as a sort of 
infrastructural and abstract law that governs the destinies of women and the rest of the 
palace servants. In this harem, women are not dumb sexual slaves but active and 
sometimes incredibly strong political figures that shape the future of the empire with 
their fierce competition to give birth to the next sultan.   
 
Moreover, the sexual life in harem is portrayed in various different forms where we 
witness homosexual relation between girls, between a soldier and eunuch (Sümbül) and 
heterosexual yet transgressive ones such as between Safiye and Nadir.  However, such 
departures from the classical schema do not help the film to be entirely freed from the 
Orientalist structures.  On the contrary, the basic Orientalist assumptions subsist within 
the re-formulation.  “To suggest that Orientalism establishes its systematic character 
through its citationary nature does not mean that every single text is nothing but a simple 
repetition of another. […] In other words, we should not simply look for the re-statement 
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of Orientalist topos in the act of simple repetition of earlier ideas and images, but also in 
displacements, divergences, and even in the dissemination of dissenting ideas.” 
(Yeğenoğlu 71)  Harem Suare enables one of the most hideous and mysterious sites of 
Orient to be exposed and revealed in front of the eyes of the spectator. To render such 
story possible, convincing and appealing to the Western audience, there is only way and 
it is to utilize the Western female protagonist who may access to and inhabit within the 
exclusively female site of harem.  Different from the Western female travelers who 
retrieve such information, the protagonist of the film is an insider and outsider at the 
same time, an Italian aristocrat who has been enslaved and given to Sultan to become 
one of his concubines. We understand that she has been brought up in harem according 
to both Eastern and Western values  due to the increasing Western impact  taking over 
the Ottoman Empire  and that steadily infuses even the most traditional and private 
domains of  palace structure. However, one must remember how she could last her 
favorite position for Sultan, since her greatest advantage was her excellent education in 
Western manners and high-culture such as opera which would enable her to get closer to 
Sultan as it has been  planned and foreseen by Nadir, her partner and lover.  If her 
exclusive advantage is her affinity with Western high culture and language, it is again 
her Western traits of individuality and self-confidence that makes her an almost natural 
leader of the concubines during the times of crisis and dissolution.  It is again only 
Safiye who could stand up and challenge the soldiers who break through the sacred 
doors of harem to announce the so-called emancipation of concubines. Safiye’s apparent 
identification with the Oriental inhabitants of harem, her ability to speak their language 
and know their manners is in the final instance to emphasize her distinguishing 
characteristics that make her the protagonist of the story. Yeğenoğlu, in her attempt to 
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re-locate Western women within the context of Orientalist writing  by means of reading 
Lady Montague’s Letters, argues that “the imperialist gesture of subject constitution is 
always predicated upon  the recognition of the other through assimilation, thorough the 
logic of the same. […]  Within the apparatus of colonial power, difference is always 
understood through the logic of the same, through the self, and as such is nothing but an 
inverted mirror-image of the same. […] In the very act of identification she establishes 
with Turkish women, Montaguee does perform the violent transformation implied in the 
act of translation of cultural difference in to the self/same.” (85)   
 
Although our case is a much more complicated one, since unlike Lady Montaguee, 
Safiye is a fictive character whose cultural identity is depicted as  a kind of complex 
hybrid. However, such complications do not change the fact that she is primarily 
inscribed as a Western protagonist around which the whole narration is organized. 
Although her identification with Turkish women ( indeed, the national identities of  
other concubines  are not implied within the movie  and we know  from the historical 
facts that harem was  made up from  non-Turkish, mostly European ethnicities  who 
were culturally assimilated for the obvious political concern of  not mixing the authentic 
Ottoman blood with other Turkish lineages) goes far beyond Lady Montague’s 
empathetic remarks to an almost confusing degree regarding her cultural identity, it is 
still certain which portion of  cultural and ethnic heritage dominates and determines  her 
portrayal.  
 
If we remember the bath house scene where Safiye caresses Kara Nergis with incensed 
oils in return for Nergis’ domestic  and usual service of  washing the concubine for the  
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upcoming night, we may argue that through the erased and pacified presence of Nergis, 
Safiye could adopt the masculine gaze and the phallic power that are  exclusively 
reserved for men. This homoerotic scene is followed by her direct confrontation of Nadir 
who secretly watches them behind the blinds. It is as if the whole encounter was 
theatrically made-up for Nadir and hence, by implication, the spectator. The power of 
this particular scene emanates from Safiye’s adoption of masculine desire and gaze upon 
the body of the Oriental feminine.  
 
This borrowed and incorporated phallic power is the source of nostalgia and yearning for 
the originary scene of Oriental, the harem,   which have been destroyed by the rising 
modernization that grabs and shakes the whole empire. It comes no surprise that through 
Safiye the film evokes the feelings of melancholia and nostalgia for the loss of harem 
and the authentic Orient, just like Hamam’s nostalgia for the golden days of Turkish 
bath houses; for the good old times when Istanbul was still Istanbul when it was 
promising sensualities and erotic adventures.  What Yeğenoğlu argues for Lady 
Montague seems to shed some light on Safiye as well: 
 
Therefore, to have the kind of appropriative and intrusive relation she has 
with the Orient, she attaches a phallus to herself so that she can enter into the 
domain of the other, to the origin of all civilizations, to the “mother-nature-
Orient,” and thereby be. Thus she finds the life-enhancing origin, which has 
been denied to her (in the West) within the phallocentric economy, in the 
Orient, in the space of its women. It is by entering into the 
harem/Orient/womb that she can reproduce herself and constitute her 
identity. She thus becomes the One/Self in relation to the Orient and Oriental 
woman. (93) 
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The dissolution of harem by Ittihat ve Terakki nationalist activists , contrary to the 
soldiers’ claims that they bring freedom and salvation to the concubines, has been 
depicted as  a traumatic  event that ruin the concubines’ lives. The concubines have been 
left in the middle of the turmoil that will eventually pace up by the end of the empire. 
Most could not start over a new life and go under more modern versions of oppression 
like prostitution and semi-erotic freak shows like Safiye had to. Rest of the harem 
workers, including eunuchs who once enjoyed significant powers, and minor servants 
like Nergis were returned to their countries where poverty and exclusion awaits. The 
film departs radically from the classical conviction, “that the harem is an inherently 
oppressive institution [which] functions as an  a priori assumption” in most of the 
Western feminist and native nationalist discourses. (Zonana 155)  
 
Zonana rightly points out that by this major premise “the lives of women in England or 
France or the United States can be compared to the lives of women in “Arabia,” then the 
Western feminist’s desire to change the status quo can be represented not as a radical 
attempt to restructure the West but as a conservative effort to make the West more like 
itself.” (154-155)  We must admit that film’s rhetoric radically departs from this scheme, 
nonetheless,  it perfectly fits to the nostalgic regression that  Orient  should remain  as 
Orient  eternally , since  if it  goes under historical changes like every other geography 
does, it would not provide the fantasmatic site for the Western subject to realize 
him/herself through masquerading, mastery and conquest. The same logic governs 
Hamam’s rhetoric as well disguising under a romantic criticism of high capitalism. 
Although both films could be read as progressive criticism of modernity in this regard, I 
insist that such reading would prevent us  from thinking upon in what ways such naïve 
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criticism would profit the Western subject, since s/he constitutes the center of both 
films’ concerns.  
 
Harem, in spite of all the historical corrections and “positive” representation (which is 
indeed nothing more than a mere reversal of the classical Orientalist scheme) that the 
film seems to aim, is still rendered as the great spectacle where material abundance and 
ornamental female nudity and the harmonious composition of concubines (alluring to the 
polygamous fantasies of the spectator) has been displayed without problematizing the 
voyeuristic position of the spectator.  Such exposing gesture is similar in its effects with 
what Malek Alloula argues for the colonial postcards from Algiers: “Better yet, to be the 
witness of such intimacy is to partake in it. And so, magically, the photographer enters 
through the main door into this holy of holies. He is no longer the surreptious and 
sneaky visitor who steals away with a few meager scraps when a favorable occasion 
arises. Quite the contrary, having lifted the curtain, he roams openly throughout the 
harem, undisturbed, observing at leisure the life that is hidden from indiscreet eyes.” 
(Alloula 69) Such exposition is further fueled by the labyrinthine and disorienting design 
of interior settings that are partially disrupted with blinds, curtains and veils which will 
be overcome by the camera in the following moments; hence heightening the pleasure to 
see what lies in there.  
 
Apart from the picturesque exhibition of harem as the fantasmatic site of passions, 
Harem Suare also brings a two-fold strategy to narrate the transgressive love affair 
between Safiye and Nadir. Such love affair is transgressive at least on two levels.  One is 
the miscegenation between a white woman and a black man, which is one of the biggest 
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anxieties of the Western phallic imaginary. It is useful to remember how even the 
possibility of such encounter has become the target of immense censorship by 
Hollywood Production Code and how it is still one of the most avoided themes in 
mainstream melodrama although it provides an excessive supply of fantasy and fear and 
a frequent theme  in porno and horror genres.  The second aspect that renders the love 
affair so transgressive is maybe even more atypical, since Nadir is a eunuch, which 
means that he is castrated.  These two transgressive aspects could be either considered as 
doubling the shocking effect or, on a second level, lessening the unease of one another. 
To understand such neutralization effect, one should better think of other two 
alternatives:  If Nadir was not castrated; the alleged monstrosity of such miscegeneous 
encounter could be amplified due to the alleged hypersexuality of black man. Then, such 
love affair would evoke the rapist fantasies that occupy the Western phallic imaginary 
stamping the cinema history right form its very beginnings with Griffith’s Birth of a 
Nation. Alternatively, if the castrated lover was a white European male, the castration 
anxiety would surely be more heavily felt by the male spectator.  Although it is not 
certain which way such combination may work, the alternative that castration of the 
black male relieves the fear of miscegenation should not be totally ignored.  
 
In the scheme provided by Richon, eunuch emerges as the founding absence upon which 
the representation is based: (256)  
 
What to think of a woman who desires one of them and what to think of men 
if eunuchs are desired by women? The eunuch would be a saint respected by 
all and a pervert desired by all. At this point, the role of the eunuch may be 
displaced. He would not only be the invisible spectator of the harem but the 
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one upon whom all places depend: he is a semblance, a seducer, a 
simulacrum. (Richon 256-257) 
 
 
Since the eunuch is made visible and even made central in a love affair, his position is 
no longer the founding absence that Richon speaks of with reference to academic 
Orientalist paintings. Within the context of Harem Suare, there is a complex operation 
that first posits and exhibits the radical alterity of Nadir regarding his skin color and 
castration which would later be disavowed and normalized with a certain rhetoric.  His 
racial alterity is compensated by the specific choice of a native French actor, whose 
perfect French speech would help to get him closer to the Western identity despite its 
apparent simulacral condition.  Language could play a significant role to relatively 
incorporate and ignore the racial difference when it is tactically required.  Secondly, the 
radical alterity and the implicit threat residing in the condition of castration is relieved 
by a subtle normalization. Although Nadir is physically castrated, he seems to take a 
considerable share from the phallic power since he is a politically influencial figure who 
could indirectly determine the successor of the empire.  But, the most effective means of 
normalization is carried out by repressing the apparent oddity of the relationship 
between Safiye and Nadir.  Although, they love passionately each other, Nadir has to 
and wills to sexually share his beloved with Sultan so that Safiye could bear a child to be 
the next sultan.  Such scheme, which is intolerable for the Western norms of romance, is 
successfully repressed by converting them into a Western type of couple.  Such strategy 
becomes most apparent when the camera captures Safiye and Nadir and the baby as an 
ideal copy of the proper Western family. Further, the scene that exposes Nadir making 
love to Safiye which ends with her orgasm could be conceived as the restitution of the 
proper heterosexuality. Malek Alloula mentions a similar gesture in colonial postcards 
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that composes Western-type nuclear families from Algerians, whose familial structures 
were not essentially monogamous.  
 The very ideas of the couple is an imported one  which is applied to a society 
that operates on the basis of formations that are greater than simple twoness, 
such as the extended family, the clan, or the tribe. First colonized, then 
rearranged along the bourgeois criteria, the Algerian  family becomes , in 
the postcard, only the  exotic ( see the dress) replica of its European 
counterpart (Italic author’s, Alloula 38-39) 
 
Such universalization and consolidation of the Western couple relieves and hides the 
otherwise shocking nature of the relationship according to the Western standards of 
romance.  
 
3.2.3 Adventures in the Orient: Mastery and Dissolution  
 
Lastly, the homoeroticism of Hamam should be briefly mentioned within the context of 
Orientalist practices. Joseph A. Boone rightly asserts that:  
 
Perhaps nowhere else are the sexual politics of colonial narrative so explicitly 
thematized as in those voyages  to the Near  East  recorded or imagined by 
Western man.[…] For such men, the geopolitical realities of the Arabic 
Orient become a psychic screen on which to project fantasies of illicit 
sexuality and unbridled excess —including, as Malek Alloula has observed, 
visions of “generalized perversion” (95) and, as Edward Said  puts it, “ 
sexual experience unobtainable in Europe,” that is, “ a different type of 
sexuality”(190).  (Boone 209)  
 
Although more egalitarian and less oppressive than the trajectories of Western 
homosexual men, including many literary names such as Gide and Wilde,   who pursued 
the easily accessible sexual encounters provided by the boy prostitutes of Maghreb 
(Boone  211), Francesco’s journey to Istanbul and his homosexual love affair with 
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Mehmet is not altogether disparate from the oppressive schema of Orientalism.   Since 
the identificatory rhetoric of film works for Francesco rather than Mehmet, we, as 
spectators, largely occupy his point of view. And from such point of view, Mehmet, like 
his sister Füsun, is captured as the object of desire and aesthetic contemplation sustained 
by the camerawork that exposes his naked body and the incessant close-ups to reveal his 
androgynous beauty.   While the actor who plays the role of Francesco is distinguished 
with his well-built body and masculine facial traits, the actor chosen for playing Mehmet 
has androgynous almost feminine looks.  More important than that, while we pursue 
Francesco’s novel homoerotic awakening, we know entirely nothing  about Mehmet’s 
former sexual inclinations, whether he was gay or not before he fell in love with 
Francesco although his obscene jokes about women hints at his ongoing interest in the 
opposite sex.  His feminization and pacification should not be understood merely in 
sexual terms, since Mehmet has been rendered passive and submissive in his relation 
with Francesco like the rest of the family in almost all aspects of everyday life. While 
Francesco starts to renovate the bath house together along with his own alienated life, 
Mehmet is readily at hand for helping this ritual of recreation. 
 
 Perhaps, the one and the only erotic scene where we see two men caressing and kissing 
each other illustrates this point more than anything else.  The composition is highly 
stylized, where we see Francesco having the upper hand and dominating the scene. 
Mehmet lies exposing his body. His image has been blocked by the overwhelming body 
of Francesco kissing him.  Such bodily gesture clearly illustrates the feminization of 
Mehmet to enable the restoration of Francesco who had been castrated by his al-too-
potent wife.  It is obvious that the love affair between two men is informed and perhaps 
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enabled by the asymmetric relations of power and mobility. However, the film totally 
ignores this crucial issue and naturalizes the whole staging by successfully erasing 
Mehmet from the site of enunciation by locating him as the object of desire. Therefore, 
the whole homoerotic encounter becomes the exclusive experience of Francesco that 
validates and re-adjusts his identity while leaving Mehmet totally out of question.  
Without the Orientalist discourse that displace and re-adjust itself, the whole economy of 
this transgressive experience would entirely change, perhaps even could not be possible. 
The sexual liberation of Francesco comes at the cost of objectifying Mehmet, whose 
desire for Francesco could not exist without the obvious asymmetrical power 
relationship between the two. 
 
As a final point, the play of sexual and racial difference that has been accepted and 
disavowed at once (a common gesture that dominates the whole Orientalist discourse), 
also determines both films and actually sustain the sexual fantasy of loss and mastery 
that gives the verve to both stories. No matter how the sexual encounters between the 
white protagonists and the non-Westerns are depicted   “positively”, carrying all the 
virtues of a properly Western romance, it does not help to resolve the films with “happy 
endings”. It seems that both films are somehow compelled to end with tragic death, 
dissolution and loss. While in Hamam, Francesco is murdered by a Turkish gangster 
hired for the reason that Francesco had gone against the emerging capitalist authorities; 
in Harem Suare, Nadir throws himself under a train (which hold allegorical  meanings as 
well) and Safiye awaits her own death alone. It is as if both sexual and racial 
transgressions should be symbolically punished; as if it is entirely impossible for these 
people to live their life together at least for some time or to simply go on their lives after 
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breaking-up. Indeed, by such tragic ending, two things have been sustained at once.  The 
first one is the maintenance and re-appropriation of the phallic order that inserts itself 
forcefully upon both texts.  As Deborah Root argues within the context of the novel and 
film Sheltering Sky, “The notion that cultural difference provided authentic experience 
functions again and again as a kind of pharmakon for the Western colonialist subject, in 
that this experience is presented as something that can (appear to) cure the Western 
disease of alienation and ennui, but which can also kill and render insane. […] Hence the 
equivalence of “going native” and madness [which equals to other versions of radical 
subject dissolutions such as, the illness of melancholia and death in Özpetek’s films]; in 
such stories  the encounter with difference produces a kind of poison, and in this sense it 
is possible  to say that Kit and Port suffered from difference poisoning.” (Root 85) In 
Özpetek’s films the difference that has been celebrated as the cure and renewal of the 
alienated Western subject, is held implicitly responsible for the following tragedies.  The 
same gesture that forecloses both narrations with tragic ends also, paradoxically, sustains 
a certain criticism against modernization that cannot tolerate deviances from the norms it 
inserts. Despite the apparent contradiction between these two readings, I believe that it 
does not weaken the inherent Orientalist schema, on the contrary grant even more vigor 
and credibility supported with an alleged criticism of Western modernism. 
 
In a dialectical relation with the first schema that resolves both stories in favor of a 
symbolic punishment for transgression, the tragic dissolution of protagonists could be 
argued to negate and sublate the inevitable change and turmoil of modernization, which 
also enabled to shake the former power relations in favor of the colonized (yet, not 
without its own problematics as we can clearly observe in nationalist projects). By such 
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maneuver of denying the lovers the chance to carry on together and also the possibility 
of movement and change after the loss of one of the parties, film consolidates the 
colonial power inherent within the texture of their love affair.  By the gesture of self-
destruction or self-exile, their love is rendered immune to the inevitable law of change 
and time and  becomes a frozen memorable for the good old days of Orient.   
 
 
 
 
5.3 Summary  
 
 
An ambivalent economy resides in this play of difference and identity that first posits 
then disavows a difference that could only be understood in terms of the identical and 
the same. This economy is constitutive for Western subject to found the boundaries of 
his identity by means of positing and figuring what/who is different from himself. This 
objectification of the other is historically congruent with the colonial desire of conquest 
and mastery over other cultures, which has been justified on the basis of a self-claimed 
superiority of the West.  However, the violence actually starts with an antedating 
inscription of epistemological and ontological difference that incessantly produces a 
hierarchical subordination of the other by the self.  The orchestration of difference is the 
very means of giving a distinct, transparent and immediate figure/form to the other in 
order to achieve a holistic and immediate identity of the self. This operation has to 
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repress repetitiously what precedes itself, that is the essential ambiguity and instability, 
the actual mimetic condition of self-engenderment.  The violence starts with the very 
gesture that gives an essential and static figuration/form to the other and such inaudible 
and invisible inscription cannot be noticed by logocentric epistemology that favors an 
immediate and transparent conception of presence.  
 
That is why a persistent deconstruction of Western subject is needed if we want to 
disrupt the Orientalist discourse which is one of the constitutive instances of 
engendering and stabilizing his identity through establishing a binary structure between 
western and non-Western: 
 
The binary structure is the very structure which produces the desire for 
sovereign subjectivity, i.e. the economy of the subject. The sovereign subject 
is based on the fiction of an absolute limit by which he excludes others and 
recognizes himself a autonomous. A reversal of terms is not sufficient 
precisely because it maintains  the economy by which the same absolute limit 
is sustained, whereas the whole point deconstruction  is to turn that limit into 
a passage ( hence its difference from relativism). If the Hegelian economy 
works by making the subject recognize himself in the other, Derridean 
deconstruction makes the subject recognize the other in himself or herself. 
(Yeğenoğlu, 9)  
 
 Ferzan Özpetek’s films unfortunately operate on the same Orientalist ground that they 
aim to overturn by means of staging an Orient that is aesthetically elaborated and 
enhanced to fit into the sensual and desirable picture; to the exclusive and disabling 
schema as the film makers want it to be.  However, such flattering gesture does not 
expose and challenge the entrenched asymmetry established between the two parties.  
  160                                                                                
 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
I have tried to produce a critical discussion that elaborates the intrinsic relation between 
Orientalist practices of representation and the exclusively Western inclination to know 
and determine its subject-matter by means of attributing a distinct form/figure that 
renders it at once stable and immediate for the knowing subject. Such endeavor of 
forming/figuring the other is closely related to the logic of subject/object dichotomy that 
governs the Western metaphysics. In order to posit the sovereignty and superiority of the 
(primordially male) Western subject, an economy of representation that exposes and 
produces a distinct and static figuration of the other is needed. By this maneuver, the 
Western subject would be able to posit the limit that distinguishes and elevates himself 
above other forms of subject formations.  
 
Inspired by such deconstructive moment that reveal the fictitious (yet, such fiction 
produces “real” and “concrete” effects) character of Western subject formation, I have 
tried to develop a multi-layered argument that is built on three crucial aspects of this  
endeavor of  figuration  of the other, by means of a close reading of  two films by Ferzan 
Özpetek.  Firstly, I have tried to explain how an ocularcentric conception of figure and 
idea informs the Western metaphysics of presence and how such hegemony of vision 
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manifests itself within the Orientalist representations. Consequently, I have questioned 
to what extend both Hamam and Harem Suare complies with this exclusively Western 
scheme that fixes a picturesque Orient for the Western spectator to contemplate. In order 
to do this, I have paid special attention to the visual regime employed by both films and 
revealed that three elements that govern Orientalist representations, which are 
distinction, citationality and an obsessive anachronistic fixation which govern  the visual 
aesthetics of both films as well.  
 
Subsequently, I have concentrated on the second aspect of this strive for figuration, 
which is the sound-speech, that enables speech to substitute itself as the  immediate and 
transparent  evidence of self-presence of the speaker that would hide its representational 
essence. Following the deconstructive criticism of logocentric valuation of speech-
sound, I have sought how sound had been utilized in both films with a particular 
emphasis on the voice-over narration that both Hamam and Harem Suare extensively 
employed.  My conclusions were that voice-over and musical scores, for both films, 
operated as a suturing tool that bind and unify the otherwise highly expanded and 
discontinuous layers of spatio-temporalities and hence they help bringing about a unified 
historical scheme that emphasize continuity, repetition and totality by repressing 
discontinuity, difference and singularity of  what it narrates.   With paying a special 
attention to the voice-over of Gülfidan character in Harem Suare, I have argued that in 
both films, the non-Western characters have been rendered as undifferentiated units of a 
unified category of Oriental by effectively erasing the heterogeneity and alterity of the 
characters such as Gülfidan and Kara Nergis. Therefore, I propose that, to sustain the 
tempting aesthetization of the Orient, both texts trivialize, marginalize and repress 
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certain identities and elements that would otherwise threaten the homogeneity of the 
frame 
 
Finally, I have dealt with the third aspect that signs the Western anxiety of figuring the 
other, that is sexual difference. After briefly mapping the theoretical field that examines 
the curious articulation and embedding of sexual difference within the racial discourse, 
an exclusive reading  of both films have been  initiated with the axiomatic question of 
sexual difference, desire and anxiety in mind. Such reading, that has been informed by 
but not totally submitted to the psychoanalytical theory, has facilitated that both films 
stages the Orient as the locus of desire and sexual emancipation exclusively for the 
Western protagonists whereas effectively erasing the very conditions that render Orient 
available for such erotic quest of the Western subject. Both texts are authorized with a 
fantasy of reciprocal desire and an operation that reduces the Oriental to a mere object of 
desire who is not capable of resistance and rejection.  
 
In conclusion, I argue that both Hamam and Harem Suare have been informed by the 
Orientalist conventions of representation. In their attempt to overturn the negative image 
of Orient and replace it with an appealing version, they have been caught back within 
the Orientalist scheme. Since the issue here is not necessarily about the good or bad 
illustration of Orient, but the preceding ontological distinction that endows the Western 
subject the very focal point of action and the referential quality to measure and validate 
the Orient. Both films, in their differing ways, cite the Orientalist conventions, challenge 
and replace some of them if  necessary to re-structure  the Oriental picture to render it as 
the suitable stage for their stories. “If the legacy of Orientalism is with us today, and if it 
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has been able to survive despite the collapse of empires, it is because it has articulated 
itself differently in each instance. As an unconscious memory it reappears through 
displacement, association, disruption; it intersects with newly emerging discourses. Each 
intersection, each interruption and displacement does in fact multiply and complicate as 
much as it fixes the discursive unity of Orientalism.” (Yeğenoğlu 72) The challenge 
these two films bring helps to fix the Orient as picture, albeit a pleasant one this time.   
The Orient stays as the exquisite stage for the Western protagonist to perform himself; it 
has to remain as the eternally same background for the Western subject to be able to 
attain movement.  
 
Ferzan Özpetek’s entire oeuvre (including the other two films he directed) seems to be 
signed with a strong theme of nostalgia that yearns for an originary and authentic 
elsewhere and a fairy “once-upon-a-time”.  His cinema could be characterized with a 
particular aesthetics of nostalgia and a fantasy of recurrence by means of homogenizing 
the past and present events through analogy. Concerning this significant drive that sign 
his style, it is not surprising that his cinema has an intimate almost passionate 
relationship with Istanbul and Rome, since both are very old cities where vast time 
layers do coexist side by side.  His representation of both cities seems to be determined 
by his longing for an indeterminate past. In his analysis of exilic, diasporic and 
postcolonial ethnic filmmakers, Hamid Naficy, observes that exilic filmmakers 
“memorialize the homeland by fetishizing it in the form cathected sounds, images, and 
chronotopes that are circulated intertextually in exilic popular culture. […]  The exiles’ 
primary relationship, in short, is with their countries  and cultures of origin and with the 
sight, sound, taste and feel of an originary experience of an elsewhere at other times.[…]  
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freed from old and new, they are “deterritorialized,” yet they continue to be in the grip 
of both the old and the new, the before and the after. Located in such a slipzone, they 
can be suffused with hybrid excess, or they may feel deprived and divided, even 
fragmented. […] As a result, they tend to represent their homelands and people more 
than themselves. ” (Naficy 12)  Although, we know that Özpetek is not an exile, his 
cinema reveals certain characteristics of Naficy’s definition and his cinema more 
radically differs from postcolonial filmmaking, which Naficy gives Trinh T. Minh-ha’s 
Surname Viet Given Name Nam (1985) as an example. According to Naficy postcolonial 
filmmakers “do not recover an existing past or impose an imaginary and often fetishized 
coherence on their fragmented experiences and histories. Rather, by emphasizing 
discontinuity and specificity, they demonstrate that they are in the process of becoming.” 
(Naficy 16)  Özpetek’s films perform an apparently contradictory, indeed two 
complementary gestures at a time. One is the idealization of homeland and nostalgia for 
a lost time and space, which must partially reflect the personal imaginary of the 
filmmaker himself, since he left Turkey when he was a young man. The second one is 
that the subject of enunciation authorizes both films from an exclusively Western 
position. As have been discussed in the previous chapters, the whole rhetoric of both 
films is mainly Western and they concentrate basically on Western protagonists, rather 
than pursuing the itinerary of non-Western characters.  No matter how contradictory that 
this simultaneous gesture seems to be at the first glance, I believe that  it illustrates the 
genuinely mimetic essence of identity construction and it could give us a hint about how 
the immigrant Turkish intellectual might easily  adopt the Western glance towards the 
Turkish culture and history  , which is very similar to the conventional  response of the 
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in-home Turkish intellectual towards  the confused, contradictory and complex history 
and condition of Turkish modernity and culture.  
 
Özpetek’s cinema, from the utterly Western position it occupies (not without unease and 
compromise for sure), is interested primarily with the story-telling function of cinema, 
not with the very conditions and problems of story-telling itself. As long as narration 
will be of primary interest, his cinema will respond to the conventional set of artistic 
problems that principally deals with how to master the audiovisual medium to convey 
the story in the best way. Özpetek’s cinema definitely accomplishes what it seeks and as 
long as it succeeds, it will certainly not inspire a radical critique of the very position it 
inhabits and not respond to the postcolonial critique of Orientalism.  
 
My discussion ends here. Yet there are obviously many points that inevitably could not 
be confined within the limits of this study. One, undoubtedly among many, is the 
question how the multilingual schema operates within the context of Özpetek’s cinema, 
how it complies with and subverts from the dominant Western subject positioning.  
Again, his other two films, La Finestra di Fronte and Le Fate Ignoranti  deserve a 
discussion regarding how they convey the Turkish and Asian (who constitute the other 
immigrant typology that Özpetek seems to be interested and includes in his films)   
immigrant and how they respond to his/her problematic condition within Italian society.  
I hope that this study will help to inspire following studies on films of Özpetek for his 
cinema provides an exceptional possibility to discuss emergent issues such as gender.  
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